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THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH:
MARKETS, RIGHTS, AND THE
POLITICS OF FOOD
SMITA NARULA*
In the pastfive years, interest in purchasingand leasing agriculturalland
in developing countries has skyrocketed. This trend, which was facilitated by
the 2008 food crisis, is led by state and private investors, both domestic and
foreign. Investors are responding to a variety of globalforces: Some are
securing their own food supply, while others are capitalizing on land as an
increasingly promising source offinancial returns. Proponents argue that
these investments can support economic development in host states while
boosting global food production. But critics charge that these "land grabs"
disregard land users' rights and further marginalize already vulnerable
groups: small-scalefarmers, pastoralists, and indigenous peoples who are
being displacedfrom their land andfrom resources essential to their survival.
Amid mounting global protests, two dominantframeworks have emerged to
assess and contest the global rush for agricultural land. This Article
critically examines both approaches.
Part I provides an overview of the drivers and impacts of large-scale
land transfers and the problematic land transactions involved. PartH1 sets
out the contours of what I term the market-plus approach and the rightsbased approach-theframeworks assumed respectively by proponents and
opponents of these deals. PartIII analyzes key conceptual diferences in each
framework's approach to rights and risks and to land distribution. I argue
that the market-plus approach tolerates and facilitates rights violations,
whereas the rights-basedapproach sets a normative baseline that repudiates
these impacts and addresses key distributive concerns. Part III assesses the
potential of each approach to effectively regulate land deals in practice. I
find that both approaches emphasize proceduralsafeguards to protect land
users' rights and argue that these safeguards are ineffective at contesting the
power dynamics at play in land transactions. Part IV proposes concrete
reforms to help empower communities most affected by land deals and argues
that internationalactorsmust be more involved in securingrightsprotections.

Associate Professor of Clinical Law and Faculty Director, Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice, New York University School of Law. For their insightful comments and helpful discussions,
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Global Land Rush
INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Saudi Star PLC leased roughly 25,000 acres of Ethiopia's most
fertile farmland from the Ethiopian government to produce rice for export to the
Middle East.' The investment sought to capitalize on Saudi Arabian state subsidies
for the foreign production of staple crops, which is part of the country's strategy for
ensuring its own food security.2 The Ethiopian government signed the Saudi Star
contract, and others like it, seeking to revolutionize domestic agricultural
production, employ local farmers, and produce more food for local consumption.'
Ethiopian officials claim that land earmarked for agricultural development is
"unused" or "under-utilized," and that no communities have been displaced as part
of the land deals.4 But investigations reveal that the Ethiopian government has
actively worked to remove communities from land that is earmarked for
commercial agricultural development. According to a report by the Oakland
Institute:
Prior to relocation, no community consultation was carried out, either by
Saudi Star or the government. Villagers only knew that their land had been
given to investors once the bulldozers began clearing the area. When they
expressed concern to the government about the clearing of their ancestral
lands, government officials reportedly replied, 'You don't have any land,
only government has land.'
Since 2008, the Ethiopian government has leased out at least 8.9 million
acres of land to foreign and domestic investors through arrangements like the Saudi
Star contract. At this writing, another 5.2 million acres were on offer through the
Ethiopian government's land bank for agricultural investment.6 In some regions,
the government planned to relocate 1.5 million people by 2013.' The relocation

Beth Hoffman, Saudi Company Leases Ethiopian Land for Rice Export, THE WORLD (Dec.
27, 2011), http://www.theworld.org/2011/12/saudi-arabia-leased-ethiopia-land-rice-export (discussing
the company's plans for the farmland); see also Andrew Rice, Is There Such a Thing as AgroImperialism?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/magazine/221andt.html?pagewanted=all (discussing Saudi Star's plan to purchase more than 1 million acres for overseas
crop production).
2
Oxford Analytica, Saudis Renew Search for Food Security, GULFNEWS (Apr. 23, 2009),
http://gulfnews.com/business/opinion/saudis-renew-search-for-food-security-1.65122; Rice, supra note
1 (discussing the Saudi Star's hopes of "capitalizing on the Saudi government's initiative to subsidize
overseas staple-crop production.").
Hoffian, supra note 1 ("Ethiopia has developed a comprehensive agricultural plan that
depends heavily on foreign investment.").
4
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAITING HERE FOR DEATH: DISPLACEMENT AND
"VILLAGIZATION" IN ETHIOPIA'S GAMBELLA REGION 3 (2011) [hereinafter WAITING HERE FOR
DEATH], http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0112webwcover_0.pdf.
OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA: COUNTRY
REPORT: ETHIOPIA 32 (2011) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT: ETHIOPIA].
6
WAITING HERE FOR DEATH, supra note 4, at 3; see also OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING
LAND INVESTMENT DEALS INAFRICA: THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION 2 (2011) [hereinafter THE MYTH

OF JOB CREATION].
The regions of Gambella, Afar, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz have been targeted for
relocation. See WAITING HERE FOR DEATH, supra note 4, at 19; see also COUNTRY REPORT:
ETHIOPIA, supra note 5, at 38.
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program, or "villagization process" in Ethiopia's Gambella region-the site of the
Saudi Star investment-has been particularly devastating for indigenous
communities cut off from sources of food, water, healthcare, and education.' Many
of these relocations have been forced and have taken place without meaningful
consultation or compensation.'
The Ethiopian government has reportedly
threatened, assaulted, or detained those resisting the relocation process. 0 As of
January 2012, government security forces enforcing the relocations were implicated
in at least twenty incidents of rape."
The Gambella regional government promised basic resources and
infrastructure in the new villages to which communities have been relocated, but
investigations reveal "inadequate food, agricultural support, and health and
education facilities."l 2 The jobs created will likely not compensate for the number
of people displaced," and water diverted from local farming and fishing to rice
production may force locals to compete for water in addition to land. 4 These
relocations also threaten many indigenous communities' way of life.'" For
example, the indigenous Anuak community practices a shifting form of cultivation
that is at odds with the sedentary nature of the relocation villages. Similarly, the
pastoralist Nuer community must now "abandon [its] cattle-based livelihood[] in
favor of settled cultivation."
These troubling developments threaten to destroy livelihoods and
exacerbate widespread hunger and malnutrition in a country that is already well
known for its cyclical famines." The lack of farms or food in relocation sites has
led one individual to comment: "Now we're living like refugees in our own
country."" Another displaced individual poignantly lamented: "The government is
killing our people through starvation and hunger ... we are just waiting here for
death."' 9 Because indigenous communities in Gambella lack formal title to the land
they have traditionally occupied,20 they have no redress in the form of expropriation
or compensation procedures under Ethiopian law,2' despite the Ethiopian
WAITING HERE FOR DEATH, supra note 4, at 3. Roughly 70,000 people
were slated to be
moved in Gambella by the end of 2011. Id. at 2.
SId. at 2.
o Id. at 2, 34-35.
Id. at 19-20. According to Human Rights Watch, these relocations are reflective of the
"Ethiopian government's longtime tactic of stifling opposition to programs and policies through fear
and intimidation," and its "longstanding history of military abuses against the local population." Id. at
32.
12
13

Id. at 2.
See THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION, supra note 6, at 2 (examining the number of jobs created

compared to the number of jobs promised and concluding that such promises are often overstated and
misleading).
14 Hoffman, supra note 1 ("[Mjany of the local Anuak tribe ... worry the rice will dry up the
water they rely on for their own farming and fishing.").
" See WAITING HERE FOR DEATH, supra note 4, at 16-18.
Id. at 3, 16-17 (noting that the Nuer community's culture and livelihood is "based largely on
finding grazing lands for the Nuer's cattle").
1
See id at 46 (noting that severe starvation would likely result from the lack of rain in
2011,
which had prevented farmers in Gambella from planting crops).
18 Hoffman, supra note 1 (quoting an Ethiopian woman from the Anuak tribe).
19
20

WAITING HERE FOR DEATH, supra note 4, at 45.
See id. at 4.

21

Id. at 72.
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Constitution's strong recognition of customary rights of land tenure.22 The
Ethiopian government's claim that these lands are uninhabited or underutilized also
thwarts the potential for constitutional and legislative protections. 23
Investors have expressed little concern for the rights of host populations24
and have instead praised Ethiopia for its low labor costs, tax and duty exemptions,
relaxed regulations, and abundant amounts of "undeveloped" land. 25 For its part,
the Saudi Star is hoping to expand its investment to 500,000 acres within the next
27
ten years.26 The going rate 26for this land is approximately $4 per acre per year.
The Ethiopian experience is not singular. In the past five years, interest
in purchasing and leasing agricultural land in developing countries has
skyrocketed. 29 The commodification of foreign land is admittedly nothing new, but
the scale and intensity with which recent investments have proceeded is startling.30
Reliable measurements are difficult to obtain, and even figures derived from incountry empirical research may underestimate the scale of investments because of
constrained access to data or the exclusion of deals that are still under negotiation.3 '
22
See id. at 7 I (noting that the Ethiopian government has failed to recognize traditional land
rights systems, instead deeming the land unused or underutilized).
23 Id. at 4.
24
In Ilea village in Gambella, "the Indian investor, Karuturi, has repeatedly stated that no land
has been lost, and no local people have been displaced" as a result of Karuturi's investment in Ilea.
COUNTRY REPORT: ETHIOPIA, supra note 5, at 44. According to the local people, however, the
village's communal agricultural crops and its royal cemetery were destroyed when Karuturi arrived in
the village and began clearing the land. Id.
25
See id. at 16. The government has also not placed any restrictions on investors' water use,
nor have investors completed environmental impact assessments for their projects. See id. at 1.
26
Hoffman, supra note 1 (discussing the plans for the leased Ethiopian land).
27
Ed Butler, Land Grab Fears for Ethiopian Rural Communities, BBC
(Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-l 1991926. The S4-per-acre figure is based on the conversion of
the $10-per-hectare amount cited in the article; one hectare equals 2.47 acres.
28 For example, in three case studies of land grabs in Cambodia, peasants were "notified of land
grabs by the arrival of bulldozers and excavators to clear the land." ALISON ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER,

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITHOUT OUR LAND? LAND GRABS AND RESISTANCE IN RURAL CAMBODIA 21
(2011).
29
Throughout the Article, I will refer to these transactions as "land transfers." Although land
can be transferred in any number of ways, I use the term specifically to describe the acquisition or lease
by state or private investors, both domestic and foreign, of legal interests in the agricultural land of a
developing country. These land transfers typically are negotiated by the developing country's
government, or sometimes, additionally, in consultation with proximal communities or individuals.

30

WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S

FARMLAND 4 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE RACE FOR THE
WORLD'S FARMLAND], http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ASIA-090629_Land%20Grab-rpt.pd
f; see WORLD BANK GROUP, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE
AND

EQUITABLE

BENEFITS?

9 (2010)

[hereinafter

RISING

GLOBAL

INTEREST],

available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/ESWSept7-final-final.pdf (noting that this
"'land rush' is unlikely to slow").
3 See LORENZO COTULA, LAND DEALS IN AFRICA: WHAT IS IN THE CONTRACTS? 12 (2011)
[hereinafter LAND DEALS IN AFRICA], http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12568IIED.pdf (noting the figures
"must .. . be treated with caution, as they may underestimate the scale"); FAO ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT THAT RESPECTS RIGHTS, LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCES:

EXTENDED VERSION 1 (2010) [hereinafter RAI PRINCIPLES] (commenting that though good numbers
are tough to come by, "it is true that some countries have been confronted with informal requests
amounting to more than half their cultivable land area"); see also GRAIN, LAND GRABBING AND THE
GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS (2011), http://www.grain.orgibulletin-board/entries/4429-new-data-sets-on-landgrabbing (pointing out that different studies provide disparate estimates on the geographic size of land
deals).
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All sources agree, however, that the amount of land being targeted for purchase or
lease is dramatic. According to the World Bank Group,32 foreign investors targeted
more than 56 million hectares (138 million acres) of agricultural land between 2008
and 2009.'" More than 75% of these deals took place in Sub-Saharan Africa.34
Another study notes that close to 60 million hectares (148 million acres) of land
were acquired in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 alone"--an area the size of Germany
and the United Kingdom combined.36
This trend, which was facilitated by the 2008 food and financial crises, is
being led by state and private investors, both domestic and foreign. In some cases,
investments are to produce food for export, while other investments are to produce
biofuels or to benefit from carbon emissions credits for clean development
mechanism projects. In still other cases, entities invest for purely speculative
reasons.38 The World Bank Group has helped facilitate these deals by actively
supporting the creation of investment-friendly climates and land markets in
developing countries. 39 This global drive to invest in land and boost agricultural
production is justified with reference to the ongoing food crisis, which has seen
basic commodity prices soar beyond the reach of vulnerable populations.40
Although renewed investment in agriculture presents a number of opportunities to
improve food security and promote economic development, few substantive checks
have been placed on these investments. As a result, in countries like Ethiopia, there
are "[1]arge discrepancies between publicly stated positions, laws, policies and
procedures and what is actually happening on the ground."4 '
A wealth of evidence-largely in the form of investment case studiesreveals that many large-scale land investments are not servicing the goal of
ensuring equitable development and sustainable food security in host countries and,
32 The World Bank Group consists of five organizations: the International
Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). About Us: Who We Are,
WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/BLDCT5JMIO (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). The World Bank
commonly refers to the IBRD and IDA.
About Us: What We Do, WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/7Q47C9KOZO (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). This Article uses the terms "World
Bank," "World Bank Group," and "the Bank" interchangeably.
3
RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at xiv.
34
id.

35 See OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD BANK GROUP 1 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP],
http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI1brief WorldBankGroupO.pdf.
36 See United Kingdom, CIA - THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/

library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (select "Geography" tab) (last visited Feb. 22,
2013); Germany, CIA - THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/gm.html (select "Geography" tab) (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
3
Although the media and case studies have largely focused on foreign or inter-regional
investments, these deals are also spurred by domestic investors or may be intra-regional in nature. See
WARD ANSEEUW ET AL., LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND: FINDINGS OF THE GLOBAL
COMMERCIAL PRESSURES ON LAND RESEARCH PROJECT 4 (2012) [hereinafter LAND RIGHTS AND THE
RUSH FOR LAND], http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ILC%20GSR%20

reportENG.pdf.

o
41

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See text accompanying infra notes 55-56.
COUNTRY REPORT: ETHIOPIA, supra note 5, at 1.
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in fact, may be further jeopardizing the rights of host populations. Land transfers
are taking place in countries already suffering from acute poverty, food insecurity,
and water shortages and in environments that lack oversight and regulation. Deals
often lack transparency, disregard land users' rights, and are concluded without
meaningful consultation with affected communities. These factors increase the risk
of serious human rights violations for host populations, further marginalizing
already vulnerable groups-small-scale farmers, pastoralists, indigenous peoples,
and artisanal fishers who are being displaced from their land and from resources
essential to their survival.42
The scale, scope, and impacts of these land transfers-both potential and
realized-have elevated the debate around large-scale land deals to the global
level.43 Many agricultural investments to date have been denounced by civil society
groups and farmers' organizations as "land grabs" that "depriv[e] the poorest from
their access to land, and increas[e] concentration of resources in the hands of a
minority."" According to one editorial on the issue, rural communities throughout
Latin America, Africa, and Asia "are being crushingly pushed aside in deals that are
forcing large-scale migration, violent conflicts, unemployment, deepening poverty

and hunger."45

In response to the din of local and international protest, two dominant
frameworks have emerged to assess and contest the global land rush. The first
approach, led by the World Bank Group, balances the harms arising from land deals
against the benefits of generating greater agricultural investment. This approach
privileges market-led processes as engines for economic growth and increased
agricultural productivity, but also recognizes the need for proper business, legal,
and regulatory environments to help investments flourish. This approach is attuned
to the rights and needs of vulnerable communities and readily acknowledges that
land deals entail significant risks. A heightened focus on rights and a more frank
acknowledgment of risks arguably distinguishes the current response of influential
international economic actors to land investments from the purely market-based
responses of past decades. 46 For this reason, and for the purposes of this Article, I
call this approach the market-plus approach. Such terminology recognizes the shift
in focus to impacts on local individuals and communities while remaining mindful
of the market-based foundations of the solutions offered.
See infra Parts .B and I.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
44
Olivier De Schutter, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Keynote Address at the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Commission on Investment: Enterprise and
Development: Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture 1 (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/260410_keynote-unctad-principles-responsi
bleinvestment.pdf. One such farmers' organization has launched a campaign against "land grabs."
See Press Release, La Via Campesina et al., Stop Land Grabbing Now!! Say No to the Principles of
"Responsible" Agro-enterprise Investment Promoted by the World Bank (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.landaction.org/spip/spip.php?article499. For more on La Via Campesina, see infra notes
410-13 and accompanying text.
45
Wendy Harcourt, Editorial: No More Black Fridays, 54 DEV. 1, 2 (2011), available at
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/development/journal/v54/nl/pdf/dev2010107a.pdf
46
For an overview of these responses, in connection to the issue of food security, see Smita
Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under InternationalLaw, 44 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 711-18 (2006) (describing this feature of the economics-driven approach to
food security). See also Saturnino Borras & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems
with a "Code of Conduct"forLand Grabbing,13 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 507, 512 (2010).
42
43
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The market-plus approach argues that if carefully disciplined and
appropriately regulated, large-scale land transfers can achieve win-win outcomes
for both the investor and host populations. It is argued that such regulation can be
achieved through continued facilitation of an appropriate investment climate and
adherence to a set of good governance principles. 47 The market-plus approach
treats land as a commodity and seeks to revitalize land that is deemed idle and
nonproductive to help boost global food production. The formalization of existing
land rights, as a means of both clarifying use and ownership rights and facilitating
land markets, is central to this approach.48
The market-plus approach's insistence that host communities' rights can be
protected through the creation of robust land markets, coupled with good
governance measures, has been met with great skepticism from the human rights
community and civil society groups. In response, human rights advocates have put
forward an alternate framework. This rights-based approach-which is led by the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food ("Special Rapporteur")-seeks to
focus the analytical framework on the positive fulfillment of human rights. Under
the rights-based approach, states' human rights obligations must trump other
considerations.
Land is also instrumentalized under this approach; access to land is seen as
a gateway to the realization of multiple human rights, including the right to food.
The rights-based approach encourages legal reforms to strengthen security of
tenure, and agrarian reforms that lead to more equitable distribution of land for the
benefit of small-scale farmers. This approach also encourages investments that
support small-scale farming, and that do not involve land transfers or evictions. To
the extent that large-scale land transfers do move forward, the rights-based
approach offers a set of principles for regulating these transactions-principles that
are grounded in and give expression to states' obligations under international
human rights law.49
This Article critically assesses both approaches. It is an important time to
undertake these assessments as countries and leading international bodies are
currently deliberating how best to move forward with reforms to agricultural
investment and land tenure policies. The Committee on World Food Security
(CFS), for instance, is preparing to undertake worldwide consultations to develop a
set of principles that will gamer broad ownership by states and other key actors.50
These consultations will consider proposals put forward under both frameworks."
47
See Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 514-15 (asserting that it is widely thought that using a
two-pronged approach-developing a favorable policy environment and establishing a code of
conduct-is a promising approach that benefits each party).
48
See infra Part II.A.
49 See infra Part II.B.
5o
Comm. on World Food Sec., Process of Consultation on Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment (RAI) Within the Committee on World Food Security, 4 (37th Sess. Oct.
2011); Comm. on World Food Sec., Final Report, 123 (39th Sess. Oct. 2012).
5
See id., at Appendix D: Proposed Terms of Reference to Develop Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment (noting that the principles will take into account the RAI Principles proposed
by the World Bank Group and will build on the FAO-formulated Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food
Security (VGGT).
The principles will also take into account existing human rights standards
concerning the progressive realization of the right to adequate food). The VGGT are a related set of
guidelines endorsed by the CFS in May 2012. Comm. on World Food Security, Rep. of the 38th
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But little effort has been made to consolidate all of the dimensions of the debate:
assessing the practice of large-scale agricultural land transfers from a broader and
more considered perspective; comprehensively documenting the harms to local
populations; attending seriously to the arguments of proponents; and critically
evaluating the recommendations of skeptics. This Article seeks to address this gap
in the literature, distilling and critically assessing the underlying normative
frameworks employed by the market-oriented international financial institutions
that facilitate these land transfers and the human rights advocates who oppose them.
The Article concludes with concrete recommendations for empowering affected
communities and securing rights guarantees, a challenge in a world where such
rights are so often inadequately protected.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the drivers and impacts of
large-scale land deals, and highlights problematic patterns that have emerged with
regard to land transfers and land-related transactions. Part II sets out the contours
of the market-plus approach and the rights-based approach, and explores the
principles endorsed by each approach for regulating land deals. Part III assesses
both frameworks, analyzes key distinctions, and surfaces overlapping problems. In
Part III.A, I examine differences in each framework's approach to rights and risks,
and to land distribution. I argue that the market-plus framework's balancing
approach both tolerates and facilitates rights violations, whereas the rights-based
approach-which is grounded in international human rights law-sets a normative
baseline that repudiates rights violations and addresses key distributive concerns.
Part III.B considers the potential of each approach to effectively regulate land deals.
I find that both approaches emphasize procedural safeguards to protect land users'
rights and conclude that these safeguards are insufficient for contesting the power
dynamics at play in land transactions. Part IV proposes concrete reforms to help
empower affected communities and argues that international actors must be more
involved in securing rights protections. I further argue that the agrarian reforms
promoted by the rights-based approach represent a more sustainable framework for
supporting substantive rights and achieving broader development goals.
I.

LARGE-SCALE LAND TRANSFERS: DRIVERS, TRANSACTIONS, AND IMPACTS

In the span of just five years, the global agricultural sector has been hit by
two interrelated phenomena: first, a dramatic and unprecedented rise in food prices
and, second, a renewed international interest in agricultural land investments.
These two trends are related in a complex and bidirectional manner. Studies have
identified multiple underlying causes of the global spike in food prices, including
long-term underinvestment in agriculture, higher fuel prices, climate change, the
diversion of food crops to biofuels, speculative investment, and an increased
52
A
demand for more resource intensive food in emerging market countries.

(Special) Session of the Committee on World Food Security, June 11-15, 2012, U.N. Doc CL 144/9
(May II, 2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/025/md958e.pdf; FAO, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES
ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT

OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2012) [hereinafter VGGT], http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/
i2801e.pdf. See also infra notes 452-54 and accompanying text.
52

HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT

To FOOD 7 (May 2008), http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/1-srrtfnoteglobalfoo
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number of these same trends, coupled with the international community's response
to the food crisis, have also served as drivers for large-scale land investments.
Notably, the investment that has taken place includes not only support and loans to
existing agricultural producers but also the purchase or lease of large tracts of
"underutilized" or "under-producing" agricultural land.
This Part details the causes and consequences of the rush to invest in
agricultural land. Part L.A offers an overview of the main actors and drivers behind
large-scale land transfers, providing essential background for the regulatory
measures and reforms that I later propose." Part I.B surveys the pattern of
problems that have emerged in relation to land transactions, and Part I.C highlights
the negative impacts of large-scale land transfers on host communities. These Parts
are offered to help contextualize subsequent analysis of the major responses to the

global land rush.54

A. Drivers and Actors Behind Large-ScaleLand Transfers

International food prices have been highly volatile since 2006, and in
2007-08 food prices soared, with basic commodities doubling their average 2004
prices." The surge in food prices led to widespread social unrest. At the height of
the crisis, food riots were reported in over 30 countries. 6 The global food crisis
generated an appropriately global response, which emphasized the need for greater
investment in agriculture in developing countries. The World Bank Group has been
at the forefront of this response.1
To help increase foreign direct investment in agriculture the World Bank
Group works through its private sector subsidiary, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), and its partner organization, the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service (FIAS), to provide direct financing and advisory support to agribusiness
operations." The IFC also assists developing countries in removing obstacles to
dcrisis-2-5-08.pdf; see also Amid Food Riots and Shaken Governments IFIs Scramble to Develop a
CoherentResponse, BANK INFO. CENTER (May 9, 2008), http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3763.aspx.
5

See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.

See infra Parts II and III.
FAO ET AL., PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: POLICY
RESPONSES 11 (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/pdf/InteragencyReport tothe G20 on
Food Price Volatility.pdf; FAO Food Price Index, FAO, http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfshome/foodpricesindex/en/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Food Price Index].
56 ANURADHA MITTAL, U.N. COMM'N ON TRADE & DEV.,
THE 2008 FOOD PRICE CRISIS 15
54
5

(2008) (noting that as of July 2012 overall international food prices were higher than they were on
average in 2008); Food Price Index, supra note 55.
5
See the World Bank's "New Deal for Global Food Policy," through which the Bank pledged
to increase its lending for agriculture in Africa from $450 million to $800 million. Robert B. Zoellick,
A Challenge of Economic Statecraft, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 2, 2008), http://go.worldbank.org/KRFP
Z40U30. The Bank's investments in agriculture and related sectors doubled between 2008 and 2012,
from $4.6 billion to $9.3 billion. See WORLD BANK, GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY IN AGRICULTURE
AND AGRIBUSINESS WORLD BANK GROUP LENDING TO AGRICULTURE app. B at 99 (2012), available

at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGPAA/Resources/AppendixB.pdf,
WORLD BANK, ISSUE
BRIEF: AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (2012), availableat http://go.worldbank.org/BR4V
X14IQ0.
See ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 35, at 1; Zoellick, supra note 57
(discussing the IFC as the private sector arm of the World Bank); see also IFC, GLOBAL
AGRIBUSINESS:

CREATING

OPPORTUNITY

IN

EMERGING

MARKETS

4

(2011),

available at

I11
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foreign investment, whether through legislative and policy reforms, or the creation
of investment promotion agencies.' Development agencies have also actively
6
facilitated agricultural investment in developing countries, ' as have foreign2
governments. Foreign governments provide critical financial support to investors
and help establish the regulatory framework to govern land deals through national
legislation and through intergovernmental agreements such as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs),63 cooperation agreements in agriculture, or other intergovernmental
deals. 4
These policies have made agricultural land investments even more
attractive to Western investors. With the certainty of a steadily rising demand for
food and emerging climate change markets, many Western investors increasingly
view direct investments in land as a safe investment in an otherwise shaky financial
climate. Investment and pension funds are now joining sovereign wealth funds
and individual investors in the pursuit of farmland." As of 2012, an estimated
fourteen billion dollars of private capital was invested in farmland and agricultural
infrastructure, and experts expect this amount to double or triple by 2015." These

http://wwwl.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/17blc500476244cdab45ef9022d5a78b/AgribusinessSingles-D
ec%2Bl4.pdfPMOD=AJPERES.
See SHEPARD DANIEL & ANURADHA MITTAL, (MIS)INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE: THE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION IN GLOBAL LAND GRABS (2010),

5

ROLE

http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/misinvestment-web.pdf (profiling IFC
initiatives that have helped encourage international investment in land by facilitating short- and longterm regulatory reforms in target countries).
60

ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 35, at 1-2.

In addition, the World Bank

Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insures foreign land transfers against
PROJECTS I
various political risks. MIGA, MIGA: GUARANTEEING INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING
20
12/01/17/000
(2011), http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
333038_20120117234859/Rendered/PDF/663360BRIOmanuOOBox365757BOOPUBLICO.pdf.
See generally OAKLAND INST., LAND DEAL BRIEF: THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 1
61
(2011), http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Olbrief role-of development
agencies_0.pdf (exploring the role of development agencies, multilateral institutions, and "socially
responsible" investment funds through a study of fifty land investment deals in seven African
countries).
Foreign governments act as investors and provide essential support to private investors
62
through subsidies, loans, guarantees, and insurance. Foreign government support is also provided
through export credit agencies in investor home states and investment promotion agencies in
investment host states. LORENZO COTULA ET AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?

AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA 27 (2009) [hereinafter

LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?], http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land-grab.pdf.
63

BITs create a set of legally enforceable rights for foreign investors against the host state. Id.

6

Id. at 29, 32-33.

at 32.
SHEPARD DANIEL & ANURADHA MITTAL, THE GREAT LAND GRAB: RUSH FOR THE
WORLD'S FARMLAND THREATENS FOOD SECURITY FOR THE POOR 4 (2009) [hereinafter THE GREAT
65

LAND GRAB], http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/pdfs/LandGrab

finalweb.pdf; GRAHAM ET AL., CSO

MONITORING 2009-2010 "ADVANCING AFRICAN AGRICULTURE" (AAA): THE IMPACT OF EUROPE'S
POLICIES AND PRACTICES ON AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY: LAND GRAB STUDY 51

(2010), http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/report-on-land-grabbing/pdf

ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 35, at 1.
See INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T & DEV., FARMS AND FUNDS: INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE
GLOBAL LAND RUSH 1 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter IIED, FARMS AND FUNDS], available at
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/171211lED.pdf; OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT
66
67

DEALS

IN AFRICA: DECIPHERING EMERGENT'S INVESTMENTS

IN AFRICA (2011), http://media.

oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/O1EAMBrief 1.pdf.
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investors understand that farmland and freshwater sources are strategic assets and
non-renewable resources, the demand for which is certain to grow."
Since the 2008 food crisis, certain states have also begun to seek
opportunities to invest in foreign farmland in order to secure reliable food sources
for their domestic populations. 6 9 This is particularly evident in relation to
investments made by many "resource-poor but cash rich" Gulf States"0 whose
scarce water and soil resources make them heavily dependent on international
markets for their food supply." Countries with food security concerns and fastgrowing populations, such as China, South Korea, and India, have also begun to
seek opportunities to produce food overseas.72
International and domestic responses to climate change have also triggered
a renewed interest in agricultural land. The surging demand for biofuels has led
investors to target vast tracts of land in developing countries for biofuel
production." Additionally, projects like the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development
Mechanism have incentivized some states to meet their compliance requirements by
launching emission-reduction projects abroad, such as planting forests in
developing countries.7
Implementation of the Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Scheme, which offers financial
incentives for preserving extant forests, may also prove to be a driver of large-scale
land acquisitions."

6
Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmlandand the Rights
ofLand
Users, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 504, 516 (2011) [hereinafter De Schutter, The Green Rush].
69 See Press Release, GRAIN, GRAIN Releases Data Set with Over 400 Global Land Grabs
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4479-grain-releases-data-set-with-over-400global-land-grabs (releasing a data set of over 400 large-scale land deals that have been initiated since
2006 and that have been led by foreign investors for the purpose of food crop production).
7o
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Addendum to Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principlesand Measures
to Address the Human Rights Challenge, delivered to the 13th Session of the Human Rights Council 7,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33/add.2 (Dec. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Large-scale Land Acquisitions and
Leases], available athttp://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305 a-hrc-13-33add2_land-principles en.pdf; LAND GRABBING AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS, supra note 31, at 10
(listing Gulf States' investments around the world by country).
1 THE GREAT LAND GRAB, supra note 65, at 2 (citing GRAIN, SEIZED!: THE 2008 LAND GRAB
FOR FOOD AND FINANCIAL SECURITY 9 (2008) [hereinafter SEIZED!]).
72 See Joachim von Braun & Ruth Meinzen-Dick, "Land Grabbing" by Foreign Investors in
Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities, IFPRI POLICY BRIEF 13, 1 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bpo3all.pdf (listing Chinese investment in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Philippines; South Korean
investment in Sudan; and Indian investment in Ethiopia).
73
The term biofuel refers to the range of fuels that are derived from
some form of biomass.
Investors are mainly from the private sector and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) member countries. THE GREAT LAND GRAB, supra note 65, at 4 (noting that
increased biofuel demand is largely a result of ambitious targets that certain oil-dependent countries
have established for biofuel production and for increasing the proportion of biofuels used in land
transport).
74 CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
CASE STUDIES ON AGRICULTURAL AND BIOFUEL INVESTMENT 3 n.19 (2010) [hereinafter FOREIGN
LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS], available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
landreport.pdf.
7
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Climate Change and the Human Right to Adequate
Food 4 (2010) [hereinafter Climate Change and the Human Right to Adequate Food].
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B. Land Transfers and Transactions:Documented Problems

The specific form and mechanisms of agricultural land transfers are quite
diverse. Land transfers can encompass a range of land use and ownership changes,
which are undertaken for a wide variety of reasons76 and which occur through
highly diverse legal and political mechanisms. Investors are national and
international, public and private, individuals, companies, and investment entities.
Precise legal arrangements are to a large extent dictated by national laws and
policies and can include contractual arrangements, long-term leases (some up to
ninety-nine years)" or outright purchase." The size of any single land deal can be
quite large, including deals involving 100,000 hectares" or even 600,000 hectares."'
These transactions may be mediated by a central government authority, approved at
a local governance level, or negotiated directly with a private title-holder. " Despite
this diversity, several clear and problematic patterns have emerged in relation to
land-related transactions.
Dozens of case studies across a range of industries and countries reveal that
large-scale land deals frequently disregard existing land users' rights, lack
transparency and accountability, and move forward without meaningful
participation by those most affected by these investments.82 In part these problems
arise because large-scale land transfers are taking place in countries characterized
by great inequities and in the context of extreme power differentials between the
actors involved. Investors may also be seeking out such asymmetries to secure
deals on the most favorable terms. The World Bank has found that investors have
primarily focused on countries that "failed to formally recognize land rights,""
76
Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, Towards a Broader View of the Politicsof Global
Land Grab 13-14 (Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies, Working Paper No. 001, 2010)
(systematizing land transfers into four main categories: food to food, food to biofuels, non-food to food,
and non-food to biofuels).
7
David Hallam, International Investment in Developing Country Agriculture: Issues and
Challenges, 3 FOOD SEC. 1, 2-3 (2011), available at http://www.maff.go.jp/primaff/meeting/kaisai
pdf/0903-3.pdf; see also Hoffman, supra note 1 (discussing Ethiopia's land lease).
78
LAND DEALS INAFRICA, supra note 31, at 75.
79 Id. at 13 (noting a 100,000-hectare project in Mali and citing LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT
OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 62).
so Hallam, supra note 77, at 2-3; see also OXFAM INT'L, LAND AND POWER: THE GROWING
SCANDAL SURROUNDING THE NEW WAVE OF INVESTMENTS IN LAND 18 (2011) [hereinafter LAND
AND POWER], available at http://oxf.am/4LX (analyzing a 600,000-hectare agreement between Nile
Trading & Development Inc. and South Sudan). According to one report, however, "the average sizes
of projects above 1,000 hectares are much smaller than what is suggested by media reports." LAND

DEALS IN AFRICA, supra note 31, at 143.

LAND DEALS INAFRICA, supra note 31, at 78.
See, e.g., FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 34 (concluding that
two key institutions, the Tanzanian Investment Centre and Tanzania's National Biofuels Task Force,
"should ensure the meaningful participation of affected communities in its work"); THE GREAT LAND
GRAB, supra note 65, at 4 (noting, for example, that leases have been made to Chinese rubber
manufacturing companies despite severe food insecurity); RUTH HALL, THE MANY FACES OF THE
INVESTOR RUSH IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 4 (2011) [hereinafter THE MANY FACES OF THE INVESTOR
RUSH] (noting that many deals are for land that is already occupied and claimed by local peoples);
OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND DEALS INAFRICA: LAND GRABS LEAVE AFRICA THIRSTY 1
(2011) [hereinafter LAND GRABS LEAVE AFRICA THIRSTY], http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oakl
andinstitute.org/files/OIbrief land.grabsleave africa thirsty_1.pdf (noting that "investors see Africa
as an 'uncrowded space of opportunities"').
83
RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 55.
81

82
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implying that investors are attracted to policy environments where protections for
host communities are weak.
Many host countries do not formally recognize the land rights of
populations that have customarily occupied and used the land and instead vest all
untitled lands in the state,8 4 thereby obviating the need for local approval for land
transfers. Under such circumstances, land users' rights may not be recognized,
resulting in displacement without compensation," as was the case in Ethiopia's
Gambella region.86 Moreover, many countries require that the government
expropriate the land before it is sold to private investors.8 1 State-sanctioned
evictions may be limited to public interest goals or may extend to encompass
private interests as well, in which case there are often significant conflict-of-interest
concerns. The way in which evictions actually occur does not necessarily comply
with the intent of governing laws, 8 and individuals' and communities' appeal rights
or access to judicial mechanisms may be limited."
Even where local land rights are legally recognized, they may not be
honored in practiceo or negotiations between investors and rights-holders may be
plagued with procedural flaws that taint the actual terms of the agreements.
According to a study of biofuel projects in Africa, host states frequently negotiate
with investors without first consulting local communities that rely on the land for
their survival." Further, because investor-state negotiations are often opaque,
affected community members are unable to discern the likely effects of the deals,
let alone participate in the process of shaping them.92 The extent to which
governments and investors are required to consult with local host communities also
84 LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at 50. A 2009 study of land deals in
Africa notes that the government of the state hosting a given deal is the typical land grantor, though
occasionally the grantor will be a private landowner. LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY,
supra note 62, at 65.
85 In Zambia, for example, most of the land is governed by customary rules that are not formally

recognized by the government. In such situations, communal resources and fallow land is "often
presumed to belong to 'the state' and communities may be deprived of their customary land rights
without consultation, consent or compensation." RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 98-99.
Because existing land rights are not clearly demarcated, there are also serious risks of corruption and
illegal land transfers in such circumstances. Id. at 98.
8 See supra Introduction.
87
RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at
5.
88
RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 71.
89 Id. The Bank study adds that land transfer approval processes are also "generally ill-defined,

centralized, and discretionary, with different parts of the same government often at odds with each
other." Id.
90 See, e.g., FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 43 (noting this

phenomenon in the context of the poor implementation of customary land rights protection contained in
South Sudan's Land Act, in which "the new laws are poorly understood and rarely applied"). But this
is not uniformly the case. Mexico, for example, has extensive programs to recognize and record local

land rights, with community representation and legal restrictions on large land transfers to outsiders.
As a result, most communities in Mexico opt to engage in joint ventures with outside partners rather
than transferring or leasing land outright. RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 4; RISING GLOBAL
INTEREST, supra note 30, at 62.
91 Sonja Vermeulen & Lorenzo Cotula, Over the Heads of Local People: Consultation, Consent
and Recompense in Large-Scale Land Dealsfor Biojiiel Projects in Africa, 37 J. PEASANT STUD. 899,

909 (2010).

92 Id.; see also LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 62,
at 68, 70-74
(noting many countries' weak community consultation requirements and stating that, "[t]here is a

general sense among observers that negotiations and agreements occur behind closed doors").
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varies considerably. Few states require significant input from the communities
most affected by the land deals, and the states that do require input often
inadequately enforce the protective measures included for the affected
communities' benefit. 13 Countries such as Ethiopia and Madagascar require
consultation with communities, but these processes may not be observed in practice
and may not amount to obtaining consent for the deals in question. Other countries,
such as Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, require consent, though it may not be
fully informed or free.94 In Tanzania, for example, a Swedish company seeking to
develop sugarcane-ethanol projects reportedly "paid villagers to come to town
meetings at which they voted on the project."" Some villagers were also reportedly
"unaware of their land rights when they provided their so-called consent."96
When affected communities are consulted, the timetables for concluding
transactions may be too short to allow for adequate input.97 Community elders or
elites are typically the only ones involved in the consultations, which tend to be
one-off events, and mechanisms to resolve divergent preferences amongst
Often, communities receive poor
community members are non-existent.98
information on the specific terms of the land deal.99 Inequities in land deals can
also stem from local, political, and social structures. In Mozambique, for example,
transfers of community land need the approval of only three to nine community
members.'" In such circumstances, traditionally marginalized or politically weak
community members may be excluded from decisionmaking processes as well as
benefits that accrue from the sale or lease of communal resources.
Furthermore, many contemporary land deals result in problematic contract
terms that may systematically disfavor local communities. In many cases, there are
no contracts.'9 ' When contracts do exist, they may fail to delineate specific
obligations or provide mechanisms for ensuring investor accountability.102 The
terms of the deals are often vague'os or clearly favor the investor.'" The benefits
that do fall to the host state may not reach the communities affected by the deals in

93
Even in countries with well-developed policy frameworks, these frameworks may not be
implemented in practice. Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at 909 (citing Tanzania and
Mozambique as examples).
94 Id. at 907.
9
See FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 13.
96
Id.
9 Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at 909.
98
Id., see also Saturnino M. Borras Jr. et al., The Politics of Biofuels, Land and Agrarian
Change: Editors' Introduction, 37 J. PEASANT STUD. 575, 586 (2010) (discussing divergent
preferences).
9 Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at 909.

1* RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 103.
"o' See, e.g., Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at 909 (noting in the context of biofuel
investments in Africa that agreements between the community and investors "are generally not
documented in formal documents or legally binding contracts").
102 See generally LORENZO
COTULA, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: How TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR FAIRER AND MORE SUSTAINABLE NATURAL

RESOURCE INVESTMENTS (2010) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CONTRACTS] (outlining and identifying

ways to alleviate key weaknesses in current large-scale land investment contracts).
103 Id. at 21.
10

Id.
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the first place.'s A land deal in South Sudan offers a case in point and
demonstrates that even where land users' rights are legally recognized'o' and
consultations are required, it still may not lead to favorable outcomes for host
communities.
In 2007, a Norwegian company began negotiations for a ninety-nine-year
lease to 179,000 hectares in Sudan's Central Equatoria State (CES). The company
aimed to establish a tree plantation and forest conservation project' and to earn
carbon credit subsidies.'o South Sudan features a decentralized land administration
system that allows local government units to take the lead in negotiating land
deals.'09 The deal was negotiated between the investor, the CES Ministry of
Forestry and Agriculture, and the affected community. The investor also enjoys
extremely close ties to the Ministry: The investor's Sudan Plantation Manager
formerly worked for the Ministry; the Director General of Forestry is a member of
the investor's board.no The year-long community negotiation process was
conducted through a local development committee, which "consulted with the
community through its traditional leaders."' But questions have been raised about
the inclusiveness of the process and whether the consent given was fully
informed." 2
The resulting Land Title Agreement, which is very general and only five
pages long,"' is characterized by a number of inequitable terms. The land rental
amount indicated in the investment agreement, for example, translates to
approximately $0.07 U.S. per hectare per year, rendering it little more than a
symbolic payment.114 The agreement also does not require any production of timber
for the domestic market. "' Further evidence of imbalance can be found in the
accompanying Community Support Agreement, which requires all able men and
women from the host community to contribute two unpaid workdays during the
first five years of the project to maintain the road to Juba County."'
Given the myriad land transfer and transaction-related problems detailed
above, it is perhaps unsurprising that large-scale land transfers have carried many
negative impacts for local populations, despite promises of mutual benefit. These
impacts are examined below.

o' Id. at 39, 42.
See supra text accompanying note 90.

106

107 FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
74, at 15 (citing GREEN
RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT 2008: COMPANY REPORT 2009, at 5 (Aug. 2009), http://www.green
resources.no/Portals/l/Reports/AR_2008_FINAL.pdf).
10 As of September 2010, the company was in the final stages
of securing title to the land.
FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 36.

'"

Id. at 43.

"o Id. at 52.
Id.
12Id. at 51-53.
"
For example, the Land Title Agreement commits the investor to providing employment
opportunities but does not provide any specific commitments in relation to that obligation in paragraph
4.5. See id. at I10-11.
114 Id. at 54.
"
16

Id.
Id. at 56 (citing the Community Support Program Agreement).
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C. Negative Impacts on Host Communities

The agricultural sector in the developing world has historically been underfunded,' 17 leading to a decline in agricultural production. Agricultural land
investments have the potential to create much-needed infrastructure and reduce
poverty in host states. They can, for example, generate employment, encourage the
transfer of technology, improve local producers' access to credit and markets, and
increase public revenues from taxation and export duties. They can also increase
production of food crops to supply local, national, and international consumers."
For countries acquiring land abroad to grow staple foods, such investments reduce
reliance on international markets and increase food security for investor-country
populations." 9
Although increased investment in land may have potentially beneficial
impacts for host communities, to date this potential has not been realized. 2 0 To the
contrary, the results for many of these communities have been far from positive. In
2010, the Bank published the findings of an in-depth study of agricultural land
investments in a controversial report entitled Rising Global Interest in Farmland:
Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? 21 The study finds that many

investments have "failed to live up to expectations and, instead of generating
sustainable benefits, contributed to asset loss and left local people worse off than
they would have been without the investment."l 22 Numerous other studies echo
these findings and conclude that host communities rarely benefit from these deals.' 23
In many cases, local populations lose their most fertile and profitable land
in acquisitions by foreign investors and national elites.124 Existing land users are
often displaced from land that they have occupied for generations, resulting in
diminished livelihoods and increased tenure insecurity.125 In fact, because the
targeted land is often irrigable and close to existing infrastructure, "conflict with
existing land users [is] more likely." 26 Compensation for resource loss is "rarely
adequate," because ownership rights are not recognized and the new agricultural
operations' real resource requirements, especially water, are not properly taken into

117
11

See Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 7.
Id. at 5; VON BRAUN & MEINZEN-DICK, supra note 72, at 2.

119 Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 6-7.

some cases, however, it may be too early for such assessments.
Press Release, World Bank, New World Bank Report Sees Growing Global Demand for
Farmland (Sept. 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/XWESRO2MTO.
122
RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 71. Investments reviewed in the Bank's Rising
Global Interest study "confirm widespread concern about the risks associated with large-scale
investments," including "weak land governance," a "lack of country capacity" to "manage large-scale
investments," problematic investor proposals, and "resource conflict with negative distributional and
gender effects." Id. at xxxiii.
123
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
124 LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at 4, 21 (stating that national elites
are "key players" in the investor spectrum); see also FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 74, at 99 (finding that in Mali, many land transfers go unnoticed and remain unpublicized as
investing local elites often acquire the land through informal channels).
125
See SEIZED!, supra note 71, at 9-10 (noting that by denying land users access to vital natural
resources, large-scale land transfers undermine local livelihoods and exacerbate tenure security).
126
LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at 4.
120
121
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account.127 Affected communities are often not compensated for their loss of
livelihood 28 and employment opportunities generated by the investment may be
limited or exaggerated, and may offer unfavorable terms, low wages, or be of a
temporary nature during the "initial construction phase."' Further, the number of
jobs created may not compensate for the impact of displacement. Such was the
case in Mali, where according to one study, the few thousand workers employed in
a land deal compensated neither for the displacement of 112,537 farm families, nor
for diminished access to food for well over half a million people.130
Though taxation and export duties may serve as a source of revenue for the
host state, tax revenues are often small because host country governments provide
tax incentives in order to attract investors. Taxes are also usually not payable until
the investor's operation becomes profitable, and weak enforcement mechanisms
often leave due taxes uncollected. Benefits such as duty-free equipment imports
and special free zones for agricultural products further decrease the government's
revenue."' The possible benefits of large-scale land acquisition can additionally be
subverted by the unpredictability of speculative foreign investments, 132 which may
fail to materialize or perform as promised.
The transfer of land to foreign investors-many of whom export all that
they reap-can also induce greater reliance on food imports,'33 especially for the
number of host countries that are already net food importers. '34 Food security is
additionally threatened by the loss of farmland-generated employment and
income. 1 In some countries, land transfers are undermining land reform gains"'
that are seen by some as essential to addressing the global food crisis.' Investment

127 Id. at 5.
128 See ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 35, at 6.
129 See OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA:
THE MYTH OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2011) (highlighting the pay disparity between smallholder labor and jobs

on large, mechanized plantations); Land Research Action Network, Global Land Grabs: Investments,
Risks, and DangerousLegacies, 54 DEV. 5, 6 (2011) (noting that employment opportunities tend to be
limited as companies often favor migrant workers over those displaced, and adding that employment
terms tend to be unfavorable, with limited security, safety, or pay).
130 THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION, supra note 6, at 5.
131 LAND AND POWER, supra note
80, at 11.

132 Vera Songwe & Klaus Deininger, Foreign Investment in
Agricultural Production:
Opportunities and Challenges, AGRIC. & RURAL DEV. NOTES: LAND POL'Y & ADMIN. (The World

Bank, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2009, at 2, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/3358
07-1229025334908/ARDNote45a.pdf.
'
SEIZED!, supra note 71, at 10.
134

Shepard Daniel, Land Grabbing and Potential Implications for World Food Security, in

34 (M. Behnassi et al. eds., 2011).
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Breaking the Impasse of the Food Crises (2011),
available
at
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1 324-breaking-theimpasse-of-food-crises; see also Land Research Action Network, supra note 129, at 6 (noting that
hunger is often not a production problem but an income problem, and adding that employment
opportunities tend to be limited as companies often favor migrant workers over the displaced).
136 See Daniel, supra note 134, at 32-33 (providing the example of the Philippines); see also THE
MANY FACES OF THE INVESTOR RUSH, supra note 82, at 18 (noting that land investment trends are
"unravelling the modest gains made in the [Southern African] region towards securing and
redistributing rights to land").
13 Daniel, supra note 134, at 33.
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
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in biofuels can also have implications for food security when arable land is diverted
from food to fuel production.'"
Large-scale land transfers can have a serious and negative impact on local
water supplies-though this has been explored in less detail than the issue of food
security. Abundant water supply is an important consideration for investors,
especially for the production of water-intensive biofuels.13 9 Host populations may
therefore face rising competition for limited water resources, 140 which in some cases
constitutes the most salient harm to a local community.14' The repercussions of
unsustainable water use can also extend far beyond farming, reaching both rural and
urban populations.142 In the longer term, there are also troubling signs that largescale land transfers have the potential to generate conflict 43 and contribute to
environmental harms.144 The potential for conflict is especially pronounced where
socio-economic and ethnic divisions are already profound and life-sustaining
resources are already scarce.145
Increased commercial pressures on land are particularly concerning for
communities with weak land rights protections and whose livelihoods and food
security depend directly on the land at stake. These include small-scale farmers
"who cultivate the land in conditions that are often insufficiently secure;" 4 6 herders,
pastoralists,147 and fisherfolk who are particularly dependent on grazing and fishing
grounds;148 and indigenous peoples and other communities who rely on the products
of the forest. 149 Women also face particular disadvantages in the context of these
See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR
8, 70-71 (2007) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008], available at
that
(noting
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR 00 book.pdf
competition between food and fuel production exists and observing that demand for agricultural
feedstocks for biofuel production induces supply shocks in food items that contribute to increasing
global food prices).
139 LAND GRABS LEAVE AFRICA THIRSTY, supra note 82, at 2.
140 See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 65, at 26-27 ("Some observers point out that in fact the
global land grab is rather a water land grab due to the fact that agricultural investment is pointless
without water.").
141 LAND GRABS LEAVE AFRICA THIRSTY, supra note 82, at 2.
142 Id. at 1.
143 See THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARMLAND, supra note 30, at 15 (reasoning
that "the
38

DEVELOPMENT

factors at play in most host countries-land, food insecurity, and poverty-make up a combustible mix
that could easily explode").
144 LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at 8. Some biofuels also contribute
significantly to climate change via greenhouse gas emissions. Claire Mahon, The Right to Food: A
Right for Everyone, in FOOD SYSTEM FAILURE: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF
AGRICULTURE 83, 89 (2011).
145 FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 38 (making this point in the

context of the influx of foreign investment in post-conflict South Sudan).
146 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, 65th Sess., 10, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,U.N. Doe. A/65/281 (Aug. 11,
2010) (by Olivier De Schutter), availableat http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20
101021_access-to-land-report en.pdf [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug.
2010)]; see, e.g., Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 11; Daniel, supra note
134, at 31-32 (concluding that there is clear evidence that many land-grab situations leave no room for
small farmers and providing the examples of Madagascar and Pakistan).
147 Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 7.
148 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,
1, 10.
149 Id.
10. Climate Change and the Human Right to Adequate Food, supra note 75, at 4 (noting
that the implementation of the REDD scheme in particular may "entail risks for forest dwelling
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deals.'o These same populations are also amongst the world's most food
insecure.
The severity of the negative impacts described above has sparked a heated
debate that centers on the question of whether these investments can deliver on their
promises of social and economic development and improved access to food, or
instead whether they represent one-sided deals designed to primarily benefit foreign
investors and domestic elites. Critics charge that large-scale land transfers are
focused less on promoting rural development, and more on facilitating the growth
of agribusinesses in host countries.'52 Critics additionally caution that such
investments may worsen food and energy crises,153 the very crises they seek to cure.
These charges have given rise to the label of "land grabbing" to characterize largescale land transfers-a term that is often ambiguously defined and that can
encompass a wide swath of land use and ownership changes, occurring through
highly diverse legal and political mechanisms. 5 4 Regardless of the labels
employed, all sides agree that urgent steps are needed to protect vulnerable host
populations. No global actor or institution denies that these problems exist, or that
there are serious, pressing issues that accompany land investment in developing

communities who have only weakly recognized customary rights over the forests they depend on for
their livelihoods").
150 Women are particularly at risk of losing their land in deals negotiated with the male heads of
households. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 65, at 32-33; Vermeulen & Cotula,supra note 91, at 904.
So-called "under-utilized" land may also primarily be used by women to provide basic household
resources such as water, firewood, or other fuel, or to provide traditional medicines. JULIA BEHRMAN
ET AL., THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp017.pdf; ANDREA ROSSI & YIANNA LAMBROU,
GENDER AND EQUITY ISSUES IN LIQUID BIOFUELS PRODUCTION: MINIMIZING THE RISKS TO
MAXIMIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES 6, 10 (2008). The shift from a reliance on local, traditional knowledge
of wild plants and small-holder farming techniques to large-scale, industrialized agriculture may also
disproportionately undermine women's traditional expertise and knowledge. ROSSI & LAMBROU,
supra, at 12. Social norms may prevent women from becoming paid-wage laborers, even though such
jobs are often cited as the main benefit of large-scale farming. BEHRMAN, supra, at 2. Even if a
woman is employed, she may receive less education, less training, and fewer employment benefits and
may be exposed to greater health and safety risks than her male counterparts. ROSSI & LAMBROU,
supra, at 14.
Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, at 16.
152SEIZED!, supra note 71, at 6, 10; LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at
4; see, e.g., Press Release, La Via Campesina et al., supra note 44 (arguing that such investment results
in the "long-term corporate (foreigii and domestic) takeover of rural people's farmlands").
153 Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 515; Press Release, Dakar Appeal Against Land Grab,
G20-Agriculture: Hundreds of Organizations Say STOP Farm Land Grabbing! (Jun. 20, 2011),
http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18827; see also OXFAM INT'L, "OUR LAND, OUR LIVES": TIME OUT
ON THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH 2 (Oct. 2012), http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-landlives-freeze-041012-en 1.pdf (noting that "[tiwo-thirds of agricultural land deals by foreign investors
are in countries with a serious hunger problem. Yet perversely, precious little of this land is being used
to feed people in those countries . . . .").
154 For example, the International Land Coalition defines "land grabbing" as acquisitions or
concessions of land which are one or more of the following:
(i) in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (ii) not based on free,
prior and informed consent of the affected land-users; (iii) not based on a thorough
assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the
way they are gendered; (iv) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding
commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on
effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.
INT'L LAND COAL., TIRANA DECLARATION 2 (May 27, 2011), http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/defau
It/files/aoml 1/TiranaDeclaration ILC_201 I-ENG.pdf.
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countries.
The appropriate response to this phenomenon, however, is
significantly contested, as explored in Parts I and III.
11.

CONTESTING THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH: MARKET VS.
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES

Two dominant frameworks have emerged that take distinct perspectives on,
and propose differentiated responses to, the recent flood of land deals: a market-led
approach and a rights-based approach. This Part examines the conceptual
underpinnings of each approach as well as the proposals put forward by these
frameworks to address the negative impacts of large-scale land deals. Part II.A
explores the market-plus approach and its treatment of land as a commodity. Part
II.B examines the rights-based approach and its treatment of land as a gateway to
the realization of a range of human rights.
A. The Market-Plus Approach

Led by the World Bank Group, the market-plus approach is essentially a
market-driven approach with a special sensitivity to the need for regulation. At the
most fundamental level, it privileges market-led processes as engines for economic
growth and increased food production. The market-plus approach is premised on
the idea that the market is the most effective mechanism for increasing global
wealth and that it is the most efficient distributor of that wealth. 5 6 If market
processes fail, however, then government intervention may become necessary to
mitigate any adverse impacts.
The market-plus approach takes existing distributions of wealth as the
baseline and seeks to ensure that populations, in the aggregate, are made better off
or at least not worse off than they were before. Here, progress is measured by
looking at averages rather than the satisfaction of individual entitlements to
resources.'
In seeking to promote general welfare, the market-plus approach
directly prioritizes securing a larger pool of resources so that there are ultimately
more resources to spread around. The market-plus approach accepts that there may
be trade-offs across individuals-and across states-reasoning that net increases in
welfare might offset contingent- declines. It also accepts that certain risks may be
*
*
-158
necessary in order to maximize economic gains.
Thus, in the context of land deals, the market-plus approach weighs the
possible harms (risks) of investment to affected communities against the possibility
that investment will produce economic gains (benefits) that will support the broader
public interest. In this case, the potential benefits include greater economic
development within a host country as well as increased food production for the
global population. As described in the next Part, proponents of the market-plus
approach see the commodification of land as central to achieving these goals.

15
156
15

See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
See Narula,supra note 46, at 702.
Id.

.. Id. at 703.
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1. The Market-Plus Approach to Land: Land as a Commodity
The land-as-commodity framework of the market-plus approach aims to
facilitate the flow of capital into developing countries while simultaneously pushing
for the increasingly efficient use of land.15 9 The logic of this approach proceeds as
follows: There are a number of obstacles to meeting future food demand, including
climate change and constraints on the supply of land, water, and energy. "0 These
hurdles, when combined with growing demand for food and uncertainty about the
future, make food prices more vulnerable to shock-induced fluctuation. 6' If we
eliminate market shocks by increasing investment to boost agricultural productivity
and build sustainable production systems, food prices should stabilize.162 What is
needed is a productivity revolution.'6 But greater yields can only be assured if
arable land is first identified, and then transferred to the most efficient user." To
achieve these ends, the World Bank Group has adopted a two-pronged strategy.
First, the World Bank seeks to identify agricultural land that can be used
more productively,"' as well as "marginal" or "unused" land that can be converted
to agricultural use, especially in Africa and Latin America. 6 6 The World Bank has
promoted a technocratic approach to achieving these aims, particularly through the
use of satellite imagery and agroecological zoning to identify areas where shifts in
land usage could make the land more productive.'6 The World Bank envisions that
information gathered through this technology, coupled with mappings of local land
rights, can help identify "underused potential" and help attract investors to farm the
land, contract with local farmers, or construct complementary infrastructure.'
Second, the World Bank promotes the formalization of land rights in order
to develop robust land markets and facilitate the transfer of land to the most

1" See generally HERNANDO

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY

OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM

TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000) (arguing that the formalization of

informal land titles facilitates the use of land as a commodity, enabling local populations to leverage
their land to their benefit); Songwe & Deininger, supra note 132 (exploring how development partners
can help protect local peoples by facilitating the necessary preconditions for investment, such as
enforceable property rights).
160 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138, at 62; FAO, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE

TOWARDS 2050, at 2 (2009), availableat http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues
papers/HLEF2050_Global Agriculture.pdf (stating that to meet the growing demand for food,
agricultural production will need to increase 70% by 2050 globally and by 100% in developing
countries).
16 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138, at 62.
162 WORLD BANK, GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY IN AGRICULTURE

AND AGRIBUSINESS:
EVALUATIVE LESSONS FROM WORLD BANK GROUP EXPERIENCE 22 (2011) [hereinafter EVALUATIVE

LESSONS], availableat http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGPAA/Resources/Agribusiness-eval.pd
f, RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 1; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138, at 69.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138, at 1.

See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
1s
166

EVALUATIVE LESSONS, supra note 162, at xi; Songwe & Deininger, supra note 132, at 2.
RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 125 (advocating that countries with a high level

of unused land should identify areas where investments can provide optimal benefits).
167 Id. at 78 (noting that agroecological zoning can be used to predict potential
yield for rain-fed
cultivation of wheat, maize, soybeans, sugarcane, and oil palms, and thus may be used to pick out plots
that are worthy of investment).
168 Id
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efficient producer.' 69 Agrarian communities in developing countries often employ
communal visions of land ownership that are not easily reducible to the
conventional Western property rights regime of individual land ownership. "0 Even
where property is not strictly viewed as a communal resource, title may be secured
by informal mechanisms, leaving local individuals' claims to property "insecure"
from a formal legal perspective.'"' In response, the World Bank has long promoted
and supported land registration and titling programs in line with the philosophy that
security of tenure can help facilitate integration into the market.172 Such integration,
it is argued, can contribute to poverty reduction and greater food security as: a)
farmers are incentivized to make long-term, productivity enhancing investments in
land; 7' b) farmers gain greater access to credit by using land as collateral; and c)
land markets transfer land to the most efficient producers.'
In line with its land-as-commodity framework, the World Bank Group has
actively facilitated large-scale agricultural land transfers in developing countries, as
detailed in Part I."' By 2010, however, the negative impacts of these land deals
were well-documented and the accompanying public alarm was widespread. The
World Bank's own studiesl 76 bolstered these concerns to such an extent that it
became widely acknowledged that safeguards had to be put in place in order to
ensure that the benefits would materialize while minimizing the risks.
"9 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138, at 138; see also DE SOTO, supra note
159, at 6; Olivier De Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale
Investments in Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 270 (2011) [hereinafter How Not to Think of
Land-Grabbing] (noting that here efficiency is understood as "price efficiency, or competitiveness,
rather than as resource efficiency").
170 DE SoTo, supra note 159, at 162 (claiming that the creation of one integrated property system
in developing countries is impossible due to the hundreds of informal systems existing across
communities); Land Research Action Network, supra note 129, at 8.
171 DE SOTO, supra note 159, at 6, 162; RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 3-4.
172 International financial institutions promoted land registration and titling as part of their
structural adjustment programmes of the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently in response to the
influential writings of Hernando de Soto. Amrita Kapur, "Catch-22 ": The Role of Development
Institutions in Promoting Gender Equality in Land Law - Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict Pluralist
Africa, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75, 81 (2011); Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic
Development in Theory and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1000-01 (2011) (arguing that because of de Soto's expressed fidelity to the
neoclassical belief in the centrality of property rights, his theory became highly influential in legal and
institutional reform programs in the field of development); see also DE SOTO, supra note 159.
"' KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 115-16
(2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-1295878311276/2
6384.pdf (arguing that improved security of tenure encourages small-holder farmers to invest in the
land). The document has not been approved by the World Bank's Board and thus is not an official
statement of the World Bank Group, but at least one commentator has noted that the report serves as the
World Bank's unofficial policy document on land issues. Keith Clifford Bell, World Bank Support for
Land Administration and Management: Responding to the Challenges of the Millennium Development
Goals 6 (presented at the XXIII FIG Congress in Munich, Germany, Oct. 8-13, 2006), available at
http://www.fig.net/pub/monthly-articles/november_2006/bell november_20061.pdf.
174 This set of hypotheses is grounded in a neoclassical economic approach that applies property
rights theories to the case of land, a philosophy that deeply informs the Bank's approach to agricultural
investment. Robert E. Smith, Land Tenure Reform in Africa: A Shift to the Defensive, 3 PROGRESS IN
DEV. STUD. 3, 211 (2003). The Bank recognizes that there may be merit in allowing small landowners
to maintain their ownership over agricultural plots since in many cases small-holders are in a better
position to make efficient use of their land, so long as the property rights regime that defines land
ownership creates a robust land market. RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 35.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
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2. "Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights,
Livelihoods and Resources"
In January 2010, the World Bank Group, together with the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) promulgated the "Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment
that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources""' ("RAI Principles"). These
voluntary principles, which build on similar initiatives aimed at promoting
corporate social responsibility in other industries,"' are intended to serve as the
basis for elaborating best practices, guidelines, governance frameworks, and
possible codes of practice for the private sector.7 9 The seven RAI Principles are as
follows:
1) "Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized
and respected";
2) "Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it";
3) "Processes for accessing land and other resources and then making
associated investments are transparent, monitored, and ensure
accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and
regulatory environment";
4) "All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from
consultations are recorded and enforced";
5) "Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry
best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared
value";
6) "Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and
do not increase vulnerability"; and
7) "Environmental impacts due to a project are quantified and measures
taken to encourage sustainable resource use while minimizing the
risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them.""
Fortified by the urgency to increase private investment in agriculture-and
in line with the land-as-commodity framework discussed above-the RAI
Principles endorse steps to create an environment that facilitates land deals while
mitigating their risks. RAI Principle 1 recognizes that many lands that are
classified as "empty" or "unoccupied" are in fact "subject to long-standing rights of
use, access and management based on custom."' Thus it asserts that "[e]xisting

" RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31.
"' Id. at 1 (referencing the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and the Equator
Principles as examples of such initiatives).
179 Id. at 2. The RAI Principles have garnered interest and support from a number of countries,
including members of the G20 who, as recently as June 2012, reaffirmed their commitment to the
Principles. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Principles for Responsible
AgriculturalInvestment (PRAI), http://unctad.org/en/Pages[DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx (last visited July 18,

2012).

1so RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 2, 6, 10, 13, 16, 18.
181 Id. at 2.
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use or ownership rights to land, whether statutory or customary, primary 18or2
secondary, formal or informal, group or individual, should be respected."
Reasoning that "[r]ecognition of rights to land and associated natural resources,
together with the power to negotiate their uses, can greatly empower local
communities," it calls on to states ensure that "land-related rights are recognized
and demarcated"; "procedures for transferring such rights are clearly defined and
applied in a transparent manner"; and "expropriation . .. is strictly limited to
situations that affect the public interest rather than routinely applied to transfer of
land to private investors."' RAI Principle 1 also urges that specific attention be
paid to the land rights of women, indigenous peoples, and herders. 84 Systematic
identification of rights holders and registration of land rights, per RAI Principle 1,
should ideally take place prior to consideration of investment proposals on the
reasoning that it will attract more investment.'
The RAI Principles also call for a number of good governance measures,
which are seen as conditions for enabling effective investment. RAI Principle 3
states:
Productivity growth through entrepreneurial activity, capital deepening,
and innovation is the primary driver of economic progress. Yet new
enterprise formation, operation, and profitability are all impeded by
deficiencies in the enabling environment, such as lack of clarity as to
property rights, difficulty in enforcing contracts, rent-seeking behavior, red
tape, slow judicial processes, and so on. It follows that establishing an
enabling environment for agricultural enterprise that encourages and
facilitates good investment is critical to achieving desirable outcomes.'
In order to achieve greater transparency, RAI Principle 3 notes that data on
land ownership and on land-related investments should be publicly available' and
investments should take place in an appropriate business, legal, and regulatory
(BLR) environment. Citing investor testimony that shortcomings in BLR
frameworks undermine their investments or deter them from investing all together,
RAI Principle 3 calls on host governments to work to improve tangible factors

182

Id.

"
184

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.

"

Id. at 3, 5.

Id. at 8. Such an approach is in line with the institutional economics approach of international
financial institutions (IFIs), which argues that economic growth is best promoted through legal
institutions that guarantee property rights, enforce contracts, and protect against the arbitrary use of
government power. Frank Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of
Chinese Growthfor Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 551, 562 (2009). See
also Ibrahim F. 1. Shihata, The World Bank and "Governance" Issues in its Borrowing Members, in
THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (Tschofen & Parra eds., 1991) (arguing that good
governance in borrowing countries is necessary for the World Bank's economic programs to be
effective); Thomas, supra note 172, at 997-98 (elaborating on the manner in which concepts of good
governance, rule of law, anti-corruption, and protection of property rights became the central tenets of
development policy reform programs).
"8 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 9.
186
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(such as those measured by the World Bank's Doing Business Indicators 8 ) as well
as intangible factors (such as "perceptions regarding a country's stability and
general business climate").

89

The RAI Principles also address the investors' role in facilitating
transparency and accountability in land deals. RAI Principle 4, for example, calls
on investors to engage in meaningful consultations with host communities. These
consultations should result in detailed and enforceable contractual agreements that
clearly delineate the intended uses of the land so as to avoid speculative
investment.190 In order to enhance the effectiveness of the consultation process,
RAI Principle 4 states that "definitional and procedural requirements in terms of
who represents land holders" should be clarified and groups affected should be
adequately represented and consulted in an ongoing manner on issues of project
design and selection of project areas."'
The RAI Principles additionally urge that investments should strengthen
food security (RAL Principle 2), "generate desirable social and distributional
impacts" (RAI Principle 6), and minimize environmental harms (RAI Principle 7).
RAI Principle 5 calls on investors to respect the rule of law and human rights and
cites in particular to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the language
of the U.N. Global Compact, which calls on businesses to "support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and to "make sure that they
are not complicit in human rights abuses." 92
In sum, the RAI Principles recognize the importance of protecting existing
land users' rights and propose that such protections can be delivered through good
governance measures, formalized property rights, and meaningful consultations
between investors and host communities.
B. The Rights-Based Approach
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has proposed an
alternative framework for assessing large-scale land deals. Instead of disciplining
and reacting to market failures, this rights-based approach prioritizes the positive
fulfillment of human rights.' The rights-based approach is premised on the idea
that individuals are entitled to specific rights guarantees that cannot be traded away
88 The "Doing Business" project ranks countries
based on investors' access to land markets as
well as the robustness of property rights. WORLD BANK & INT'L FINANCE CORP., DOING BUSINESS V
(2012), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/A
nnual-Reports/English/DB12-FullReport.pdf. But see Kevin Davis & Michael Kruse, Taking the
Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1095, 1104, 1117
(2007) (commenting that reliance on the Doing Business Indicators to advance concrete policy
proposals may be premature, and arguing that many different elements of a society's legal system come
together to shape economic or social outcomes, making it difficult to disentangle the relevant causal
relationships).
89 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31,
at 10.
19 Id. at 12. RAI Principles 3 and 4 note that investor incentives should be clear and effective
and should not facilitate speculative investment. Id. at 9-10, 12.

Id. at 10-11.
192 Id. at 14.

De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 506 (emphasizing the need to "link[]
the
narrow question of how to regulate large-scale investments in land to the broader question of how to
ensure security of tenure and the protection of land users").
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in the context of large-scale land deals. This approach begins by evaluating the
claims of rights-holders and the corresponding obligations of duty-bearers. It then
seeks to develop strategies that both build up the capacity of rights-holders to claim
94
their rights and helps ensure that duty-bearers fulfill their obligations.'
Specifically, the rights-based approach proposes strategies to secure and strengthen
the entitlement of relevant groups to land as a productive, rights-fulfilling asset.

1. The Rights-Based
Human Rights

Approach

to Land:

Land as

a

Gateway to

An explicit and substantive right to land is not codified under international
human rights law,' but secure and stable access to land is seen as a gateway to the
realization of numerous human rights, including: the right to water; 196 the right to
adequate housing;' 97 the right to health;'98 the right to an adequate standard of
living; 9 9 and, most especially, the right to food.2"0 The right to food is codified
194

See U.N. Office of the High Comm'n for Human Rights, The Human Rights Based Approach

to Development Cooperation:Towards a Common UnderstandingAmong the UN Agencies, at 3 (May

2004) (by M.L. Silva), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publicatio
ns/environment-energy/www-ee-library/exteral-publications/un-the-human-rights-based-approach-todevelopment-cooperation/LNCommonUnderstanding on-Human Rights-BasedApproach toDev
elopmentCooperation-andProgramming.pdf (noting, for example, that a rights-based approach to
development should assess and develop strategies to build the capacity of communities).
195 For more on this point, see infra Part IV.C.
196 Both the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Water and Sanitation and the U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ESCR Committee") have stated that people should not be
denied the right to water on the basis of their land status. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 29th
Sess., General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), at 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 5 (Jan. 20, 2003),

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458dldlbbd713fcl256cc400389e94;

Special Rapporteur on the

Promotion & Protection of Human Rights, Realization of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, at

8, U.N. Economic & Social Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm'n on Promotion &
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 (July 11, 2005) (by El Hadji Guiss6).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) monitors states'
compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In
fulfilling its obligations, the ESCR Committee began adopting General Comments "with a view to
assisting the States parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations." Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Rep. on the Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions T 49, Apr. 26-May 14, 1999 & Nov. 15-Dec.
3, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/11 (2000). While the status of the General Comments under
international law is unclear, and potentially contestable, General Comments still constitute carefully
considered and systematic analyses that emanate from an international body that is uniquely placed to
offer an interpretation of the norms contained in the ICESCR.
19
See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing
as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, at 13, 15, Economic and Social

Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/48 (Mar. 3, 2005) (by Miloon Kothari), available at
http://www.humanlaw.org/housing.pdf (commenting that homelessness is intimately linked to
landlessness, and that the displacement of communities as a result of large-scale development projects
can drive the poor to marginal areas for fanning and threaten social and ecological sustainability).
198 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,

30 (arguing that by

helping to secure food supplies, access to land can be a powerful guard against malnutrition, thereby
promoting the right to health).
199 Id. T 1 (arguing that access to land can help secure local livelihoods).
200 Id. 130 (arguing that access to land can promote the right to food by making food more easily
and cheaply available and by providing households with a buffer against external shocks, such as the
dramatic rise in food prices in 2008); see also id. TT 28-29 (arguing that broad-based and equitable land
access can further the right to development).
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under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),20 ' and requires states to ensure that individuals, either "alone or in
community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate
food or means for its procurement."202 Under international human rights law, states
must take measures to respect, protect, and fulfill this right. 203
According to the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR Committee),204 to further their obligation to respect the right to food, states
must "refrain from taking measures that may deprive individuals of access to
productive resources on which they depend when they produce food for
themselves." 205 The Special Rapporteur argues that respecting the right to food,
first and foremost, requires states to ensure security of tenure,206 and proposes the
following measures in that regard: First, states should confer legal security through
formal titles to land and recognize both use and ownership rights, as well as
customary and collective rights. 20 7 Second, states should adopt strict anti-eviction
laws and strengthen expropriation frameworks to provide clear procedural
safeguards for landowners. 208 Third, states should respect the needs of special
groups by ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples under international law209 and
Article II of the ICESCR states:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone
to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the
measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making
full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the
principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way
as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S.
Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978); see also S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). The right first
found expression in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
202 U.N. Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC), Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
201

General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, T 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/511 (1999)
[hereinafter GeneralComment No. 12].
203 This typology of states' duties was originally developed by the former Special Rapporteur on

the Right to Food, Asbjorn Eide. See ECOSOC, Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.

of Minorities, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Report on
the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987). It is

now a widely used framework for analyzing states' obligations generally, see InternationalHuman
Rights Law, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/

Professionallnterest/Pages/IntemationalLaw.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).

See supra note 196.
GeneralComment No. 12, supra note 202, 15.
206 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, T 40(a).
207 Id. 1 20-21; cf De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 538 (noting concerns over
customary land tenure and further adding that such customs can be discriminatory and "should not be
idealized").
208 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note
146, 1 40(a).
204

205

209

text.

For more on the rights of indigenous peoples, see

infra notes 375, 466 and accompanying
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by protecting access to common resources (including fishing and grazing grounds)
for fisherfolk, pastoralists, and herders. 2 10 Finally, respecting the right to food
requires that states "prioritize development models that do not lead to eviction,
21
disruptive shifts in land rights and increased land concentration."
In furthering their obligation to protect the right to food, the Special
Rapporteur counsels that states should protect access to productive resources from
encroachment by foreign and domestic private parties.2 12 This includes mapping
various land users' rights and strengthening customary systems of tenure, as
highlighted above. 213 The obligation also requires states to ensure that investment
agreements comply with relevant obligations under international human rights

law. 214

Finally, under the obligation to fulfill the right to food, states must "seek to
strengthen people's access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their
livelihoods, including food security." 215 The Special Rapporteur cautions that in
situations of highly unequal land distribution, efforts to secure tenure or land use
rights may not be sufficient to fulfill this obligation.2 16 Instead, states should pursue
"agrarian reform that leads to more equitable land distribution for the benefit of
smallholders" on the reasoning that small-scale owner-operated farms are more
217
The Special
productive and encourage more responsible uses of the soil.
Rapporteur encourages states to channel agricultural investment into small-scale
28
farming, instead of transferring land rights to large-scale investors. 1 To the extent
that large-scale land transfers do move forward, the Special Rapporteur also offers a
set of principles for regulating these transactions.

The Special Rapporteur argues that the "recognition of communal rights should extend
beyond indigenous communities, at least to certain communities that entertain a similar relationship
with the land, centred on the community rather than the individual." Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 40(c); see also Advisory Committee on the Right to Food,
210

PreliminaryStudy on the Advancement of the Rights of Peasantsand Other People Working in Rural

at
Areas, Human Rights Council $$ 70-72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC/6/CRP.2 (2010), available
2
6
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrcouncilladvisorycommittee/docs/session6/A.HRC.AC. .CRP.
.en.pdf (explaining that overcoming the problem of land insecurity requires agricultural reform that
benefits small land holders and a new international human rights instrument); De Schutter, The Green
Rush, supra note 68, at 537 (explaining that strengthening individual property rights may prevent some
groups, such as fisherfolk, from accessing rivers and the sea).
211 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, T 40(d).
212 Id. 2 (citing General Comment No. 12, supra note 202, 115).
213 Id. 14 1(a); see supra text accompanying note 207.
214 See infra Part II.B.2.
215 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 1 2 (citing General
Comment No. 12, supra note 202, T 15). In some instances states may also be obligated to provide food
directly in order to ensure rights are being met, for example when "an individual or group is unable, for
reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal." Id.
2.
216

Id.

27.

217

id.
218 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Rep. Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Food, 16th Sess., 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49 (Dec. 17, 2010) (by Olivier De Schutter)
[hereinafter SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Food (Dec. 2010)], availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/

english/issues/food/docs/A-HRC-16-49.pdf (arguing that investing in smallholder farming is more
effective at reducing poverty and combating hunger); De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at
507 ("[B]enefits ... could result from expanding support to small-scale farmers, in particular by
strengthening their access to land and water.").
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2. "Eleven Principles: Minimum Human Rights Principles Applicable to
Large-scale Land Acquisitions or Leases"
The Special Rapporteur's "Minimum Human Rights Principles Applicable
to Large-scale Land Acquisitions or Leases" ("Eleven Principles") are based onand give concrete expression to-minimum standards applicable to large-scale land
transactions as required by international human rights law. 2 19 Although the Eleven
Principles are seen as essential to minimizing the negative impacts from land deals,
the Special Rapporteur notes that adherence to the Principles does not necessarily
justify the land investment in question.22 Instead, states must "balance the
advantages of entering into [an investment] agreement against the opportunity costs
involved, in particular when other uses" of the land might better service the needs
and human rights of the local population. 22 1 Where large-scale land deals do take
place, the Eleven Principles call on relevant parties to meet their respective
responsibilities to:
1) Conduct investment negotiations in full transparency with the
participation of host communities;
2) Consult with local populations prior to any shifts in land use, with a
view towards obtaining their free, prior, and informed consent for the
investment project;
3) Enact and enforce legislation that safeguards the rights of host
communities;
4) Ensure that investment revenues are used for the benefit of local
populations;
5) Adopt labor-intensive farming systems that maximize employment
creation;
6) Adopt modes of agricultural production that respect the environment;
7) Ensure that investment agreements include clear obligations and
predefined sanctions, with non-compliance determined by independent
and participatory ex post impact assessments;
8) Ensure that investment agreements require that a minimum percentage
of food crops produced be sold locally;
9) Conduct participatory impact assessments prior to the completion of
negotiations;
10) Comply with indigenous peoples' rights under international law; and
11) Provide agricultural waged workers with adequate protection of their
fundamental human and labor rights.222
The Eleven Principles have much in common with the RAI Principles. For
example, both sets of principles call for transparency and consultation with local

219
220
221
222

Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
Id 1 9.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-18.

1 5.
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communities. 223 They both call for measures to enhance food security, 24 secure
land rights,225 and ensure sustainable environmental practices.226 Both sets of
principles also call for assurances that investments benefit host communities,227
including through investment agreements that contain clear enforceable
obligations.228
The fact that both sets of principles cover roughly the same terrain is not
surprising. Both the RAI Principles and the Eleven Principles are, after all, meant
to guide important transactional matters surrounding land deals. The Eleven
Principles-which preceded the promulgation of the RAI Principles 229-were also
intended to "inform ... the adoption of guidelines on land policies and governance
by international and regional organizations."230 Furthermore, the principles of
transparency, accountability, and participation-which both frameworks
emphasize-are key values common to both development and rights-based
discourses.'
The Special Rapporteur has pointed out that, despite "superficial"
similarities, his "minimum" principles differ significantly from the RAI
Principles.232 First, the Eleven Principles focus the inquiry on determining what use
of land will promote human rights. Thus, in line with the land-as-gateway
framework described above, 3 the Eleven Principles call for prioritizing alternative
development pathways that do not lead to significant transfers of land use and
ownership rights.234 Second, the Eleven Principles "are not optional; they follow
from existing international human rights norms" 235 and give rise to specific
obligations that attach to multiple actors, including host states, investors, investor
home states, and international financial institutions.236 By contrast, the voluntary
223

See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 16, princs. 1, 2; RAI

PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 8-13, princs. 3,4.
224 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 16, princ.
8; RAI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 6, princ. 2.
225 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 2, princ. 1.
226 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 18-20, princ. 7.
227 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 16-18, princ. 6.
228 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
PRINCIPLES. supra note 3p1at 10.
229 The Eleven Principles were released in 2009; the AI Principles were
230 Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 3-4.

at 16, princ. 3; RAI

at 17, princ. 6; RAI
at 16, princ. 4; RAI
at 17, princ. 7; RAI
released in 20 10.

Siobhan Mclnemey-Lankford, Human Rights and Development: A Comment on Challenges
and Opportunitiesfrom a Legal Perspective, 1 J. HUM.RTs. PRAC. 51, 53 (2009) (explaining that local
participation and accountability are well established in development discourse and also are rooted in a
rights-based approach to development); Narula, supra note 46, at 702.
232 How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 255.
233 See supra Part iplB. 1.
9.
234 Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70,
231

235

Id. 15.

The Eleven Principles note that the home states of private investors "are under an obligation
to regulate the conduct of these investors abroad, particularly if the host state appears unwilling or
unable to do so." Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, 5. The Eleven Principles
add that international financial institutions, which may be involved in facilitating and implementing
these investments, are also bound by international human rights law as part of general international law.
Id. Private actors, such as corporations, have not traditionally been viewed as directly bound by
236
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RAI Principles "neglect the essential dimension of accountability." 237 Though the
RAI Principles outline investors' responsibility to respect human rights,"' they are
silent on the human rights obligations of other actors.
These and other points of divergence and convergence between the two
sets of principles, and the frameworks of which they are a part, are analyzed in Part
III.
III.

ASSESSING THE FRAMEWORKS: PRINCIPAL DISTINCTIONS
AND OVERLAPPING PROBLEMS

This Part explores the relationship between the frameworks that undergird
the rights-based approach and the market-plus approach. Part III.A looks at key
differences in each framework's approach toward (1) rights and risks, and (2) land
distribution. Part III.B assesses the potential of each framework to regulate land
deals and protect land users' rights in light of the significant power dynamics at
play in land transactions.
A.

PrincipalDistinctions:Rights, Risks, and Land Distribution

1. Risks vs. Rights Violations
a. Framingand its Consequences

As described in Part I, the negative impacts of large-scale land transfers
include forced displacement and dispossession, loss of livelihood, and rising food
insecurity. The market-plus approach frames these harms as "risks" that must be
balanced against the benefits of investment, whereas the rights-based approach
frames these harms as violations of host populations' human rights. This Part
considers the consequences of such framing.
The market-plus approach expressly acknowledges the risks of land
investments, especially in circumstances "where rights are not well defined,

international human rights law, but support has recently emerged for the "Protect, Respect, Remedy"
framework, which would require corporations and other business enterprises to avoid infringing on
human rights and address the negative human rights impacts of their operations. See Rep. of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework, 16, Annex 11, Human

Rights Council, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding
Principleson Business], availableat http://www.businesshumanrights.org/medialdocuments/ruggie/rug
gie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf. As part of this framework, businesses should also "[sleek to
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts." Guiding
Principleson Business, supra, Annex 1 13. To meet these requirements, businesses must exercise due
diligence to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts. Id. Annex 17;
237 How Not to Think ofLand-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 255, 274.
238 See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 13-16, princ. 5 (noting that investors
have a high
responsibility to ensure that their projects minimize the impact on local communities and that investors
should respect human rights).
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governance is weak, or those affected lack a voice." 239 The RAI Principles note that
these risks include "displacement of local populations, undermining or negating of
existing rights, increased corruption, reduced food security, environmental damage
in the project area and beyond, loss of livelihoods or opportunity for land access by
the vulnerable, nutritional deprivation, social polarization and political

instability." 24 0
At the same time, the market-plus approach affirms the need for even
greater private investment in agriculture by highlighting the potential benefits of
investment at both the local and global level. The RAI Principles note that many
countries have benefited from investment through "better access to capital,
24
technology and skills, generation of employment, and productivity increases." '
The market-plus approach also promotes agricultural investment with reference to
global food security concerns:
The need for more and better investment in agriculture to reduce poverty,
increase economic growth and promote environmental sustainability was
already clear when there were "only" 830 million hungry people before the
food price rise [of 2008]. The case is even clearer today when, for the first
time in human history, over a billion people go to bed hungry each night.242
In essence, the market-plus approach argues that the risks inherent in these
investments must be balanced against the benefits and reflects the belief that these
benefits can in fact be achieved through such investment.243 This balancing
approach is not new, especially in the development context where cost-benefit
approaches tend to dominate.2 4 What is new is the elevation of the narrative of the
common good to the global scale. The potential benefits are not just national but
transnational. The implication is that the benefits significantly outweigh the costs.

239

RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 1.

240

Id.

241 Id.
242 RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at xii. The "over a billion" figure is based on 2009
FAO estimates. FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 11 (2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/
docrep/fao/012/i0876e/i0876e.pdf. In 2012, the FAO revised its estimates to indicate that nearly 870
million people were chronically undernourished in 2010-12. The new estimates are said to be based on
improvements in FAO methodology. FAO, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 1 (2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2845e/i2845e00.pdf
243

See Land Research Action Network, supra note 170, at 6 (noting that many land deals are

"ostensibly negotiated under the name of development, food and water security, agricultural investment
and energy security").
244 Doreen Lustig & Benedict Kingsbury, Displacement and Relocation from Protected Areas:
InternationalLaw Perspectives on Rights, Risks and Resistance, 4 CONSERVATION & SOC'Y 404, 412
(2006) (noting this phenomenon in the context of conservations and development-led displacement);
see also Smita Narula, The Story ofNarmada Bachao Andolan: Human Rights in the Global Economy
and the Struggle Against the World Bank, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 351 (Deena R.
Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009) (noting that the Indian government has maintained that large dams are
essential for achieving the "common good," which reflects the dominance of a "balancing" or "costbenefit" approach to development over an approach that puts human rights at the center of the debate).
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To be sure, the rights of host populations are considered under the RAI
Principles,245 but these rights are weighed against and sometimes sacrificed to
further other competing interests. As noted by land and rural politics scholars
Saturnino Borras and Jennifer Franco, potential infringements of human rights "are
(re)framed as side effects of an essentially beneficial cure-they are risks that can
be managed in order to make possible a larger good."2 46 The other factors against
which these rights are balanced-facilitating agricultural investment and boosting
global food production-are given equal, if not more, consideration than the rights
themselves.
This balancing approach is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it
tolerates rights violations. Human rights are framed as a dimension of development:
a single factor to be weighed among many, rather than a legal system that trumps
and a set of norms that gives rise to accompanying obligations. The rights of host
communities, or violations of those rights, do not necessarily determine whether a
land investment is desirable or should move forward; they are simply one among
many factors to be considered in a cost-benefit balancing exercise. In other words,
the market-plus approach does not give human rights normative weight as rights,247
thereby undermining both their status and vindication.2 48
Second, the balancing approach facilitates rights violations. Under the
market-plus approach, the character of large-scale land transfers is transformed
from that of a "threat" to an "opportunity"2 49 that must be facilitated and
maximized. Here, assessments about the potential benefits of large-scale land
transfers tend to be far more optimistic than current research warrants.2 so The
framing of rights violations as "costs," coupled with unwarranted enthusiasm about
"benefits," facilitates further rights violations as it serves to validate large-scale
land transfers even in situations where proper regulatory frameworks are not in
place to protect host community rights. Indeed the World Bank Group has taken
just such an approach.

245

For example, the RAI Principles call on investors to respect human rights. See McInerney-

Lankford, supra note 231 (noting that while "a majority of development policies ... incorporate human

rights concerns, many do so only implicitly").
246 Borras & Franco, supra
note 46, at 512.
247 See Lustig & Kingsbury, supra note 244, at 411, 412 (noting that the "focus on risks may
attenuate the focus on the rights of displaced persons" and adding that when rights have to compete
with other interests, the legal vindication of human rights claims are potentially restricted).
248

Id.
See Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 511 (explaining how "the phenomenon of landgrabbing takes on the character of an opportunity, rather than a threat").
250 The RAI Principles, for instance, continue to tout the benefits of large-scale investments, see
249

text accompanying supra note 241. This is despite the fact that the World Bank's research has
determined that these benefits in many cases have not materialized, see text accompanying supra note
122; Transnational Inst., Why So-Called "Responsible Agricultural Investment" Is to Be Stopped (Apr.

21, 2011), available at http://www.tni.org/article/why-so-called-responsible-agricultural-investmentmust-be-stopped (noting that the World Bank's research "could not find any convincing examples of
"wins for poor communities or countries, only a long list of losses"). See also Lustig & Kingsbury,
supra note 244, at 411 (noting in the context of development and conservation that legal institutions'
depiction of forcibly displaced communities can be "much more sanguine about the advantages of
being resettled and the consequentialist case for balancing, than experience so far warrants").
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An October 2011 Bank study25' reports the "rather surprising result" that
"weak land governance and protection of local land rights seem to be associated
with higher rather than lower levels of investment even once other factors are
controlled for."252 In other words, "in contrast to what is found for foreign
investment more generally, rule of law and good governance have no effect on the
number of land-related investment. Moreover, and counter-intuitively, we find that
countries where governance of the land sector and tenure security are weak have
been most attractive for investors." 253
These conclusions (unsurprising to some) would suggest that proponents of
the market-plus approach should advise against aggressive foreign direct
investment in agricultural land in situations where governance is weak. The World
Bank, however, continues to push for greater investment while simultaneously
amplifying calls for good governance and transparency, instead of pausing to reflect
on its strategy in the face of its own evidence that such reflection is necessary.254
The Bank adopts this attitude precisely because of how evidence of harm is treated
under a "balancing" or "cost-benefit" approach. Conceptualizing rights violations
merely as necessary risks allows for far less cautionary responses to the problems
raised by large-scale land deals. The result is that the rights of host populations are
inevitably sidelined.
In contrast to the market-plus approach, the rights-based approach is
grounded in international human rights law and many of the harms stemming from
large-scale land transfers are framed as rights violations. Specifically, the Special
Rapporteur argues that the detrimental impacts of land deals on host populations are
in direct contravention of a number of human rights, including but not limited to:
the right to food, the right to water, the right to be free from forced evictions, the
right to an adequate standard of living, the right to self-determination, and the right
to adequate remedy.255 This framing of harms as violations of international human
Rabah Arezki et al., What Drives the Global Land Rush? 8 (World Bank Series, Working
Paper No. 5864, 2011) [hereinafter What Drives the Global Land Rush?], http://elibrary.worldbank.org/
content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-5864.
252 Id. at 16.
253 Id. at 3; see supra text accompanying note 83 (noting that the World Bank's Rising
Global
Interest in Farmlandstudy similarly finds that investors primarily focus on countries that "failed to
formally recognize land rights.") (quoting RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 55).
254 The October 2011 study concludes that its finding, "which resonates with concerns
articulated
by parts of civil society, suggests that, to minimize the risk that such investments fail to produce
benefits for local populations, the micro-level and project-based approach that has dominated the global
debate so far will need to be complemented with an emphasis and determined action to improve land
governance, transparency and global monitoring." What Drives the Global Land Rush?, supra note
251, at 3.
255 See generally Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 10-11, 13-14
(explaining how large-scale land acquisitions and leases affect or have the potential to affect these and
other rights). See Philip Alston, InternationalLaw and the Human Right to Food, in THE RIGHT TO
FOOD 23 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds.,1984) (commenting that the right to selfdetermination, as defined by article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and article I of the ICESCR, may be violated when a state permits "the exploitation of the
country's food-producing capacity (natural resources) in the exclusive interests of a small part of the
population or of foreign (public or private) corporate interests while a large number of the State's
inhabitants are starving or malnourished."); Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap:
Women, Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262, 293 (1993) (arguing that the right to
self-determination cannot solely consist of territory, boundaries, and political institutions, but should be
defined in terms that recognize the needs of all human beings, including the right to live beyond the
bare minimum of survival).
25
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rights law triggers a far stricter standard of review: The Eleven Principles note that
"[a]greements to lease or cede large areas of land should under no circumstancesbe
allowed to trump the human rights obligations of the States concerned."256
Parts III.A.1.b-c argue that international human rights law can play a
crucial standard-setting role.257 By setting a normative baseline, human rights law
can help repudiate negative impacts and address key distributive concerns. When
assessed against states' human rights obligations, the nebulous language of risks
and benefits can also give way to more concrete assessments of whether large-scale
land transfers violate rights, or whether they contribute to their realization. Indeed,
in the absence of such a normative baseline, large-scale land transfers may continue
to exact a punishing toll on vulnerable host populations without generating the
promised benefits.
International human rights norms are also appropriate standards against
which investment projects should be measured.258 International human rights
treaties reflect both the consent and consensus of states around specific moral and
legal standards. Even where states have not ratified the relevant treaty, states may
be obligated to uphold rights that have become customary international law.259 At
the same time, the inquiry cannot simply rest on the appropriateness of using a
human rights framework; it must also consider whether such a framework is
sufficiently robust to accommodate necessary tradeoffs and to manage increasingly
interdependent global processes in which the rights of multiple communities-both
within and across countries-are at stake. Parts III.A.1.b-c therefore also raise and
respond to salient critiques of a "rights-as-trumps"260 approach.
b.

RepudiatingRights Violations and Managing Trade-Offs

The potential for greater food insecurity among host populations is one of
the most significant concerns raised by large-scale land transfers. An examination
of each framework's approach to this contentious issue also serves as a useful entry
point for illustrating the need for a normative framework for regulating these deals.
Consistent with the framework in which they operate, the market-plus
approach's RAI Principles apply a balancing approach to the issue of food security.
In practice, however, such an approach undermines the very assurances that the
Principles seek to deliver. RAI Principle 2 declares that investments should not
256 Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 15 (emphasis added). If
agricultural investment is to be responsible, the Special Rapporteur notes, then governments, in
collaboration with the international community, must first ensure that appropriate safeguards are in
place to promote responsible investment before moving to legitimize large-scale land investments;
otherwise, states would likely struggle to reform regulatory frameworks once investment agreements
are finalized. Id. 1 33.
257 As suggested by Mclnerney-Lankford, supra note 23 1, at 72, "the challenge presented by an
absence of legally established normative baselines in development is potentially answered by human
rights law."
258 See id. at 70 (commenting that "[a] legal approach offers a clear rationale for the relevance of
human rights to development. Which is simply that it binds as a matter of law and is therefore
obligatory").
259 I have elsewhere argued that the right to be free from
hunger, the minimum core content of
the broader right to adequate food, is such a right. Narula, supra note 46, at 80-84.
260 See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152 (Jeremy Waldron
ed.,
1984) (introducing a metaphor in which a right trumps nonright objectives).
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"jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it," 261' but does not mandate that
investments affirmatively enhance food security as a condition of investment. Nor
does RAI Principle 2 establish a minimum level of food security for host
populations. Instead, it offers "risk-mitigation measures"262 to guard against the
impacts of the land transfers that the framework promotes. Specifically, RAI
Principle 2 encourages stakeholder consultations and participation of local
government in project design and negotiation, and counsels generally that "negative
impacts on food security should be allayed as far as possible through adjustments in
design." 263 RAI Principle 2 additionally assumes that all risks can be adequately
addressed through the market, and fails to consider the dynamics that complicate
this narrative.2
Ultimately, it concludes that integration into the market is
necessary and notes, perfunctorily, that "there can still be winners and losers on the
regional level which must be dealt with."265
The Eleven Principles, on the other hand, reflect a "rights-as-trumps"
approach. They note that, "[s]tates would be acting in violation of the human right
to food if, by leasing or selling land to investors (whether domestic or foreign), they
were depriving the local population of access to productive resources indispensible
to their livelihoods. They would also be violating the right to food if they
negotiated such agreements without ensuring that this will not result in food
insecurity.... 266 As a result, the Eleven Principles insist that land transfers can
only be justified to the extent that they "improve local food security by increasing
productivity and serving local markets, while avoiding an increase in inequalities of
income in rural areas."26 In other words, under the rights-based approach, the
possibility of various benefits is insufficient to justify certain risks-specifically
those risks that threaten key human rights.
In response, proponents of the market-plus approach may argue that the
goals of investment are not only consistent with those of the rights-based approach,
but also mutually reinforcing. In their view, greater foreign direct investment in
agricultural land can boost food production and facilitate economic growth. The
short-term costs may very well be justified by these long-term gains. If large-scale
land transfers are restricted, the argument goes, it may actually diminish the welfare
of some host country populations, as well as populations abroad who rely on food
imports to assure their own food security. Just as a balancing approach is criticized

See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 7, princ. 2.
Id.
263 Id.
264 For example, the commentary to RAI Principle 2 suggests steps to improve people's ability to
purchase food, either through increasing crop yields with better inputs or technology, creating a better
local market, or linking people to more profitable distant markets. See id. But land investments often
diminish the ability of local producers to procure cultivable land, which in turn negates any benefits
that may come from increased market access. SEIZED!, supra note 71, at 9. See also discussion
accompanying infra notes 271, 289-92.
261
262

265 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 7.

Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, 15.
Id. T 8. Principle 9 of the Eleven Principles also calls for impact assessments, prior to the
completion of negotiations, "[i]n order to highlight the consequences of investment on the enjoyment of
the right to food." Id. at 17.
266
267
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for sidelining rights, a rights-as-trumps approach is critiqued for failing to
accommodate these necessary trade-offs.268
But the rights-based approach (and the legal framework on which it rests)
is far more nuanced than these objections suggest. First, the rights-based approach
does not reject the need for greater agricultural investment; to the contrary, it argues
that agricultural investment can help alleviate poverty if it is geared toward
supporting small-holder farming.2 69 Although some have called for a precautionary
approach, whereby all large-scale land acquisitions are discouraged,2 70 the rightsbased approach does not rule out large-scale land transfers per se. Rather, it calls
on states to be cognizant of their human rights obligations when evaluating their
agricultural investment policy choices.
Second, international human rights law recognizes that the fulfillment of
socio-economic rights will involve trade-offs among various goals. At the same
time, it sets specific thresholds to help guide this forward-moving process-a
threshold that is notably absent from the market-plus approach. In the long run,
large-scale land transfers may spur economic growth and increase food production.
In the interim, however, these transfers may result in greater food insecurity for
those unable to afford food at market rates27 and may give rise to a number of other
rights violations as land users are forcibly displaced from their land and sources of
livelihood.272 International human rights law repudiates these impacts. Even as it
gives states great leeway in fashioning economic policies to support the fulfillment
of human rights, it sets a floor of minimum standards that states must uphold.
The ICESCR calls on States Parties to ensure the "progressive realization"
of the rights contained therein, including the right to food.273 The full realization of
these rights, especially in light of resource constraints, will take time and will
involve trade-offs between various goals. However, international human rights law
establishes specific standards that must be met as these broader goals are
achieved.274 These standards impose specific conditions on how States Parties set

268 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The InternationalHuman Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,

15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 101, 113 (2002) (commenting that "[t]he absolutist legal vocabulary of rights
makes it hard to assess distribution among favored and less favored right holders and forecloses

.").
development of a political process for tradeoffs among them ...
269 See supra note 218. De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 548-49 (arguing that
"channel[ing] agricultural investment into small-scale farming ... aims to ensure that investment will

be directed 'toward the most poverty-reducing ends"').
270 See GRAHAM, supra note 65, at 9; La Via Campesina et
al., supra note 44.
271 On this point, Amartya Sen argues that efforts to combat hunger must focus on the
"entitlement" that each person enjoys over food, rather than the total food supply in the economy.
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 161-62 (1999). Because of low incomes, landlessness, or

other factors, the poor lack these entitlements and, as a result, experience greater food insecurity.
272 See, for example, the case of Ethiopia included in the Introduction to this Article. Under
international human rights law, evictions can only take place in exceptional circumstances, must meet

certain standards, and must be accompanied by full and fair compensation. See infra note 385.
273 ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 2(1).
274 For an interpretation of the legal obligations of ICESCR Article 2(1), see generally ECOSOC,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties
Obligations (art. 2, / 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General

Comment No. 3], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c I 2563ed
0052b664?Opendocument. Here, states must "move as expeditiously and effectively as possible"
toward the full realization of these rights. Id. 9.
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priorities in order to protect vulnerable communities who often lose out in
215
balancing processes.
Specifically, under the principle of non-retrogression, states must not
engage in conduct that deliberately allows existing levels of rights to regress. 276 As
noted by the ESCR Committee, "[a]ny deliberately retrogressive measure requires
careful consideration and needs full justification by reference to the totality of the
rights provided for in the ICESCR and in the context of the full use of the
maximum available resources." 277 Economic, social and cultural rights also include
a "minimum core" of attendant obligations that states must realize as soon as
possible.278 With respect to the right to food, states must, as a minimum core
obligation, "ensure for everyone under [their] jurisdiction access to the minimum
essential food that is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their
freedom from hunger." 27 9 And finally, states have immediate obligations to ensure
280
non-discrimination in the provision of economic, social and cultural rights.
Collectively, these standards set a normative baseline: a threshold below
which investments cannot fall. Here, states could argue that there are other means
to immediately ensure these minimum standards, including, for example,
compensation for loss of land or even the direct provision of food. Such
arrangements, however, rarely accompany large-scale land transfers, and they are
usually insufficient even when they do."' Furthermore, focusing solely on
minimum standards misses the point. Under international human rights law, states
must continually strive to achieve the full realization of socio-economic rights, to
the maximum of their available resources,282 rather than just settling for the bare
minimum."' This includes ensuring that investments help improve access to and
utilization of productive resources, and not simply ensuring that the investments do
no harm.284

Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Principlesand Guidelinesfor
a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, 22, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12 (2006),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf; see also Margot
Salomon, Why Should It Matter that Others Have More?-Poverty, Inequality and the Potential of
InternationalHuman Rights Law 11-12 (LSE Law, Soc'y & Econ., Working Paper No. 15, 2010)
(arguing that international human rights law rejects the argument that distributional equity must be
sacrificed in favor of rapid accumulation of national or global wealth).
276 See General Comment No. 3, supra note 274, T 9 (noting that retrogression should be
carefully considered); see also OHCHR, supra note 275, 1 21 (noting that "[t]he principle of nonretrogression of rights states that no rights can be deliberately allowed to suffer an absolute decline in
its level of realization").
277 GeneralComment No. 3, supra note 274,
9.
278 Id. T 10.
279 ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 11(2); General Comment No. 12, supra note 202,
6. The
ESCR Committee adds that if a state is unable to fulfill its minimum core obligation, it has the burden
to show that its failure to do so is due to reasons beyond its control and that it unsuccessfully requested
international assistance. GeneralComment No. 12, supra note 202, 17.
280 See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
282 ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 2(2).
283 See Salomon, supra note 275, at 8 (arguing that by focusing only on what is minimally
required, attention is directed solely at the position of the worse-off members of the global society,
rather than focusing on the overall inequality that characterizes the contemporary world order).
284 See supra text accompanying note 215.
275
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A third response to trade-off-related objections is that the market-plus
approach accepts trade-offs that may not even be necessary to secure certain utility
gains. As a case in point, the market-plus approach promotes large-scale land
transfers that often involve trade-offs between existing land users' rights and the
needs of populations abroad who rely on food imports to assure their own food
security. By contrast, and because it holds investment processes to specific
normative standards, the rights-based approach looks for methods that minimize
trade-offs. For example, in the case of Saudi investments in Ethiopia, the rightsbased approach would offer that large-scale land transfers to set up industrialized
plantations are not the only option. Investors might instead support the ability of
existing land users and small-scale farmers to make productive use of land in a
more sustainable manner, which in turn can help ensure the food security needs of
both Saudi and Ethiopian populations.
The market-plus approach does not give due consideration to these
alternative development pathways, and instead simply assumes that there will be
trade-offs, and that there will be "winners and losers on the regional . .. level."285
Dilemmas are of course conceivable under which it would be impossible to act
without violating someone's human rights. But rights violations under those
conditions are inevitable, and are different from the tradeoffs of concrete rights for
vague and uncertain gains endorsed by the market-plus approach. The key point is
that the market-plus approach accepts human rights violations even where they are
not strictly required: Its balancing approach undercuts the deontological quality of
rights and ultimately undermines their vindication. The rights-based approach
repudiates these violations and affirmatively looks for methods that minimize tradeoffs-methods that do, in fact, exist.
c.

Addressing DistributiveConcerns and Managing Conflicts Between
Rights Holders

The phenomenon of large-scale land transfers has also given rise to
significant concerns around the distribution of benefits and resources. Both
approaches purport to address these concerns but the market-plus approach
struggles with a range of distributive issues precisely because it lacks a normative
framework that would provide clear standards for assessing the impact of an
investment on host communities. As a case in point, RAI Principle 6 states that
investments should "generate desirable social and distributional impacts" and "not
285 See supra text accompanying note 264. As noted by Borras and Franco, "Proposals for a CoC
[Code of Conduct] for land deals necessarily operate within and seek to sustain or extend the existing
global industrial agro-food and energy complex" and "a priori dismiss[] the possibility of other
development pathway options." Supra note 46, at 515. The Bank argues that an effective land market
can facilitate productive collaboration between local land-holders and investors and achieve mutually
satisfying outcomes. RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 25-27. Though examples of
productive collaboration do exist, these are few and far between. See, e.g., FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND

RIGHTS, supra note 74, at 102 (describing a Dutch company's biofuel project in Mali that
focuses on local participation, including production, processing and consumption); LAND DEALS IN
AFRICA, supra note 31, at 26-27 (noting that land transfers executed at below-market prices fail to
incentivize business models that involve collaboration between investors and smallholders, and that
such collaboration is certainly not a universal component of land deal contracts); see also How Not to
Think of Land-Grabbing, supra note 169, at 259 (detailing how small-scale farmers are negatively
affected by competitive markets).
HUMAN
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increase vulnerability"28 6 but lacks a normative baseline against which such impacts
should be assessed. Instead, RAI Principle 6 encourages investors to make
decisions around benefit-sharing jointly with local communities, presumably
through the consultation process signaled in RAI Principle 4.287
This primary focus on the investor-community relationship promotes a
piecemeal, project-by-project approach where investors become the stewards of
economic development. Such an approach is neither appropriate nor viable.
Investors are not an adequate substitute for the state: They are neither charged with
the same level of human rights responsibility as the state under international law,
nor are they sufficiently incentivized to self-regulate or act in service of host
communities in the process of negotiation.288 Instead, investors' fiduciary duty to
their shareholders arguably puts profit-seeking ahead of the interests of the local
communities in which they operate. In addition, and without specific standards
against which to judge an investment's performance, both investors and states can
simply point to the terms of the investment agreement to show that they have
played their part-even though those terms may not adequately distribute benefits
in the host community's favor or may distribute them inequitably amongst domestic
constituencies.
This point, in fact, exemplifies a broader problem with the market-plus
approach on the question of the distribution of benefits. The market-plus approach
argues that large-scale land transfers can, among other benefits, stimulate economic
growth, increase agricultural productivity, secure better access to capital, and
generate employment opportunities.289 But these markers of success do not account
for the distribution of these benefits across individuals. Economic success is often
judged by an average measure of growth, such as a rise in gross domestic product or
per capita income. This focus on averages obscures the fact that economic growth
is rarely equitably distributed. 290 Even when average economic growth is high, it
often bypasses particular populations-populations that are disconnected from
market forces because they lack the requisite human capital.29 1 In addition, those
who stand to benefit from greater investment and employment opportunities may
not be the same individuals or communities who stand to lose their land and
livelihood in the transfer process.2 92 The market-plus approach may also fail to
RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 16, princ. 6.
287 See id. at 10, 16 (Principle 4, noting that sustainable investments should be conducted in a
286

participatory manner that reflects the local development vision and Principle 6, explaining how to
enhance social sustainability).
288

See, e.g., David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in

Developing Countries, 34 WORLD DEv. 868, 881 (2006) (arguing that information, transparency, and
disclosure are necessary but not sufficient to hold corporations accountable in their pledges of selfrestraint and voluntary compliance; because corporations face too many alternative incentives due to
market pressures, disclosure requirements need to be mandated and enforced by governments).
289
290

RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 1.
Narula, supra note 46, at 702; Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of

Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1451, 1482 (2000) (arguing that equating social welfare with
national wealth "overlooks distributive concerns" and that "efficiency-increasing measures such as
economic liberalization may exacerbate preexisting distributive inequalities").
291 Narula, supra note 46, at 702.
292 See supra Part I.C.; see also De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 548-49 (noting
that "the vast majority of foreign investment in agriculture goes to the creation of large plantations" but
the benefits of these investments rarely trickle down).
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address the role of discrimination against women or against particular ethnic,
religious, racial, or caste groups as a reason for their economic exclusion.
The rights-based approach, in theory at least, can help keep these
differentials in check by insisting on specific rights guarantees and on the nondiscriminatory grant of those guarantees.293 International human rights law
recognizes that states must pay heightened attention to members of vulnerable
populations. Specific covenants protect those members of the population that might
suffer from discrimination while also calling for positive measures to ensure the full
realization of their rights.294 Critics of the rights-based approach might argue that
such a framework, in application, engenders conflicts between rights holders.295 In
the context of large-scale land deals, for instance, potential conflicts exist between
the rights of individuals and communities, and between the rights of host state
communities and investor state communities. The rights-based approach, however,
is cognizant of-and attempts to address-these tensions.
First, the Special Rapporteur expressly acknowledges that "there is a high
risk that traditional, patriarchal forms of land distribution will be further legitimized
through the recognition of customary forms of tenure [that he advocates], in
violation of women's rights." 296 "Such risks," he adds, "should be addressed
through the inclusion of strict safeguards in the process of such recognition." 297
Specifically, he notes that such systems should be "carefully scrutinized and, if
necessary, amended, to bring them into line with women's rights, the use rights of
those who depend on commons and the rights of the most vulnerable members of
29

the community."

8

Second, the interdependent and global nature of these transactions might
engender conflicts between populations across states. In fact, the very language of
See infra note 294. Kirk Herbertson also commented
that:
Measuring projects by their potential to increase net social welfare-an aggregate
calculation-hides the distribution of costs among individuals and communities. Human
rights standards can complement an economic perspective by placing greater emphasis on
the individual and making sure that economic gains are not undermined by the creation of
other drivers of poverty, such as discrimination and exclusion.
293

KIRK HERBERTSON ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE WORLD BANK

GROUP 13 (2010), availableat http://pdf.wri.org/roadmap-for integrating-human rights.pdf.
294 General Comment No. 3, supra note 274, TJ 1-2; U.N. Comm.
on Econ., Soc., & Cultural

Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (art.2, 1 2, of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), $T
7, 8,

U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/
E.C.12.GC.20.doc; ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 2(2); Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of Discrimination (art.1, par. 1),

2,

U.N. Doc A/48/18 (Mar. 22, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/d7bd5d2bf
71258aacl2563ee004b639e?Opendocument; Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Nov. 10, 1989), available at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/3888b0541f8501c9cl2563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument.
295 As an example of this critique, see Kennedy, supra note 268, at 116-17, commenting that
"rights conflict with one another, rights are vague, rights have exceptions, [and] many situations fall
between rights" and arguing that human rights do not offer a pragmatic framework for addressing such
conflicts.
296 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 22.
297

Id.

Id. T 24. The Special Rapporteur adds in paragraph 31 that "land
reform may be seen as an
opportunity to strengthen access to land for women, particularly single women and widows." Id. 31;
298

see also De Schutter, The Green Rush, supranote 68, at 538.
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ICESCR article 11(2)(b)-which calls on States Parties to "[t]ak[e] into account the
to ensure an
problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries,
29 9
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need" -could be relied
upon by net-food importing states to argue that these investments service the
investor state population's right to food. The rights-based approach addresses this
conflict by endeavoring to accommodate rights-holders in multiple states, while
simultaneously insisting that in no state should people fall below a minimum
standard in terms of their enjoyment of the right to food. Specifically, Principle 8
of the Eleven Principles notes that when entering into agreements with net-food
importing countries, contracts should require that3the land investor sell a certain
minimum percentage of crops on local markets. " Furthermore, and as noted
above, the rights-based approach also looks for alternative development pathways
30
that do not give rise to such conflicts in the first place. '
There are additional examples of conflict in the proposals put forward by
the rights-based approach. The redistribution of land in favor of one constituency,
for instance, may lead to the deprivation of another constituency's rights; in
particular, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property and the right to be free
from forced evictions might be implicated. Even if such deprivations are meant to
further distributive justice goals, these efforts still can result in many rights
violations.302 To address these concerns, the Special Rapporteur calls for significant
30 3
In addition, the land rights of
rights protections in the process of redistribution.
ensure greater access to land
to
need
the
with
conflict
may
indigenous communities
however, does not have a
conflict,
This
communities.
for landless non-indigenous
solution.
prescribed
In the end, these are difficult questions that do not lend themselves to easy
answers. The rights-based approach recognizes that upholding rights for some may
risk the rights of others. There are also significant obstacles to implementing the
solutions offered to address some of these concerns, as discussed in Part III.B. But
from a conceptual standpoint, the fact that these conflicts exist should not invalidate
the rights-based approach; conflicts are, after all, intrinsic to any endeavor to
manage the distribution of limited resources across multiple stakeholders. The
299
300

ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 11 (2)(b).
It also notes that this percentage could increase if food commodities on international markets

reach certain, unspecified levels. Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 17,

princ. 8; see also id. at 16 ("Investment contracts should prioritize the development needs of the local
population and seek to achieve solutions which represent an adequate balance between the interests of
all parties."). The RAI Principles also suggest "call options," which could function like caps on

exports. RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 7. But see How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing,supra note

169, at 273 (criticizing the World Bank's approach because it leaves significant questions unaddressed).
301 See supra text accompanying note 285.
302 Zimbabwe, for example, was roundly criticized for its seizure of white-owned farms in 2000,
that led to a great deal of violence and instability and that resulted in the concentration of
process
a
many farms in the hands of President Robert Mugabe's political supporters. See Case Study: Land
Reform in Zimbabwe, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearighttolfour-b/ca
sestudy-artl7.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) (noting that shortly after land redistribution was
announced in 2000, the country plunged into recession and that significant violence arose as farms were
Land Takeover, a Golden Lining, N.Y.
taken by squatters); see also Lydia Polgreen, In Zimbabwe
72

TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0 / 1/world/africa/in-zimbabwe-land-takeovera-golden-lining.html?r-I&pagewanted=all (describing how small scale tobacco farmers who received
redistributed plots of land after 2000 have thrived in recent years).
303 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,
38.
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strength of the rights-based approach is its normative framework that compels
policymakers to endeavor to manage these dilemmas in a manner that prioritizes the
needs of the most vulnerable communities. The market-plus approach struggles to
protect these communities precisely because it lacks such signals and instead
operates in a non-normative framework that emphasizes average utility gains. As a
result, benefits are rarely equitably distributed and risks tend to be borne by the
same vulnerable groups.
The need to address distributive concerns is particularly salient in relation
to land access. As considered below, the market-plus approach's failure to identify
any substantive standard against which to assess the social and distributional
impacts of the market-or otherwise limit the vulnerability of host communities in
the context of these deals-has fundamental implications for the distribution of this
key asset.
2. Land Markets and Land Distribution
Access to land is of particular importance in the debate between the
market-plus approach and the rights-based approach. Land is instrumentalized
under both approaches as a means of enhancing welfare, but there are key
differences in how each approach defines welfare, which in turn informs their
respective approaches toward land distribution. The market-plus approach takes
current distributions of land as the baseline and does not consider the need for land
redistribution. Instead, as its name implies, the market-plus approach relies on the
market to distribute land to the most efficient producer. In contrast, the rightsbased approach, which values land as a rights-fulfilling asset, places great value on
how land is distributed and to whom. The rights-based approach makes the case for
alternatives to large-scale land transfers, calls for legal reforms to strengthen tenure
security, and promotes state-led agrarian reforms to support small-scale farming
and to achieve more equitable land distribution.30
These differences between the market-plus approach and the rights-based
approach underscore "a fundamental opposition between two concepts of security
of tenure; one oriented towards promoting land marketability through titling, and
the other oriented towards broadening the entitlements of relevant groups in order
to ensure more secure livelihoods."305 As considered below, these conceptual
differences, in application, can have a significant impact on the distribution of
land,30 ' which in turn can greatly affect substantive rights as well as productivity
goals.

3

See supra Part II.B.1.

305 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food

(Aug. 2010), supra note 146,
21; see also
Elizabeth Fortin, Reforming Land Rights: The World Bank and the Globalization of Agriculture, 14
Soc. & L. STUD. 147, 158-59 (2005) (demonstrating that the Bank's definition of security was
modified to include the ability of an occupant to sell and mortgage the land and critiquing this
definition as "stretch[ing] notions of 'security' so as to fit within policies of economic liberalization and
privatization").
306 Here I define distribution in both
use and ownership terms.
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The Market-Plus Approach: EnhancingProductivity or Exacerbating
Problems?

As outlined in Part II.A, the market-plus approach views land as a
commodity whose productivity must be enhanced in order to yield beneficial food
production outcomes. Greater yields, however, can only be assured if "available"
or "underutilized" land is first identified and then transferred to the most efficient
producer. Land titling coupled with robust land markets, proponents argue, can
help ensure efficient allocation of land. 30
This land-as-commodity framework gives rise to a number of distributional
concerns. First, land that is classified as underutilized is rarely truly available in the
sense of being unused. Land that may be deemed underutilized by World Bankstyle efficiency projections may actually provide essential support for local
populations, whether by supporting smallholders who work the land, or by
providing access to essential resources for fisherfolk or pastoralists.30 s From a legal
perspective, land may appear available because those who operate it do so under
some system of customary tenure that is not honored by the state and fits poorly
into a Western property rights regime. o The problem may be compounded by the
use of technocratic tools-such as satellite imagery and agro-ecological zoning-to
identify "underutilized" investment-worthy land.3"o Simply put, the satellite-level
appearance of disuse can be misleading."
Second, the prioritization of individual private property rights and the
formalization of land rights through titling programs may not recognize the myriad
and customary uses of land by rural communities.3 12 More fundamentally, land
titling may not lead to security of tenure."' To the extent that poorer landowners
are vulnerable to pressures to sell their land, titling can facilitate land transfers that
See supra Part II.A. 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-16, 42, 146-48; see, e.g., Hallam, supra note 77, at 5
(identifying this phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa); see also How Not to Think of Land Grabbing,
307

308

supra note 169, at 260 (commenting that the interest in investing in "under-utilized" land often ignores
perceived "non-productive" uses of the land).
309 See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 1 18; see, e.g.,
SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI'I:THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 93, 95 (2000)

(discussing how the historical system of land tenancy in Hawai'i, which was based on genealogy and
rank, was replaced with a system of private fee-simple landownership based on property ownership and
the market, resulting in massive displacement and land alienation for Hawai'i's indigenous population).
310 See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
311 RAI Principle 4 additionally endorses the use of satellite imagery by local officials to help

guide the location of land investments ostensibly in a manner that optimizes "agro-ecological potential"
and reduces conflicts. RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 11. At the local level, the use of satellite
imagery may also fail to promote efficient use of land or make formalization of land titling a more
expedient and equitable process. A study completed by Frank Upham and Leah Trzcinski on
Cambodian legal reform offers a case in point: The authors note that the software that professional
surveyors use may not be "flawlessly responsive" for local administrators unfamiliar with the
technology, and moreover, the land registration process itself may fall prey to corruption. Leah
Trzcinski & Frank Upham, Creating Law from the Ground Up: Land Law in Post-Conflict Cambodia
6-16 (Sep. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
312 See supra text accompanying note 308.
313 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Development-based Evictions and Displacement, 25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (2007), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/housing/docs/guidelines-en.pdf; Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, at 2.
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are inimical to their interests. Indeed, the more effective titling is at easing land
transfers, the more vulnerable poor landowners can become to such pressures.3 14 In
jurisdictions where access to titles tracks formal claims to land, titling can also
reinforce inequitable land distribution.315 The legal prioritization of individual
private property rights may also disproportionately advantage better-resourced or
elite sectors of the population."'
Here it is important to note that the market-plus approach's RAI Principles
do move beyond individual property rights. In an effort to better recognize land
users' rights and customary rights, the Principles broaden the categories of rights
that must be recognized and respected to include both ownership and use rights,
"whether statutory or customary, primary or secondary, formal or informal, group
or individual.""' Although this recognition is significant, it falls short in two key
respects. First, the RAI Principles still focus on existing rights and do not consider
the need for land redistribution. Second, the formalization of these rights is still in
service of integrating land users into the market, and facilitating the transfer of
land.3 ' Thus, although the RAI Principles' attention to the rights of land users and
marginalized communities is to be welcomed, the Principles still lack a nuanced
critique of the market and its distributional impacts. Moreover, in its own

314

Thus poorer landowners are often better off where selling land is made more difficult rather

than less. Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, at 11,

20; see also

De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 528; Fortin, supra note 305, at 164 (citing a 2003
World Bank study that indicated that land markets "are likely only to be used by the poor to sell their
land in the face of economic hardship and instability, their distress exacerbated by the permanence of
such a transaction").
3'

How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 269; see Fortin,supra note 305, at

170 (arguing that recognizing property rights and creating land markets in the context of extreme
inequality may prove to be a mechanism for reaffirming inequality rather than a mechanism for
redress); see also Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,

17 (arguing

that a focus on formal ownership can "confirm the unequal distribution of land, resulting in practice in
a counter-agrarian reform").
316 Small landowners, for example, may not be able to afford the costs associated with securing
title to their land. Annelies Zoomers, Globalisationand the ForeignisationofSpace: Seven Processes
Drivingthe Current GlobalLand Grab, 37 J. PEASANT STUD. 429, 432 (2010), http://farmlandgrab.org/

wp-content/uploads/2010/06/7-Processes-Driving-Global-Land-Grab.pdf, see also De Schutter, The
Green Rush, supra note 68, at 528. Domestic elites also often have easier access to the resources,
knowledge, and connections necessary to register land rights under formal legal processes. RISING
GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 99; see also Smith, supra note 174, at 213; Zoomers, supra, at

432 (showing that attempts to promote land titling in Africa have had a negative distributive effect
because "people with good connections, information and resources were able to register land in their
names, at the expense of others"). Even where property rights are demarcated and recognized, local
elites may be able to capture the community decision-making process to secure individual benefits from
communal land. RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 100. The titling process also can fall
prey to corrupt local officials. How Not to Think ofLand-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 269.
317 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 2, princ. 1; see also WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008,

supra note 138, at 139 (noting that individual titling can "weaken or leave out communal, secondary, or
women's rights" and that titling processes can be captured by bureaucrats and local elites and also
commenting that "although individual titling is still appropriate in many cases, it needs to be

complemented by new approaches to securing tenure").
m In similar fashion, the RAI Principles discourage expropriations not because they alienate
occupants from their land, but because "such centralization adds complexity and discretion [and] makes
direct negotiation" between investors and host communities impossible. RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note
31, at 5. A better solution, the RAI Principles argue, is for states to keep expropriation to a bare
minimum and regulate procedures for transferringuse rights. Id.
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programming, the Bank continues to prioritize and promote individual ownership
rights as the most "modem" form of landholding.3 9
The market-plus approach's land-as-commodity framework also gives rise
to a number of productivity-related concerns. The Bank's continued focus on land
titling and land markets is justified with regard to the need to boost food
production. Yet there are a number of ways in which land markets can actually
interfere with the productive allocation of agricultural land. For instance, land
markets may result in land being taken out of production, such as when investments
are made for speculative reasons or when food crops are diverted to biofuels, which
decreases productivity and increases landlessness among the poor.3 20 Land sales
also tend to favor those with greater access to capital and credit rather than those
who can make the most productive use of land.32 ' Small farmers may also be priced

out by land speculation.3 22
Further, the impact of titling on productivity is, at best, unclear. Studies
produced from 1994-2001 show few significant effects of titling on production.3 23
This may especially be the case when titling is promoted in isolation from other
policies that provide essential support to smallholder farmers, such as technical
assistance or access to capital.32 4 The World Bank's own study, which evaluated
the World Bank Group's activities in the agricultural sector between 1998 and
2008,325 does little to assuage these doubts. On the subject of formalization of land
rights, the study found that "[e]vidence of the impacts of [World Bank Group]
efforts on agricultural productivity is sparse . .. particularly for land administration,
because these projects do not typically have agricultural productivity as a core
objective to be monitored."326 The study concludes that Bank interventions have
performed "well below average" in agriculture-based economies, most notably Sub-

Saharan Africa.3 27

319 See Fortin, supra note 305, at 170 (commenting that even though the World Bank recognizes
customary rights, it still views individual ownership rights as the most "modem" form of landholding).
According to one World Bank study, eighty-five percent of stand-alone projects related to the World
Bank's agriculture-related lending between 1998 and 2008 focused on land administration and efforts
to clarify land rights. EVALUATIVE LESSONS, supra note 162, at 48. The study also notes that some
World Bank projects are "attempting to deal with formalization of rights under systems of customary
tenure" but adds that "these projects are fewer in number." Id.; see also Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitfrom Marx to Market, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621,

622 (1997) (arguing that when too many owners are given an exclusive right of use, the land tends to be
underused instead of being used most efficiently).
320 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,
19.
321

Id. (citing Celestine Nyamu Musembi, De Soto and Land Relations in Africa: BreathingLife

into Dead Theories About Property Rights, in MARKET-LED AGRARIAN

REFORM: CRITICAL

PERSPECTIVES ON NEOLIBERAL LAND POLICIES AND THE RURAL POOR 41 (Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. et

al. eds., 2008)).
322

How Not to Think ofLand-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 270.

323 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 174, at 211-12 (citing studies that found the effect of tenure
security on land improvements to be mixed).
324 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 1 19
(citing Nyamu
Musembi, supra note 321); How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 270.
325 See EVALUATIVE LESSONS, supra note 162,
at xii.

326 Id. at xii. The Bank has acknowledged that land sales markets have at times failed to
increase
productivity or reduce poverty but attributes these failures to capital markets imperfections and policy
distortions. DEININGER, supra note 173, at xxix.
327 Id. at x, xii, and xiv.
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The World Bank's approach to land productivity can also be critiqued for
its shortsightedness. The development of large-scale plantations for the production
of food, energy, and cash crops has already facilitated greater concentration of rural
land, turning small-scale farmers into landless agricultural laborers who can barely
eke out a subsistence living.3 28 Even as the Bank now calls for reinvestments in
agriculture and rhetorically supports small-scale farming as essential to
development and poverty reduction in agriculture-based economies,' it continues
to promote the development of large-scale, agribusiness-driven, export-oriented,
and capital-intensive farms over owner-operated, small-scale agriculture.3 30 This
default preference towards large-scale land transfers can undermine productivity
goals by concentrating land rights."' In the long-run, the development of largescale plantations can also threaten ecological sustainability while possibly
contributing to political and social instability.3
Ultimately, and as evidenced above, the market-plus approach does not
question its own underlying philosophy towards land markets and distribution,
despite the documented, significant problems with its approach."' The market-plus
approach also disregards an obvious and salient point: land is a finite resource.
Land cannot both be given away to investors and be made more available to local
users.33 4 Attuned to this reality the rights-based approach highlights the need for
policies that do not separate rural communities from land that serves as both a
primary asset and a vital social safety net. More fundamentally, the rights-based
approach takes a different starting point than the market-plus approach, asking first
whether underutilized land should be redistributed to small-scale farmers, rather
than simply assuming that land allocation should be market-driven.

Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,
1, 7; see also How
Not to Think of Land-Grabbing,supra note 169, at 270 (noting that "historically, the creation of a
market facilitating sales of land has led to reconcentration of land unless strong support is given to
328

small-scale farmers, particularly in order to allow them to have access to capital"). IFI-imposed
structural adjustment programs, along with the liberalization of trade in agricultural products, have also
turned a number of food-exporting developing countries into net food-importers over the past 20 years.
Smita Narula, Reclaiming the Right to Food as a Normative Response to the Global Food Crisis, 13
YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L.J. 403, 411 (2010).
329 Indeed the RAI Principles open with the statement that "investment to increase productivity
of owner-operated smallholder agriculture has a very large impact on growth and poverty reduction."
RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 1; see also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 138,
at 1 (noting that the use of agriculture to promote development and reduce poverty in agriculture-based

economies "requires a productivity revolution in smallholder fanning").
330

Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,

7.

331 Id.; see also infra Part

III.A.2.b.
332 As considered in Part I.C., in countries that already suffer from food and water shortages and
that are already starkly divided between the rich and poor, large-scale land transfers and the
displacements they often entail can have a polarizing effect, lead to political instability, and even result
in violent conflict
333 See John K. M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development and the Developmental
States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 91, 94 (1999)
(arguing that despite contrary evidence, free market development advocates continually make the faulty

assumption that Western-style property rights are necessary for economic development because of
biases embedded in the rule of law rhetoric).
334 De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 547.
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The Rights-BasedApproach: Making the Casefor AgrarianReforms

In line with its land as a gateway to human rights framework, the rightsbased approach seeks to strengthen rural communities' access to land while
minimizing the negative distributional impacts of the market. Specifically, the
Special Rapporteur argues in favor of limiting land sales in order to "protect
smallholders from pressure to cede their land" and to "protect use rights regarding
communal land and preserve communal forms of land management.""' In addition,
the Special Rapporteur urges states to "prioritize development models that do not
lead to eviction, disruptive shifts in land rights and increased land concentration"336
and to adopt strict anti-eviction laws and strengthen expropriation frameworks to
provide clear procedural safeguards for landowners. 3
The rights-based approach does not reject titling processes; rather, it calls
for greater recognition of use rights over full ownership rights, as well as customary
and collective rights as an alternative to individual titling.' Because land titling
can have a particularly detrimental impact on women, regardless of its form,' the
Special Rapporteur cautions that customary forms of tenure should not be idealized
and should also be reformed.34
Most significantly, the rights-based approach promotes land redistribution
through a state-led process of agrarian reform. Although redistribution arguments
rest primarily on the need to strengthen rural populations' access to land as a
primary rights-supporting asset, these arguments are also promoted by referencing
productivity and economic growth. Article 11(2)(a) of the ICESCR calls on States
Parties to "improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food
by ... developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the
most efficient development and utilization of natural resources."34 ' The Special
Rapporteur interprets article 11(2)(a) "as encouraging agrarian reform that leads to
more equitable distribution of land for the benefit of smallholders, both because of
the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity and because small-scale
farming (and linking farmers more closely to the land) may lead to more
responsible use of the soil."3 4 2 Equitable land distribution, the rights-based
335

Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146,

336

Id.

20.

3
Id. 40(a); Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, princ. 3; De Schutter,
The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 552; supra Part II.B.1.
338 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note
146,
20-21; De Schutter,
The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 538.
3
Because formal title to land is often solely listed with and held by the male head of
household, women are often effectively excluded from decision-making processes relating to family
property. Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at 904. Where property is held and distributed through
customary tenure systems, women often only gain access to land through their husbands or another
male family member. Susana Lastarria-Cornhil, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property
Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1322 (1997) (adding that under such circumstances,
privatization of land often consolidates property in the hands of male community leaders or male family
members, who can make legally-cognizable claims to property).
340 See infra note 383; see also De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 538.
341 ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 11(2)(a).
342 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 1 27. See also Special
16-20 (citing studies that show that
Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Dec. 2010), supra note 218, at
small-scale agro-ecological farming practices can significantly improve yields, in a sustainable
manner).
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approach argues, can help encourage economic growth, reduce rural poverty, and
enhance opportunities for the empowerment of women, among other human rights
benefits. This is especially the case when beneficiaries of such reforms are
"supported through comprehensive rural development policies," which provide
"support for land users in their utilization of the land."343
These arguments linking equitable land distribution with economic growth
find robust support in World Bank studies.3 44 One such study analyzed land
policies in 73 countries between 1960 and 2000 and showed that the growth rates
achieved were two to three times higher in countries where land distribution was
initially more equitable.345 Land reforms also proved successful in East Asia:
Following World War II, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan instituted redistributive
land reform that created highly egalitarian access to land.346 These reforms
equalized land assets and income distribution among rural society, which in turn
contributed to the "democratization and social and political stability in the postwar
era."3 47 Collectively, these examples evidence a large number of small, independent
farmers being more efficient overall than industrialized agriculture, even where
efficiency is defined by the market as promoting economic growth.3 48 When
efficiency is defined to include resource efficiency (as in managing agricultural
resources in a sustainable manner) or social and political stability, the results are
even further skewed in favor of independent smallholders.3 49
Ultimately, plausible empirical evidence suggests that it is possible to
pursue the market-plus approach's goals of stimulating economic growth and
increasing the productivity of agricultural land, while also improving local
populations' access to land and its resources. As such, the rights-based approach is
not only viable, but in some cases may be preferable, both for its means and its
343 Id. if 24, 37. The Special Rapporteur offers that such policies could, among other benefits,
enable smallholders to become more competitive against larger farms and improve smallholders' access
to credit. Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 38. On this point,
Robert Smith comments, "[i]f low credit uptake is the problem, then land tenure reform, especially in

the advanced form of titling [which is advocated by the market-plus approach], is an expensive
solution." Smith, supra note 174, at 216. Elizabeth Fortin adds that, "[r]ather than continuing to
advocate the use of land as a means of accessing credit, it would be better to concentrate research into
other, more desirable means of accessing resources." Fortin, supra note 305, at 162.
344 See DEININGER, supra note 173, at 18.
345 Id. at 18.
346 Keith Griffin et al., Poverty and the Distribution of Land, 2 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 279, 302
(2002); Cristobal Kay, Why East Asia Overtook Latin America: AgrarianReform, Industrialisationand
Development, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 1073, 1076 (2002).
347 Toshihiko Kawagoe, AgriculturalLand Reform in Postwar Japan:Experiences and Issues 35
(World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 2111, 1999). The Special Rapporteur notes that "[t]he
failure of Latin American reforms when compared with Asian reforms has been attributed to the fact
that Latin American reforms have traditionally focused solely on access to land, neglecting rural
development policies." Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, at 18
(citing DEININGER, supra note 173, at 146).
348
Frank Upham suggests that much of the explanation for the Bank's under-attention to the
policy implications of unexpected examples of economic growth and social advancement "lies in the
way economists understand the world. Put starkly, they simplify and generalize." Upham, supra note
186, at 593. The frequency of this issue is exacerbated by the World Bank's strong emphasis on
mathematical modeling and the fact that the World Bank has to "understand and act in the entire
world." Id. at 594-95.
349 De Schutter, The Green Rush, supra note 68, at 545-46 (arguing that "competitiveness should
not be confused with resource efficiency. While large industrialized plantations are more competitive,
they are less efficient per hectare than are small farms.").
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ends: It allows states to respect crucial individual and community interests, as
required under international human rights law, while arguably offering better results
in efficiency terms.
B.

OverlappingProblems: The Limitations ofProceduralSafeguards

As analyzed above, the market-plus approach and the rights-based
approach are conceptually distinguished in two key respects: their approach to
rights and risks and their approach to land distribution. At the same time, the
principles put forward by each approach similarly rely on procedural safeguards to
protect land users' rights, and on host states to create appropriate regulatory
environments and enforce these safeguards. Although these sets of measures are
intended to secure different substantive outcomes, they are each undermined at the
point of implementation because of the significant power dynamics at play. In the
context of these dynamics-and as evidenced by numerous case studies on largescale land transfers-procedural safeguards have not empowered affected
communities. Rather, such proceduralism has more often than not been co-opted by
powerful investors and domestic elites with the willing cooperation of the host
state.
1. The RAI Principles: A Misplaced Focus on Procedural Fairness
The market-plus approach assumes that robust land markets, coupled with
community consultations and good governance measures, can help mitigate the
risks and deliver the benefits of large-scale land transfers."o RAI Principle 1, for
instance, reasons that "[r]ecognition of rights to land and associated natural
resources, together with the power to negotiate their uses, can greatly empower
RAI Principle 3 adds that all processes governing land
local communities."'
transfers and investments should be "transparent, monitored, and [should] ensure
accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory

environment."3 52

Greater transparency and accountability are indeed goals worth pursuing,
especially as so many deals are characterized by a lack of transparency and rights
abuse."' There are also sound reasons to emphasize and seek to correct problems
within the legal and regulatory framework, since such deficiencies can greatly
undermine the human rights of host populations. The RAI Principles' focus on
good governance, however, is not framed as directly serving the rights of host
populations. Rather, it serves to facilitate greater investment,3 54 which in turn, the
350

See supra Part II.A.

351 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at princ.

1.

Id. at princ. 3.
353 See supra Part I.B.
354 See Land Research Action Network, supra note 129, at 9 (arguing that the RAI Principles
"are primarily concerned with facilitating enabling conditions for a 'stable and efficient investment
climate' for corporations, regardless of the production model") (citing LAND RESEARCH ACTION
352

NETWORK, WHY WE OPPOSE THE PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT (RAI)

In similar
(2010), http://www.landaction.org/IMG/pdf/FINAL _EnglWhy-we-opposeRAI.pdf).
fashion, the World Bank Group's "Investment Across Borders" [IAB] benchmarking initiative-
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market-plus approach argues, can benefit host populations if properly regulated.355
Here, regulation focuses largely on improving the process of large-scale land
transfers.
This focus on procedural fairness is a natural extension of the framework in
which the RAI Principles operate. In the absence of a substantive normative
baseline against which to assess the benefits and harms of large-scale land
investments, the discourse-around both the problem and the solution-shifts to
procedure. Although the RAI Principles acknowledge that large-scale land
transfers may have adverse impacts on host populations, they largely understand
these issues as arising from procedural problems: consultations either do not take
place, or are not meaningful; contracts either do not exist, or lack essential clauses
that would define parties' rights and responsibilities; and so on. Diagnosing the
problem as procedural naturally leads to solutions that focus on creating new or
better procedures, all the while leaving substantive considerations surrounding
project legitimacy unaddressed. In other words, the RAI Principles fail to question
the "why" of large-scale land transfers, focusing instead on the "how."
The RAI Principles' focus on procedural corrections over substantive
outcomes is exemplified by its approach to community consultations and
investment contracts. RAI Principle 4 calls for consultations with all those
materially affected and for the enforcement of agreements arising out of these
consultations. This recommendation responds to "an important initial lesson
emerging from case studies"-namely, "that even where community consultation is
formally required to approve land investments, it may not offer communities
adequate opportunities to either voice their concerns or hold investors
accountable."1 6 RAI Principle 4 thus attempts to remedy this problem by calling
for better consultations and procedural safeguards.' As considered below, these
solutions fall short in three key respects.
First, although RAI Principle 4 notes that the "consultative process should
allow communities to turn down investors if they so desire,""' it does not include a
requirement of consent, and instead focuses on the mechanics of the consultative
process."9 The distinction between consultation and consent is crucial, and this is
particularly true in the context of land deals. In order to be meaningful,
consultations must be undergirded by the ability of affected communities-both
legally and politically-to withhold their consent. Otherwise, consultations may
wherein a country ranks favorably only if investors have access to its land markets-focuses "primarily
on laws and regulations governing foreign companies' access to industrial land, and less on legal
protections for countries' citizens and environments." See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, INVESTING
ACROSS BORDERS 2010, at 1, 41 (2010), availableat http://iab.worldbank.org/-/media/FPDKM/IAB/D
ocuments/IAB-report.pdf.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
356 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3 1, at 11. For more on problematic consultations, see supra Part
I.B.
See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 11.
358 id.
In similar fashion, the World Bank's own internal policy around "involuntary settlement"
(Operational Policy 4.12)-which covers "economic and social impacts that both result from Bankassisted investment projects, and are caused by the involuntary taking of land"-does not include a
requirement of consent, only stipulating that "[d]isplaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and
should have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs."
WORLD BANK, OPERATIONS MANUAL 4.12 (2011), http://go.worldbank.org/96LQB2JT50.
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simply be reduced to box-checking measures, rather than delivering outcomes that
are chosen by affected communities."o
The second problem with the RAI Principles' approach to consultations is
that they do not envision community input at the most critical point in the policysetting process. RAI Principle 4 notes that investments should be "designed
consistent with local people's vision of development,"' and calls for the linking of
land transfers to "local land use and overall development plans;"3 62 the Principles,
however, are silent on the need for macro decisions around "overall development
plans" to undergo a meaningful, consultative process. Indeed there is little evidence
to show that in countries now being targeted for land investment, the initial impetus
to create land markets or make arable land available to foreign investors underwent
a deliberative and transparent process with affected communities.
The intimate connection to land-and its life-sustaining and identityforming qualities-certainly calls for greater deliberation with and input from those
who stand to be most affected by such deals. But such deliberation and input must
be ensured much earlier in the process so that economic planning itself becomes a
rights-promoting exercise. Consequently, community participation must occur at
the policy development stage rather than being relegated to consultations around
individual land deals that are taking place within this larger policy framework.
Accountability and transparency must also come into play sufficiently early in the
policymaking process such that there is ample opportunity for policies and
institutions that might be inherently weighted against marginalized communities to
be scrutinized and recalibrated before their implementation.
A third problem with the RAI Principles' approach to consultations is that
significant problems in the implementation and enforcement of consultation-related
rules and outcomes-i.e., contracts-are insufficiently addressed. Here, the rightsbased approach faces similar problems, especially with effectively implementing
some of the procedural safeguards reflected in the Eleven Principles, as explored
below.'6 In some cases, the problem is a rule-making one, meaning sufficient laws
or standards do not exist to mandate or guide consultations. But in many cases, the
problem is how these rules are implemented or enforced. Even when laws requiring
consultation are in place, they may not be enforced or may be implemented in an ad
hoc manner or in a manner that favors specific constituencies.
The World Bank itself acknowledges the limited impact of law on the
consultative process in land transfers. It notes,

360 See LAND RESEARCH ACTION NETWORK, supra note 129, at 9 (arguing that the RAI
Principles "do[] not recognize the rights of small scale, local food producers to secure productive
resources, to produce and be food self-sufficient through their own means, to safe and healthy
environments, and to the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent").
361 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 10.
362 id.
363 See, e.g., Borras et al., supra note 98, at 584 (noting in the context of the development of
biofuels that "[t]he opportunities of local people, or even wider social movements, to penetrate and
influence such policy processes remain limited").
'
See infra Part III.B.2.

154

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

49:1

[L]aws are often insufficient for ensuring that consultation is meaningful
and results in agreements that can be enforced. Even if consultations are
mandatory, their usefulness may be limited by a lack of clarity about who
must participate, what information needs to be made available beforehand,
and whether the output of such meetings is formally recognized or
enforceable."'
Even attuned to these problems, the solution the Bank proposes is a greater focus on
rule-making. To wit,
To be effective, consultations must be undertaken before approval, with
clear rules on who has to attend, what type of information has to be
available in advance, and how outcomes are to be recorded and enforced.
To improve the chances of a meaningful process and resultant benefit
sharing, local stakeholders need to enter consultations with a clear
understanding of their legal rights, the issues at stake, and the rules of
engagement. 366
The RAI Principles note that "consultation should ultimately lead to proper
contractual arrangements."
In fact, both the RAI Principles and the Eleven
Principles urge that contract terms be clearly stated and that agreements include
pre-defined sanctions in case of non-compliance.3 68 But the power dynamics
inherent in the very consultations that give rise to these contracts suggest that
agreements will rarely articulate terms that equitably share the benefits.36 ' Even if
such terms are articulated and specified in human rights terms,"o their enforcement
remains a significant concern.
For the market-plus approach at least, the current ineffectiveness of these
measures has not led to a reassessment of strategy; rather, it has simply given rise to
calls for more good governance measures"' and for more investment in agricultural
land. In simpler terms, this tautological argument proceeds as follows: (1) Good
governance measures are needed to create objective and predictable rules; (2) These
rules must be consistently followed and enforced by government; 372 (3) When these
rules are not implemented or appropriately enforced, more rules are needed to
correct for the initial failings of reform.

365
366
367

RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 106.

id.

367 RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 12.
368 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases,
supra note 70, princ. 7; RAI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 31, princ. 4.
369 See supra text accompanying
notes 101- 16.
370 See Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, princ.
7 (noting the need for

contracts to include "clear and verifiable commitments related to ... the long-term sustainability of the
investment and its compliance with human rights").
3 As a case in point, on the issue of lack of enforcement capacity, the RAI Principles point to
weaknesses in the judicial capacity of target countries that may make enforcement difficult and suggest
the establishment of alternative fora such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 12-13.
372 See Shihata, supra note 186,
at 85.
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Yet the deeper problems associated with land deals cannot be resolved by
rulemaking alone. As demonstrated by case studies discussed in Part I.B,
formalistic measures such as consultations and contracts do not help mitigate risk or
distribute benefits. Formalistic measures are often hampered by significant power
interests working to achieve competing goals. Moreover, adherence to formally
approved processes without sufficient attention to outcomes may help sanitize
problematic transactions, as investors and host states can claim that they have
abided by the rules and are therefore not responsible for any shortcomings in the
fact
project's success. In the end, the market-plus approach fails to consider the
73
outcomes.
substantive
improve
to
fail
may
that procedural fixes, on their own,
2.

The Eleven Principles: Procedural Means for Substantive Ends

The Eleven Principles offer a number of advantages over the RAI
Principles. They set a substantive baseline that must at least be met, if not
exceeded, in order for investments to move forward. The Eleven Principles' focus
on distributive concerns also makes them a more powerful framework for ensuring
adequate benefit-sharing-both between investors and host communities and
among various groups within host communities. Principle 1 of the Eleven
Principles calls on host states to first consider whether land can be put to other uses
that would better serve the long-term needs of the community and the "full
realization of their human rights."37 4 This framework puts the rights and needs of
affected communities at the forefront of the discussion about development policyrather than leaving the discussion of community interests to the negotiations around
individual land deals. The Eleven Principles also require that "any shifts in land
use can only take place with the free, prior and informed consent of the local

communities concerned,"3.. thereby affording affected populations far greater
agency in the decision-making process.
But the Eleven Principles, too, focus on procedural safeguards to protect
Like the RAI Principles, they emphasize the need for
land users' rights. 7
transparent negotiations, community consultations, and binding agreements" See Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 520 (commenting that an "uncritical belief in the basic
3
beneficence of formalistic and legalistic measures" raises significant concerns).
374

Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, princ. 1.

Id. at princ. 2 (emphasis added). The "free, prior, and informed consent" standard normally
attaches to indigenous populations under international law but according to the Special Rapporteur,
extending the requirement to other communities having a similarly strong relationship to the land on
which they depend for their livelihoods would be justified and would help to ensure that states and
investors seriously consider the human rights impacts of their land transfers. See supra note 210; see
37

also Antoanella-Iulia Motoc et al., StandardSetting: Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior

and Informed Consent 1 45 (U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Working Paper No. 1,
July 14, 2005) (commenting that "[s]elf-determination of peoples and the corollary right of free, prior
informed consent, is integral to indigenous peoples' control over their lands and territories, to the
enjoyment and practice of their cultures, and to make choices over their own economic, cultural and
social development" and clarifying that these rights "cannot be weakened to consultation of individual
constituents about their wishes").
376
The Eleven Principles are explicit about the procedural nature of their contribution: One of
the Principles' main aims is to "ensure that negotiations leading to land acquisition and leases comply
with a number of procedural requirements, including the informed participation of local communities."
Large-scale Land Acquisitions andLeases, supra note 70, at 1.
See id. princs. 1, 2, and 7.
37
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safeguards that may be similarly ineffective at contesting the power dynamics at
play. Like the RAI Principles, they also call on host states to implement a
multitude of legislative reforms. Whereas the RAI Principles call on host states to
create a proper business and legal environment to help facilitate land transfers, 178
the Eleven Principles seek the enactment and enforcement of legislation to
safeguard host communities' rights as ends unto themselves.37 9 Principle 3 of the
Eleven Principles calls on states to "assist individuals and local communities in
obtaining individual titles or collective registration of the land they use, in order to
ensure that their rights will enjoy full judicial protection."3 ' 0 These safeguards aim
to secure a rights-based conception of security of tenure, which as noted above, is
geared toward "broadening the entitlements of relevant groups in order to ensure
more secure livelihoods.""' In practice, however, these reforms may be contested
or co-opted, or they may be insufficiently enforced. This is especially true of
reforms that are aimed at strengthening tenure security, because land is both a
primary source of wealth and a primary site for power struggles. The three
examples below consider whether procedural safeguards can overcome these
complex power dynamics to recognize customary land rights; to secure community
consent; and to circumscribe forced evictions.
First, with respect to customary land rights, the Special Rapporteur
cautions that greater recognition of use and customary rights-which he advocates
as an alternative to individual titling-may disenfranchise some community
members, particularly women.382 The Special Rapporteur then proposes that such
problems "should be addressed through the inclusion of strict safeguards in the
process of such recognition." 3
But this proposal does not answer how such a
process might be managed and implemented. It also does not address whether a
top-down process can successfully navigate entrenched power dynamics. As
argued by Robert Smith, a scholar on African land reforms:
[T]he dynamic process of titling, especially if implemented with imperfect
governance, frequently reduces tenure security and equity although
designed to enhance both, and is unlikely to make efficient users win the
day .... If tenure insecurity is fundamentally due to an inability of rightsholders to get their rights enforced, whether the legal instruments are
customary or statutory, then the problem ultimately traces back to
powerlessness, and proposed solutions must address this.384

See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ. 3.
Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, princ. 3 ("In order to ensure that
the rights of local communities will be safeguarded at all times, States should adopt legislation
protecting these and specifying in detail the conditions according to which shifts in land use, or
evictions, may take place, as well as the procedures to be followed.").
3so See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ. 3.
378

381

See supra note 305 and accompanying
text.

See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
38Special

Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note
146,

see supra note 298 and accompanying text.
3
Smith, supra note 174, at 219.

22 (emphasis added);
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Second, with respect to consent, although the Eleven Principles set a much
higher bar by requiring the free, prior and informed consent of affected
communities, the Principles do not fully specify what community governance
structures would be necessary to ensure that consent is secured through a robust and
collective decision-making process. In fact, this remains a central question that is
left unaddressed by either approach. Land investments deeply affect communal
resources and often occur through traditional governance structures that may
sideline marginalized groups. In concrete terms, this means that the procedural
requirement for community consultation or consent will remain ambiguous, as will
any outcomes stemming from such consultations.
Third, with respect to circumscribing forced evictions, the Eleven
Principles reflect the human rights principle that forced evictions may only occur
States must ensure that evictions serve a
under extremely limited circumstances.
legitimate public purpose; are not discriminatory; meet the requirements of due
In other words, the
process; and provide communities with fair compensation.'
right to be free from forced evictions sets forth procedural standards that bar
evictions in some circumstances and permit them in others. Procedural safeguards,
however, can all too easily be co-opted by a state because its claims about what
constitutes a public purpose may not be easy to contest. Particularly within the
context of land investments, states could use the very general and under-scrutinized
87
language of "economic development" to justify takings in the public interest.
Indeed the model of economic development being promoted by the World Bankthat of foreign and private investment in agricultural land as an engine of
development and growth-allows for a liberal application of the public purpose
doctrine and for the transfer of communal lands to private commercial investors.

3. A Critical Challenge: Generating Political Will
Given the dynamics described above, it should come as no surprise that
neither set of principles has been effectively implemented in practice-a conclusion

385

Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, princ. 2. These conditions are

spelled out in the ESCR Committee's comment on the right to adequate housing. ECOSOC, Comm. on

Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing, U.N. Doc.

E/1998/22. Annex IV (1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/959f71e47628459680
2564c3005d8d50 (noting in General Comment No. 7 that states must refrain from forced evictions,
must use "'all appropriate means' to protect the right to adequate housing ... including the adoption of
legislative measures," must take legal measures against its agents or third parties who carry out forced
evictions, and must "ensure that legislative and other measures are adequate to prevent and, if
appropriate, punish forced evictions carried out, without appropriate safeguards, by private persons or
bodies"); see also Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, supra note 313 (providing, among others,

that evictions should only be carried out "for the purpose of promoting the general welfare"; should be
"reasonable and proportional"; and should be "regulated so as to ensure full and fair compensation and
rehabilitation"). Principle 2 of the Eleven Principles adds that evictions must also be accompanied by
alternative resettlement or access to productive land. See RAI PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ. 2.
386 See supra note 385.

387 In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court has defined "public use" as "public
purpose" and has found that the taking of property for the purpose of economic development can satisfy
the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
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that is confirmed by several recent case studies.'
Both sets of principles are
admittedly new. As with any set of guidelines, it will take time for them to
penetrate global processes and generate sufficient buy-in. Still, the key question
that arises is whether preliminary examples of non-compliance will simply be
repeated, or if instead there are realistic prospects that these frameworks will
constrain future land investment deals.'
The RAI Principles are voluntary in
nature, and there is currently no mechanism set up to monitor investor
compliance. 90 These Principles operate in a corporate social responsibility
framework, problematically relying on the self-regulation of the private sector.39'
The Eleven Principles help overcome some of the concerns associated with selfregulation by adopting an accountability framework in which states are called upon
to fulfill their obligations under international human rights law. But as discussed
throughout this Article, host states often lack the political will to follow through on
their human rights obligations in practice.
Indeed, an essential problem with both the market-plus approach and the
rights-based approach is that their proposed legal-and particularly proceduralreforms necessarily rely on the willingness of the host state to implement these
recommended measures. These approaches further assume a self-executing, trickledown quality of the law wherein top-down processes can effectively navigate
entrenched power dynamics. The problem raised by this assumption is not specific
to large-scale land transfers; it reflects a general shortcoming of both good
governance and human rights frameworks wherein the state is both the target as
well as the guarantor of the reforms promoted.392 But the state and its ruling elite
are not neutral agents of social change. To the contrary, state actors and domestic
elites may actually benefit from investors' unregulated behavior and as such have
little incentive to protect existing land users' rights. This may especially be the

3 See, e.g., OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING

LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA:

COUNTRY REPORT: SIERRA LEONE 2 (2011) (showing that land deals conducted subsequent to the
elaboration of both sets of principles exhibit many, if not all, of the traditional problems and are

seemingly unaffected by either framework).
389 On this point, critics have pointed out that the simple promulgation
of the Eleven Principles
may not be enough to safeguard against the detrimental aspects of large-scale land acquisitions. See,
e.g., GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 65, at 8, 9 (noting for instance, the difficulties posed by delays caused
by interweaving the implementation of regulations that conform to the Eleven Principles with other
national policies and the inability of governments to enforce these regulations). Regarding the RAI
Principles, the World Bank notes that although the RAI Principles have served to "remind[] countries

and investors of their responsibilities and draw[] attention to policies that seemed to violate them ...
the real challenge is to make [the Principles] operational in a country setting." RISING GLOBAL
INTEREST, supra note 30, at 3.

390 See Anastasia Telesetsky, Resource Conflicts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States:
Creating an United Nations Ombudsman Institution to Review Foreign Agricultural Land Leases, 3
GOTTINGEN J. INT'L L. 283 (2011) (commenting that self-regulatory voluntary codes of conduct do not
adequately regulate the leasing process and calling for the creation of a U.N. Ombudsman to provide
legal and technical oversight and support for host states).
391 For problems with such an approach, see Graham
and Woods, supra note 288 and
accompanying text.
392 See Makau Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South
Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 67 (1997) (citing Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104
HARV. L. REv. 917 (1991)) (arguing this point in the context of human rights law).
393 Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The "Untouchable"
Condition in Critical

Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 255, 333, 335 (2008) (discussing non-implementation of rights
protections for India's "untouchables").
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case where land users belong to different ethnic, religious, or caste groups or are
3 94
members of indigenous communities.
Even if one were to assume the existence of a benevolent state, one must
still ask whether legal reforms alone can serve as a vehicle for social change.
Numerous commentators have noted the limits of law reform in effecting social
change. Dan Banik, for example, argues that legal strategies for social change are
insufficient, because they "underestimate the ability of political actors to ignore,
95
bypass, or selectively implement judicial recommendations and verdicts."
Instead, "[b]oth in principle and in the development experience, legal empowerment
is much more a matter of civil society and bottom-up initiatives.""' Studies of land
reform initiatives support this assertion. Ben Cousins, for example, has reviewed
at securing
post-apartheid South Africa's history of land redistribution, its attempts
9 He argues that
property rights, and its continued eviction of small landholders.'
focusing solely on legal reform is inadequate to secure social change. Law is "only
one source of rule-making in society"; and both formal and informal institutions
"centrally involve issues of power, authority and contestation," which must be
taken into account.398 Jennifer Franco takes a similar view of the land reform
movement in the Philippines, and the continued struggle of agrarian movements to
399
As several scholars studying
realize and maintain available legal entitlements.
the recent land transactions suggest, "clear and secure land property rights are
necessary but not sufficient to guarantee protection of rural poor land rights."o
Recent case studies of large-scale land transfers also provide support for the
"critique ... that legal empowerment through legislative reform, while effective in
394 Privileges accorded to investors also may be the result of government corruption and the
bribery of government officials. See FRED PEARCE, THE LAND GRABBERS: THE NEW FIGHT OVER
WHO OWNS THE EARTH 43-47 (2012) (detailing the accounts of U.S. investors who have targeted land
deals in South Sudan because of lax investment oversight and the prevalence of local corruption); see
also Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 509 (commenting that deals are characterized by "close
the
partnerships (or collusion) between foreign investors and the national governments that rule over
lands in question").
39s Dan Banik, Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty
Eradication, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE OF L. 117, 128 (2009).
396 Id.at 129.
Ben Cousins, How Do Rights Become Real? Formal and Informal Institutions in South
3

Africa's Land Reform, 28 INT'L DEV. STUD. BULL. 59 (1997) (discussing South Africa's formal and
informal land reform institutions).
398

Id. at 60. See also Ryan Bubb, States, Law, and Property Rights in West Africa (2011)

(unpublished draft), available at http://www.econ.yale.edulconference/neudc l1/papers/paper_- 250.pdf
(showing that even though property laws were very different in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, the contours
of de facto property rights were nearly identical, reflecting the minimal influence of formal laws on
shaping community property rights). See generally Kennedy, supra note 268, at 117 (arguing that
human rights promote the idea that justice is better served by securing rights on paper failing to
recognize the role of people making political decisions, and thus human rights ultimately fail to bridge
the gap between "law in the books and law in action [and], between legal institutions and the rest of
life"); Frank Upham, The Man Who Would Import: A Cautionary Tale About Bucking the System in

Japan, 17 J. JAPANESE STUD. 323 (1991) (demonstrating that government policy can be enforced just
as effectively through informal community norms of obedience as it can be through formal legal power,
citing a case study in which the Japanese bureaucracy effectively regulated business even without legal
power).

399 Jennifer C. Franco, Making Land Rights Accessible: Social Movements and Political-Legal

Innovation in the Rural Philippines,44 J. DEV. STUD. 991 (2008) (examining how access to politicallegal mobilization and "rights-advocacy" outreach networks assist rural poor claimants, and the
limitations of such strategies).
400 Borras & Franco, supra note 46, at 518 (citing Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91).
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certain important regards, is intrinsically limited by the quality of laws and
institutions, and more fundamentally by the milieu of the political economy." 401
In the end, one cannot rely solely on the political will of the host state or
rest on legal platforms alone. 4 02 Although legal guarantees and transparent
consultative processes are critical, these approaches must be accompanied by a
process of political and social mobilization that compels host states to restrict largescale land transfers and undertake essential agrarian reforms. Part IV provides
examples of such bottom-up initiatives but cautions that these strategies alone may
be insufficient to confront current conditions of economic globalization wherein a
multitude of global actors are involved in shaping domestic agricultural policies.
Part IV therefore calls for essential institutional reforms at the international level to
help empower affected communities and secure rights guarantees.
IV.

EMPOWERING AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

This Part proposes a range of measures and reforms to help empower
communities most affected by large-scale land deals. I argue that both international
and domestic pressure must be brought to bear on host states and investors to help
close accountability gaps and secure rights protections. 403 Part IV.A looks at
resistance strategies to contest the global rush for agricultural land and argues that
these strategies must be complemented and supported by international actors and
reforms. Part IV.B proposes potential regulatory measures for host states, investor
home states, and international financial institutions alike. Part IV.C concludes with
consideration of key agrarian reforms and normative developments to help support
substantive rights and achieve broader development goals.
A.

Resistance Strategies and the Needfor StructuralSupport

Opposition to large-scale land transfers occurs in a range of forms, from
popular protests and political opposition, to broad-based social movements
comprising peasants and small-scale farmers most affected by these deals. Popular
protests have successfully derailed, or at least forestalled, some large-scale land
deals. In 2009, for instance, widespread protests against the leasing of
approximately half of Madagascar's arable land to the Korean company Daewoo
led to a coup that ousted the country's president. The government of Madagascar

401 Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 91, at
913. Similarly, Kevin Davis argues that all causal
claims about the relationship between "any specific feature of the legal system" and development "are
inherently suspect .... Universal claims about the role of law in development necessarily deny the
significance of local variations." Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent Objections, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J. 537, 538 (2010). For example, there may be important differences in how a given
society measures development, id. at 539-40; societies may differ in "ways that alter the causal

connections between law and social or economic outcomes." Id. at 540.
402

See DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN

RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL

EcONOMY 108 (2009) (arguing that "[i]t is better to cajole and persuade all states, individually and
collectively, to tackle development using all the persuasive resources to hand, including legal
instruments, rather than to try to do battle on the narrow ledge of definitive legal interpretation alone"
and citing with approval Kennedy, supra note 268, at 108-09).
403 See KINLEY, supra note 402, at 189 (arguing for multiple forms of pressure to compel states
to "plug the gaps in their own laws regarding corporate behaviour within their jurisdiction").
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subsequently cancelled the Daewoo deal. 40 In the Philippines, public protests
halted a 2009 deal between China and the Philippine government involving
1,240,000 hectares of land. 405 A $4.3 billion deal for 500,000 hectares of rice
paddies was stalled in Indonesia in 2009 as a result of local opposition. 406 The
largest land deal in South Sudan also stalled after local leaders and communities
appealed directly to Members of Parliament and to the President in July 2011,
stating that they "unanimously, with strong terms, condemn, disavow or deny the
401
land-lease agreement" between the government and a Texas-based company.
Civil society actors in investor home states have also proved influential. In
February 2012, for example, Iowa State University withdrew its involvement in a
controversial land deal in Tanzania after growing public pressure from a number of
U.S.-based civil society actors.40 8
These examples, however, are few and far between, especially when
compared to the number of deals that have moved forward. This suggests that the
success of local protests may be short-lived and may depend on the extent to which
civil society goals align with those of political or foreign actors.4 0 But social
404 See Javier Blas, South Koreans to Lease Farmland in Madagascar, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea8de830-b5d9-11 dd-ab71-0000779fdl8c.html#axzz2FbULSU5N
(announcing the deal between Daewoo and Madagascar); see also Paul Vallely, Wish You Weren 't

Here: the Devastating Effects of the New Colonialists, INDEP.

(London) (Aug. 9,

2009),

http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/wish-you-werent-here-the-devastating-effects-ofthe-new-colonialists-1767725.html (describing how the Daewoo deal contributed to the overthrow of
President Ravalomanana's government).
405 Vallely, supra note 404 (using the Philippines as an example of public outcry over
governmental land deals).
406

Buying Farmland Abroad: Outsourcing's Third Wave, ECONOMIST (May 21,

2009),

http://www.economist.com/node/13692889.
407 John Vidal, Indian Agribusiness Sets Sights on Land in East Africa, GUARDIAN (London)
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/201 1/aug/24/indian-agribusiness-landeast-africa.
408 Led by Iowa-based Agrisol Energy LLC ("AgriSol"), the deal involves leasing over 800,00
acres, threatens eviction for more than 160,000 people, and has reportedly moved forward without
public consultation and without apparent plans for compensation or relocation. Press Release, Oakland
Inst., Lives on Hold-AgriSol's Land Deal in Tanzania Create an Uncertain Future for More than
160,000 People (July 9, 2012), http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/press-release-lives-hold-agrisols-landThe deal is contested by a number of
deal-tanzania-creates-uncertain-future-more-160000-people.
actors, including the Oakland Institute, Sierra Club U.S., Sierra Club Canada, Iowa Citizens for
Community Improvement, and the national consumer advocacy non-profit Food & Water Watch.
Letter from Sierra Club U.S. and Sierra Club Canada, to AgriSol, Do Not Displace 162,000 People in
Tanzania (Oct. 20, 2011), http://media.oaklandinstitute.org/letter-sierra-club-us-and-sierra-club-canadado-not-displace-162000-people-tanzania; Press Release, Iowa CCI, Iowa CCI Statement to the Press in
Light of New Report from Oakland Institute (July 9, 2012), http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/iowa-ccistatement-press; National Nonprofit Food & Water Watch Joins Complaint Against Rastetter, Exposes
Another AgriSol Executive as Complicit in Tanzania Land Grab, NORTHCENTRALPA.COM (July 19,

2012), http://www.northcentralpa.com/feeditem/2012-07-19_national-nonprofit-food-water-watch-joins
-complaint-against-rastetter-exposes-an. Iowa State University's involvement was revealed in June
2011, and the University withdrew from the deal in February 2012. Nicholas Miller, Report Alleges
AgriSol Is Associated with Human Rights Violations in Tanzania, DAILY IOWAN (July 9, 2012),
Iowa State University Withdraws
http://www.dailyiowan.com/2012/07/09/Metro/28986.html;
Completely from AgriSol Energy's Investment Deal in Tanzania, OAKLAND INST. (Feb. 12, 2012),
http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/iowa-state-university-withdraws-completely-agrisol-energy/ E2%80%
99s-investment-deal-tanzania.
409 In Madagascar, for example, there were other factors at play: The urban poor were already
angered at the high prices of food, and some have characterized the land deal as a spark that ignited
already simmering national discontent. See Vallely, supra note 404 (discussing protest motivations in
Madagascar); Sebastien Berger, Madagascar'sNew Leader Cancels Korean Land Deal, TELEGRAPH
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movements, both national and transnational in scope, are growing. Some frame
their grievances in human rights terms; others frame their opposition using a food
sovereignty paradigm. 410 Collectively, these movements give expression to a
profound source of discontent over large-scale land transfers-that they
fundamentally alter the relationship of communities to their environs and
undermine democratic control over agricultural policy decisions. These movements
also seek to challenge the power dynamics that undergird large-scale land transfers
and give greater voice and agency to the communities made most vulnerable by
these deals.
La Via Campesina, for instance, is an international grassroots movement
that promotes and defends food sovereignty and small-scale sustainable agriculture
"as a way to promote social justice and dignity.""' Member organizations 412 have
mobilized against "land grabs" through large-scale protests, meetings with
government officials, and other actions aimed at raising awareness, shifting the
terms of the debate, and compelling key policy reforms. 4 3
Both global and local campaigns-some connected to La Via Campesina
and others that have evolved separately-claim multiple successes, but they also
face significant resistance. In some countries, individuals and groups mobilizing in
opposition to large-scale land transfers have endured considerable backlash. Local
opposition has been met with brute force; 414 social activism by peasant movements

(London) (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/madagas
car/5012961/Madagascars-new-leader-cancels-Korean-land-deal.html (noting that immediately after
the change in leadership analysts suggested that "other foreign investors were unlikely to be affected").
In some countries, domestic opposition has also led to legislation imposing moratoria on land deals or
limiting the purchase of land by foreigners, though as considered below, these initiatives, too, may be
short-lived. See infra notes 437-38 and accompanying text.
410 See, e.g., Peter Rosset, Food Sovereignty and Alternative Paradigms
to Confront Land
Grabbingand the Food and Climate Crisis, 54 DEV. 21, 28 (2011), available at http://www.palgrave-

journals.com/development/journal/v54/nl/pdf/dev2010102a.pdf (arguing that "[o]nly food sovereignty
based on genuine agrarian reform, and the defense of land and territory against land grabbing, offers a
real alternative to the multiples crises we are facing"). The concept of food sovereignty was originally
proposed by La Via Campesina in 1996, which defined the term as "the right of each nation to maintain
and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity."
Raj Patel, Food Sovereignty, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 663, 665 (2009). For more on La Via Campesina

see infra notes 411-12 and accompanying text. As a policy paradigm, food sovereignty stands in
distinction from "food security" and the "right to food," both of which are seen to have distinct and
much narrower meanings. MICHAEL WINDFUHR & JENNIE JONStN, FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARDS
DEMOCRACY INLOCALIZED FOOD SYSTEMS 23 (2005).
411 La Via Campesina, What is La Via Campesina? The International
Peasant's Voice (Feb. 11,

2011), http://www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44/what-is-la-via-campesin
a-mainmenu-45. Since the movement began in 1993, it has pushed for "comprehensive land reform
granting peasants and sustainable family farmers, both men and women, control over the land they
cultivate." International Conference of Peasants and Farmers: Stop Land Grabbing!, 3 LA VIA
CAMPESINA NOTEBOOK 1, 13 (2012), http://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/mali-report-2012-enl.
pdf [hereinafter Stop Land Grabbing].
412 La Via Campesina is comprised of about 150 organizations in 70 countries and claims to

represent around 200 million farmers worldwide, paying particular attention to the rights of women

farmers. What is La Via Campesina?, supra note 411; see also Annette Aur6lie Desmarais, United in
the Via Campesina, FOOD FIRST (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1580 (describing the

history and structure of La Via Campesina).
413

Stop Land Grabbing, supra note 411, at 6.

See Transnational Inst., supra note 250 (noting that countries such
as Cambodia, Ethiopia,
and Ghana "are using legal and brute force to suppress local contestation").
414
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and other civil society actors has been criminalized.415 The ability of social
movements to change the substantive course of policy decisions is also undermined
by the significant power dynamics at play at the international level.416 The marketplus approach continues to enjoy far greater institutional and state backing and thus
tends to prevail over these movements' calls for a more dramatic shift in the status
quo.417 This asymmetry tests assumptions about the roles that "strategies of
disavowal and resistance" can play in "opening the spaces for constructive
participatory engagement under current conditions of globalisation." 4" To be
effective, resistance strategies must have structural support.
To empower host communities and support social movements, both
normative and regulatory frameworks at the international level must cohere and
evolve with the backing of established institutions. Specifically, investor home
states and international financial institutions (IFIs) must be more involved in
protecting rights through regulation, 419 as relying solely on the political will of host
415 In Sierra Leone, for example, forty local landowners were reportedly arrested in October 2011
for blockading Socfin Agricultural Company Sierra Leone Ltd.'s plantation project in Pujehun district.

Sierra Leone: PopularResistance and CorporateLandgrabbing in Sierra Leone, ALL AFRICA (May 3,

2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201205031196.html (interviewing Oakland Institute's policy director
about the organization's report on Sierra Leone land deals). At least fifteen local community activists
have also been imprisoned for voicing their dissent to Socfin's land deal. See supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ethiopian government's crackdown against those resisting forced
relocations).
416 In 2006, for example, at the FAO-organized International Conference on Agrarian Reform
and Rural Development in Brazil, "a strong mobilization of peasants and small-scale farmers put land
reform back on the world political agenda." Stop Land Grabbing,supra note 411, at 13. According to
La Via Campesina, the Conference declaration, signed by ninety-two states, recognizes "the need to
support sustainable family farming and the redistribution of land and other agrarian resources," as well
as the role of peasant movements and rural organizations in setting agricultural policy. Id. However,
La Via Campesina notes, "due to strong resistance on the part of 'developed' countries, the declaration
was never implemented, as shown by the new wave of land grabbing we are witnessing today." Id.
417 This was made evident in a public statement issued by the Director General of the FAO and
the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The statement called on the
private sector to double its investment in land and become the "main engine" of agricultural growth and
food production. La Via Campesina and others issued a strident response accusing the statement's
authors of presenting biased claims that obscure widely available data showing that small-scale farming
is more productive and efficient than large-scale agribusiness. The response stated that "it is
unacceptable and even incomprehensible for a Director General of the FAO to be promoting the
destruction of peasant farming and an increase in land grabbing" instead of validating "the importance
of peasant agriculture and the critical role small farmers must play in food production," especially in
light of "three years of careful, hard work by La Via Campesina and other organizations" in
constructing the FAO's Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. Common Statement, La Via
Campesina et al., Why are the FAO and the EBRD Promoting the Destruction of Peasantand Family

Farming? (Sept. 14, 2012), http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-maimnenu-27/agrarianreform-mainmenu-36/1295-why-are-the-fao-and-the-ebrd-promoting-the-destruction-of-peasant-and-fa
mily-farming. But see Suma Chakrabarti & Jose Graziano Da Silva, Op-Ed., Hungryfor Investment:
The PrivateSector Can Drive AgriculturalDevelopment in Countries That Need It Most., WALL ST. J.

(Sep. 6, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443686004577633080190871456.html
(discussing the role of the private sector in global food production).
418
Lustig & Kingsbury, supra note 244, at 405.
419 Powerful global actors are increasingly being urged to take cognizance of their human
rights
obligations. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. I have elsewhere argued that investor home
state obligations should extend to respecting and protecting human rights extraterritorially, including
through regulation of the activities of private investors operating abroad. Narula, supra note 46, at 745;
see also THE MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA

OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHT (2011), available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-

cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Maastricht-Principles-analysis-brief-201 1.pdf.
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states and investors has proven to be ineffective. Even more fundamentally, the
World Bank must reform its approach to land markets and land distribution.
Human rights law, too, must normatively evolve to develop a substantive right to
land for rural communities who depend on it for their survival. These essential
reforms are considered in Parts IV.B-C.
B. Restricting and RegulatingLarge-Scale Land Transfers

The need to more effectively regulate land investment activity and protect
land users' rights is paramount. If rights are to be taken seriously, there must be
less tolerance of risk in land deals and less reliance on ineffective procedural
safeguards such as consultations and negotiations for protecting land users' rights.
Instead, large-scale land transfers must be subject to far greater substantive
restrictions and regulation. This Part proposes a range of regulatory measures for
host states, home states, and IFIs alike.
Host states possess the power and responsibility to mitigate-if not
eliminate-many of the harms associated with large-scale land transfers. Most
importantly, host states have the authority to determine whether problematic land
deals may proceed at all. States could, for instance, impose moratoria on largescale land deals. This would allow states to evaluate the rights impacts of these
deals 420 and would give domestic institutions time to develop the ability to stave off
some of the ill effects of the deals in the event that they are resumed.421 It is also
possible to impose conditional moratoria; Argentina, for example, recently passed
legislation stipulating that no more than 15% of the country's land may be foreignowned.422 Here, it is important to consider the potentially deleterious role played by
domestic investors rather than simply limiting land transfers involving foreigners.
Moratoria could be especially useful in states that possess weak governance
structures or underdeveloped regulatory frameworks such as the nascent Republic

Principles-which were adopted in September 2011 by a group of experts in international law-"aim to
clarify the content of extraterritorial state obligations to realize economic, social and cultural rights." Id.
at Preamble. The Principles note that, at minimum, states have an obligation to avoid causing harm in
foreign countries; as such, states should assess the potential impacts of their policies and practices on
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights abroad. Id. at princs. 13, 14. International
financial institutions, too, are bound by international human rights law, as part of general international
law. Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, T 5; see also Galit A. Sarfaty, Why
Culture Matters in InternationalInstitutions: The Marginalityof Human Rights at the World Bank, 103

A.J.I.L 647, 657-58 (2009) (reviewing the Bank's obligations under international law and noting
disagreement amongst legal scholars on this point). I have also elsewhere argued that the status of
international financial institutions as multi-state actors can provide an additional basis for subjecting
them to the requirements of international human rights law through the many member states that have
ratified human rights treaties. Narula, supra note 46, at 41.
420 See LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND, supra note 37, at 65 (advocating moratoria
to
allow time for democratic debate about the merits and demerits of permitting land deals).
421 In Mozambique, for instance, in order to give the government sufficient time to complete a

map of formal land tenure in the country, no new concessions of more than 10,000 hectares were
publicly agreed to between October 2007 and October 2011. OXFAM, supra note 153, at 16; see David
K. Deng, NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID, The New Frontier: A Baseline Survey of Large-Scale Land-

Based Investment in Southern Sudan 1, 37 (2011), http://www.npaid.org/filestore/NPA NewFrontier.p
df (advocating moratoria to allow domestic institutions a chance to establish themselves).
422

Shane Romig, Argentina Fences Off Land to Foreign Buyers, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
23, 2011),

http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19829.
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of South Sudan.423 Under some circumstances, states may wish to do more than
simply forestall the possibility of future deals; states may wish to cancel existing
deals that fail to live up to their productive promises or fail to comply with
domestic legislation.424
States may also pass legislation aimed directly at the content of land
transfer contracts. Here there is wide latitude for creativity. Some of the most
straightforward measures cap the size of land transfers425 or the length of land
leases.426 Such caps can help limit the risks of large-scale land transfers, which are
often compounded by their immense scale and duration.427 States may also restrict
purely speculative investments. For example, states may require that land transfer
contracts impose development conditions that must be satisfied for investors to
retain control of the land.42 8 States could also restrict the use of freezing clauses,
which lock in a state's applicable domestic legislation, in perpetuity, from the
moment that a land transfer contract is finalized.429 Such clauses are inherently
inflexible and can preclude upgraded regulations.430
Although the measures best suited for a given country will vary by context,
it is important for host states to recognize the tools available to them in asserting
some crucial level of control over the terms and prevalence of large-scale land
transfers. Of course, the primary challenge to the effective use of that power lies in
summoning and sustaining the requisite political will. As argued above, political
pressure exerted by domestic movements can play-and has played-a critical

In countries such as Brazil, 43 2 Argentina, 433 and Ukraine, 43 4 failed

role. 31
4

423 See, e.g., Deng, supra note 42 1, at 37 (arguing for a moratorium on land
deals in the Republic
of South Sudan due to its fragile state).
424 RISING GLOBAL INTEREST, supra note 30, at 133.
A number of legal doctrines permit
governments to breach contracts with private parties, for example, to prevent long-term, inefficient
lease arrangements. See generally Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liabilityfor
Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. & ECON. R. 313 (1999) (defending, among other things, the public trust
and sovereign acts doctrines on efficiency grounds).
425 See, e.g., Romig, supra note 422 (describing legislation in Argentina that caps land ownership
by foreign individuals or companies at 1,000 hectares, thus creating a de facto cap on the size of any
deal featuring a foreign buyer).
426 See, e.g., Land Union of Ukr., Ukraine's ParliamentPasses Law on Land Market, FOOD
CRISIS & GLOBAL LAND GRAB (July 20, 2011), http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18960 (describing
legislation in Ukraine that limits land leases to a period of no longer than fifty years).
427 See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
428

See LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 62, at 107 (recommending

monitoring mechanisms and transparent government contracting as methods of discouraging land
speculation).
429 INVESTMENT CONTRACTS, supra note 102, at 72 (advocating against the use of freezing
clauses "under all circumstances" and also adding that such clauses may be found unenforceable in
many jurisdictions).
430

Id.

See supra Part IV.A.
An August 2010 legal opinion of the Federal Attorney General of Brazil extended the
application of a Brazilian law that restricts the acquisition of rural land by foreigners to acquisitions of
land by Brazilian companies controlled by foreigners. Foreign companies, even if acting through a
subsidiary in Brazil, are restricted to specific quotas when buying land. At the time of this writing, the
Attorney General's legal opinion had not been enforced, though the recommendations had been moving
through congressional committees. See Raymond Colitt & Reese Ewing, Brazil Curtails Land Sales to
431

432

Foreigners, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/24/brazil-

land-idUSN2425631120100824; Gabriel Elizondo, US FarmersScramble to Buy Brazil's Farmland,
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investments have resulted in domestic pressure and even legislation to limit the
purchase of land by foreigners. 435 But sustaining this political will is an especially
difficult task in the face of prominent IFIs that continuously promote even the
minatory elements of land transfers. The World Bank, for instance, has strongly
cautioned against state implementation of protectionist measures aimed at
restricting or exerting various forms of control over land deals.436 Yet the point of
considering such measures is to expand the host state's arsenal for combating forces
that have disproportionately large and negative effects on the rights of vulnerable
rural populations-the same populations that ought to be at the forefront of the
World Bank's concern, even by its own explicit standards.
The current pushback on moratoria in countries such as Tanzania and
Ukraine further suggests that domestic movements must be complemented and
supported by international reforms.437 Otherwise, the success of these movements
will continue to be piecemeal and short lived. 43 8 Here, the World Bank Group has a
critical role to play given the enormity of its influence on land investments and on
agricultural policies in the developing world-a scale of influence that far outstrips
that of human rights experts and institutions. 43 9 As described throughout this
Article, the World Bank Group has played a pivotal and powerful role in creating
land markets and facilitating large-scale land transfers-the very investments that
AL JAZEERA (Sep. 29, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/20129131121377449
56.html.
433 In December 2011, the Argentinean Parliament approved the Rural Land Law, which caps
land sales to foreign investors. The bill aimed to encourage "responsible foreign investment" and
safeguard the right of the Argentinean people to its resources. See Declaration of the Argentinean
Government Regarding the Legislative Proposal for the Rural Land Law (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://wwwl.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dsecretaria/Periodo2011/PDF2011 /TP20 11/0001-PE-11 .pdf.
434 The Ukrainian bill prohibits the purchase of farmland by foreigners, but continues to permit
leasing. Land Union of Ukraine, supra note 426. Recent developments, including legislation allowing
foreigners to purchase nonfarmland, threaten to jeopardize the moratorium; at the time of this writing,
however, the moratorium remained in place. Oksana Grytsenko, Investments on Hold as Farmland
Battle Intensifies, KYiv POST (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.kyivpost.com/contentIbusiness/investmentson-hold-as-farmland-battle-intensifies-123941.html;Rada Allows Foreigners to Buy Non-agricultural
Land, KYiv POST (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/rada-allows-foreigners-tobuy-non-agricultural-land-313853.html; see also infra note 437.
435 What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?, supra note 251, at 17.
436 The World Bank favors an approach that prioritizes efforts to improve
land governance,
noting that "recognizing local rights, educating right holders, and allowing their voluntary and
transparent transfer [] are likely to be a more appropriate policy response." Id. at 17. The Bank adds
that because a number of land deals involve nationals and not foreigners, excluding foreigners "may
exacerbate rather than resolve governance challenges by, for example, limiting competition." Id.
437 In April 2011, President Viktor Yanukovich told lawmakers during a speech to parliament
that Ukraine needed a "fully fledged" market for farmland to boost the agricultural industry's
efficiency, and so would allow farmland sales in 2013 for the first time to stimulate investment.
Graham Stack, Investors Run Fingers Through Ukraine's Black Earth, BUSINESS NEW EUROPE (Apr.
15, 2011), http://www.bne.eu/story2630/Foreign-investors-run fingersjthroughUkraines black
earth.
438 In October 2009, the Tanzanian government suspended new biofuel projects in Tanzania in
response to growing pressure from farmers and NGOs protesting the land losses, food shortages, and
other issues associated with foreign biofuel investments. New biofuel projects, however, resumed just
six months later with the development of draft guidelines for Tanzania biofuels sector. Peter G. Veit et
al, Biofuel Investments Threaten Local Land Rights in Tanzania, INT'L LAND COAL. LAND
PORTAL 1, 2-3
(Feb. 28, 2012), http://landportal.info/sites/default/files/biofuel-investments-land_
rights tanzania.pdf
439 Lustig & Kingsbury, supra note 244, at 411 (discussing the importance of the World Bank
because of "the scale of its influence on projects and on laws in developing countries").
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have given rise to the problems that their RAI Principles now seek to address. Yet
even as the Bank calls for investors to respect human rights in the context of land
deals, it does not consistently apply these same standards to its own policies and
programming."o To more effectively address the risks and mitigate the harms of
land deals, the World Bank should cease its support of large-scale land transfers in
environments where appropriate regulatory frameworks are not in place to manage
them, or where there are clear threats to inviolable rights."'
Investor home states, too, can play an important regulatory role. Home
states provide extensive political and financial support to investors442 and in that
capacity can require investors to disclose standardized information on the
environmental, labor, and human rights impacts of their investments."' These
regulations would allow for direct monitoring of investors by home states and
would increase investors' accountability to civil society in both home and host
states. 44 Studies have shown that mandatory disclosure policies can improve
environmental outcomes, though the results have been mixed."' Efforts must also
be made to address the factors that drive large-scale land transfers, such as biofuel
subsidies and mandates, 4 46 and speculative investments in agricultural
Galit Sarfaty explains the dissonance between rhetoric and reality as symptomatic of the
World Bank's organizational culture. Although rhetorically the World Bank has been more mindful of
the need to consider human rights in its operations, these concerns are not systematically incorporated
in staff decision-making or consistently considered in lending operations. Sarfaty, supra note 419.
441 In October 2012, Oxfam International called on the World Bank to institute a six-month
freeze on investments involving large-scale land acquisitions on the reasoning that it would "create
space to develop policy and institutional protections to help ensure that no Bank-supported project
resulted in land-grabbing." OXFAM, supra note 153, at 3. Citing food production concerns, the World
Bank Group rejected the call for a moratorium, arguing that the best way to approach the issue was to
work with relevant stakeholders, "while continuing to offer advice and assistance to governments and
investors to ensure positive outcomes and encouraging responsible investments." Press Release, World
Bank, World Bank Group Statement on Oxfam Report, "Our Land, Our Lives" (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/10/04/world-bank-group-statement-oxfam-report-our-landour-lives. The Bank asserted that it does not support "acquisitions which take advantage of weak
institutions in developing countries or which disregard principles of responsible agricultural
investment," World Bank Group Statement on Oxfam Report, supra, but case studies and reports cited
throughout this Article suggest otherwise. Moreover, since 2008 alone, no less than "21 formal
complaints have been brought by communities affected by Bank investments that they say violated
their land rights." OXFAM, supra note 153, at 4 (citing case files on the IFC's Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman site and the World Bank's Inspectional Panel site).
442 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
44
Nadia Cuffaro & David Hallam, Land Grabbing in Developing Countries: Foreign Investors,
Regulation and Codes of Conduct, at 11, paper presented at International Conference on Global Land
Grabbing, University of Sussex, Apr. 6-8, 2011; see also Graham & Woods, supra note 288, at 881.
444 Others have called for greater transparency in land investment contracts, suggesting that
home states could introduce disclosure requirements for agricultural investors. Such a provision could
mirror the Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, which
requires oil, gas, and mineral companies listed on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to
publicly disclose their payments to the U.S. and foreign governments. See Oakland Inst. et al., Dealing
with Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Decision-Making Over Large-Scale Land Acquisitions,
Allocations and Investments, OAKLAND INST. 10, 45 (2012), available at http://www.oaklandinstitute.
org/dealing-disclosure-improving-transparency-decision-making-over-large-scale-land-acquisitions.
"s Magali Delmas et al., Mandatory Information Disclosureand Environmental Performance in
the Electricity Industry, 2-3 (draft paper, Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/papers/delmasmontes-shimshackoct2006.pdf (last visited July 24, 2012) (reviewing the
empirical literature).
446 Advocates have urged members of the G20 to end biofuel mandates, subsidies, and tax breaks
in order to ease this pressure on land acquisition. See, e.g., Clare Coffey, G20 and Biofuels,
ACTIONAID (July 12, 2012), http://www.actionaid.org/eu/2012/07/g20-and-biofuels (last visited July
440
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commodities,"' farmland, and related infrastructure.44 3
Additionally, steps can be taken to reform the underlying investment
framework, for example by incorporating human rights concerns into bilateral
investment treaties. The text of both model and existing BITs could be reformed to
more explicitly include human rights concerns. For example, changing the
preamble of a BIT to state that investments must be consistent with human rights
could help shift the treaty's aims and influence its interpretation."' Even further,
additional chapters could be included to outline the obligations of investors, home
states, and host states alike.450 If heeded, these recommendations could begin to
remedy accountability gaps in the investment framework on the international plane,
in service of protecting rights on the domestic plane.451

29, 2012). In October 2012, the European Union announced that it planned to cut its biofuel mandate
for 2020 in half (from ten percent of total European Union transport energy demand to five percent).
While the Special Rapporteur noted that the plans were "a major turning point," he emphasized that
they did not "go far enough," adding that governments should put "food security first" and should
support small-scale models where "biofuel production strengthens local food producers and food
systems, rather than uprooting them." In a World Hungryfor Biofuels, Food Security Must Come First,

GUARDIAN (London) (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/
2012/oct/1 7/world-hungry-biofuels-food-security.

In the United States, for example, financial reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act have
attempted to limit speculation by limiting the number of agricultural commodities that can be held by
any one trader, among other provisions. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 737, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to Reduce the Risks
of Price Volatility, 7 (Briefing Note No. 2, Sept. 2010), available at http://www.kontextwochenzeitung.
de/fileadmin/userupload/2012/5/23052012/UN-Nahrungsmittelspekulation.pdf
(calling for higher
regulation of commodities, including the separation of markets for commodity derivatives and financial
derivatives).
44
Home states could consider creating incentives for investment funds to structure their
investments in ways that support rather than undermine small-scale farmers, such as by encouraging
investment in agricultural equities that provide capital to companies with strong track records of
collaboration with local communities and farmers. See IIED, FARMS AND FUNDS, supra note 67, at 4.
44

See MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10

(2010) (noting that preambular language that references human rights can influence the interpretation of
a BIT's object and purpose, which in turn can influence its interpretation); HOWARD MANN ET AL.,
IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

NEGOTIATORS' HANDBOOK 2 (2005), http://ces.iisc.ernet.in/envis/sdev/investment modelint handbo
ok.pdf (explaining the interpretive significance of the Preamble and offering an example of how the
Preamble could be written to balance the rights and obligations of investors and states).
450 See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 449, at 34 (noting that inclusion of a chapter that references

human rights obligations makes these rights concrete rather than illusory).
451 Problems enforcing rights guarantees on the domestic plane
are further compounded by
dynamics on the international plane.
Investment-related obligations may conflict with states'

obligations to ensure human rights. See JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME

GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 375-77 (2011) (showing that a state's ability to regulate in
protection of human rights may be constrained by the state's foreign investment obligations under
bilateral investment treaties). In practice, these conflicts are often resolved in favor of the investor as
states try to incentivize greater investment. See Lorenzo Cotula, InternationalLaw and Negotiating
Power in Foreign Investment Projects: Comparing Property Rights Protection Under Human Rights
and Investment Law in Africa, S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 62, 66 (2008) (commenting that the human right

not to be arbitrarily deprived of property-as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-is
often overshadowed in favor of ensuring investor property-security); see also LUKE ERIC PETERSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 37 (2009) (arguing that host states do not always

represent the interests of their citizenry when faced with the choice of protecting human rights or
attracting wealthy foreign investors).
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C. Reforming our Approach to Land: A Frameworkfor the Future

In May 2012, following years of negotiations and deliberations that
involved the active participation of social movements and civil society groups, the
125 member countries of the Committee on World Food Security endorsed the
"Voluntary Guidelines on Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in
the context of national food security."452 The Guidelines call on states to "improve
the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests," "with an emphasis on
vulnerable and marginalized populations" and with the "goals of food security and
progressive realization of the right to adequate food." 453 Addressing the specific
issue of large-scale land transactions, the Guidelines call on states to:
[P]rovide safeguards to protect legitimate tenure rights, human rights,
livelihoods, food security and the environment from risks that could arise
from large-scale transactions in tenure rights. Such safeguards could
include introducing ceilings on permissible land transactions and regulating
how transfers exceeding a certain scale should be approved, such as by
parliamentary approval. States should consider promoting a range of
production and investment models that do not result in the large-scale
transfer of tenure rights to investors, and should encourage partnerships
with local tenure right holders.454
The Guidelines additionally call on states to consider redistributive reforms as a
means of facilitating "broad and equitable access to land and inclusive rural

development."4 55
The adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines represents a strong endorsement
of the agrarian reforms promoted by the rights-based approach. They also represent
a clear repudiation of the philosophy that land distribution should be purely marketdriven, or that large-scale industrialized agricultural production can ensure the
developmental and food security needs of the planet in a sustainable and equitable
way. In order for these important Guidelines to take hold, however, the World
Bank Group must first reform its own approach to land. The development of land
markets and the facilitation of large-scale land transfers can no longer remain the
default policy option, and should not be imposed automatically without an
understanding of how these policies affect the human rights and development needs
of a range of stakeholders, in both the immediate and long term.45 6
In many respects, the use of satellite imagery to identify investment-worthy
sites stands as a metaphor for the Bank's current approach. Technocrats, physically
452

See VGGT, supra note 51.

453

id. ..

VGGT, supra note 51, 1 12.6.
VGGT, supra note 51, 1 15. 1. The Guidelines add that states should "ensure that the reforms
are consistent with their obligations under national and international law," and that "redistributive land
reform programmes [should] provide the full measure of support required by beneficiaries, such as
access to credit, crop insurance, inputs, markets, technical assistance in rural extension, farm
development and housing." Id. 1 15.4, 15.8.
456 See Trzcinski & Upham, supra note 311, at I (using the experience of Cambodia to illustrate
the practical problems of instituting a one-size-fits-all model of land reform).
454

455
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and professionally removed from the land in question, use tools that are even
further removed in time and space in order to assess land's current and potential
value. This approach assumes that land and resources can be quantified by
objective, distant images, and that the myriad uses, customs, and benefits informing
the interests of land users can be captured, guaranteed, and marketized through
written, formally-demarcated rights. These assumptions belie the complexity of
land's real value to those who depend on it as a source of spiritual, social, and
economic sustenance as well as a guarantor of rights.
The Bank additionally assumes that the trade-offs inherent in large-scale
land transfers are necessary to service agricultural productivity and efficiency goals.
But on this point, and as analyzed in Part III.A.2.b, rights and productivity goals
can be seen to converge: Specifically, more secure, sustainable, and equitable
access to land for rural communities can help ensure local communities' rights
while also supporting broader economic growth and food security goals.457
Moreover, supporting agrarian policies that favor small-scale farmers, including
those that redistribute land to benefit small farmers, directly serves the World
Bank's food security efforts: Of the nearly 1 billion people hungry in the world
today, approximately 500 million depend on small-scale agriculture. Small-scale
farmers are struggling both because "the price they receive for their crops is too low
and they are less competitive than larger production units" 458 and because they
"cultivate plots that are often very small-which makes the vast majority of them
net food buyers ....
International human rights law, too, must evolve.
Although the
international human rights framework offers many important tools for addressing
the problems with land investments, further normative developments are needed to
strengthen the ability of human rights law to support land users' rights.
Specifically, international human rights law must evolve from an instrumentalist
approach toward the development of a substantive right to land for those whose
very survival depends on it. 46 0
International human rights law guarantees only limited land rights. States
cannot arbitrarily deprive people of property 461 and cannot evict settled communities
457
See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra note 146, 38; supra Part
III.A.2.b. The Bank recognizes that in countries characterized by "highly unequal distribution of land"
a strong case can be made for redistributing property rights. EVALUATIVE LESSONS, supra note 162, at
46; see also WORLD BANK, AGRICULTURAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION: TOWARD GREATER CONSENSUS,
Foreword (Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize, Camille Bourguignon, & Rogier van der Brink eds., 2009),
available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/AgLand Redistribution.pdf
(noting that land redistribution "holds the promise of significantly reducing poverty and increasing
broad-based agricultural growth"). Still, the Bank prefers to support "market-led approaches that seek
to match willing buyers and sellers," EVALUATIVE LESSONS, supra note 162, at 46, which may have
some of the same pitfalls as land titling for poor communities.
458 Special Rapporteuron the Right to Food (Aug. 2010), supra
note 146, T 1.
459
.
460 See Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, supra note 385,
31 (calling on the U.N.
Human Rights Council to "ensure the recognition in international human rights law of land as a human
rights").
461 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right to own property and
prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
201. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also protects "the right
to own property alone as well as in association with others" in order to combat discrimination.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) art.
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that rely on a piece of land but lack legal title to it, without first meeting certain
462
conditions.
The right to property, however, protects the rights of existing
property owners. It does not protect the majority of those who are affected by land
deals: those who are landless and those whose relationship to land is difficult to
formalize in legal terms.463 And even the general bar against eviction can easily be
circumvented. States have broad discretion to expropriate land in the public
interest, as explored in Part III.B.464
In sum, international human rights law does not provide sufficient
normative support to individuals and communities affected by land deals suggesting
that greater normative development is needed. Moreover, if access to land
continues to be given primarily instrumental consideration-as an asset that serves
as a gateway to the realization of other rights-then states can continue to
undermine land access by claiming that there are other means to satisfy these
corollary rights.465
Land as a substantive human right has been most developed with regard to
the rights of indigenous peoples, for whom land is an important part of their
spiritual and cultural identities.466 In this view, the value of land arises out of the
relationship between a group of people and the land that they use, care for, or
occupy rather than out of the relationship between land and the market. Extension
of the indigenous rights framework, at least as it relates to land and resource use, to
all other communities is not necessarily feasible or desirable. Indigenous peoples
have particular histories, cultures, and self-limited identities that are not necessarily
5(d)(v), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm.
Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women protects
"the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property."
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 16 (1), Sept. 3,
1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513, 19 .L.M. 33 (1980).
462 Large-scaleLand Acquisitions and Leases, supra note 70, at 9. See also supra note 385.
463 See Borras & Franco, supra note 76, at 25 (explaining how land reforms should be
implemented to benefit the landless and rural poor); Jennifer Franco, Making Land Rights Accessible:
Potentialsand Challenges of a Human Rights Approach to Land Issues, TRANSNAT'L INST., Apr. 2006,
at 4, availableat www.tni.org/archives/docs/200702051733154350.pdf (quoting an argument by Sofia
Monsalve distinguishing a property rights approach from the "right to property," which she frames as
"the right to have land for those who have not got land, who do not have enough land or whose
ownership of land is not recognized") (citation omitted).
464 See supra notes 385-87 and accompanying text.
465 See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1384-85 (1984) (arguing that
rights suffer from political disutility, in the sense that "[i]f a right to [achieve] Y is only pragmatically
useful as a means to X, Y will be abandoned as soon as some other means to X appears more
promising").
466 See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 14,
June 27, 1989, ILO Doc. C169, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169
(requiring States Parties to guarantee to indigenous peoples the right to own and protect the lands they
have traditionally occupied). For additional land and resource-related rights, see also id. arts. 1, 13, 15,
16; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 26(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html (stating
that "indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired"). For additional land and resource-related
rights, including the requirement to secure the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples,
especially where relocation is concerned, see also Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
supra, arts. 10, 26(2), 26(3), 28, 29, and 32. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was
adopted by the General Assembly but is not legally binding. See Elisabeth Wickeri & Anal Kalhan,
Land Rights Issues in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 4 MALAY. J. HUM. RTs. 16, 18-19 (2010)
(offering an overview of indigenous peoples' land and resource-related rights under international law).
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analogous to all communities and individuals affected by land investments.467
However, the indigenous rights framework does provide some inspiration and a
fruitful start for building substantive guarantees for rural communities for whom
access to land is essential to their very survival.468
Additional normative work on a right to land can draw from the indigenous
rights framework but requires separate development as well, by academics and
human rights mechanisms alike. Even if normative issues were resolved,
implementing a substantive right to land would remain highly contested. 469 Still,
additional normative clarity could provide a stronger foundation to support calls for
land redistribution. It could also fortify the struggles of social movements and set a
benchmark for states and IFIs as they pursue essential agrarian reforms.
Collectively, these developments would help empower rural communities and the
social movements that support them. These developments would also help
establish a more sustainable framework that addresses our land-related needs today
and safeguards them into the future.
CONCLUSION

In the past five years, hundreds of millions of acres of agricultural land
have been targeted for purchase or lease. Land transfers are taking place in
environments characterized by acute poverty, food insecurity, and a lack of
oversight and regulation. The negative impacts on host communities are now well
documented. Food, financial, and energy crises are growing and the resulting
commercial pressures on agricultural land are not likely to diminish any time soon.
In the face of this likely future, strategies to protect host communities' rights and
support sustainable uses of land are desperately needed. Two dominant frameworks
have emerged to take on this weighty task: a rights-based approach, led by the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, and a market-plus approach, led by the
World Bank Group. This Article critically examined both approaches.
I argued that the market-plus approach and the rights-based approach are
conceptually distinguished in two key respects: their approach to rights and risks,
and their approach to land distribution. The market-plus approach reframes rights
violations as risks and balances these risks against the benefits of agricultural
investment-benefits that are touted with unwarranted enthusiasm. I argued that
this balancing act undermines the status and vindication of rights. It also facilitates
rights violations as it validates large-scale land transfers even in situations where
proper regulatory frameworks are not in place to protect host community rights.

467 See Lustig & Kingsbury, supra note 244, at 409
(noting that "the indigenous category,
although imprecise, is to some extent a self-limiting one-many governments are able to support new
norms on indigenous issues because they do not expect this to be costly for them").
468 For instance, the indigenous rights framework provides that the right to land need not be (and
indeed should not be) a universal right. Instead, the right should be limited to specific communities that
have a specific relationship with the land. Similarly, see text supra note 375, on the Special
Rapporteur's suggestion that the "free, prior, and informed consent" standard that normally attaches to
indigenous peoples be extended to other communities having a similarly strong relationship to land.
469 See Franco, supra note 463, at 12 (explaining, for example, that "the implementation of
redistributive land laws ... has proven to be complicated, messy and extremely difficult," a result that
has been attributed to competing legal frameworks and strong anti-reform elite resistance).
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I argued that the grounding of the rights-based approach in international
human rights law establishes a normative baseline for assessing land investments.
International human rights law sets crucial standards that repudiate rights violations
while addressing key concerns around the distribution of benefits and resources.
When assessed against states' human rights obligations, the nebulous language of
risks and benefits also gives way to more concrete assessments of whether largescale land transfers violate rights or contribute to their realization.
Access to land is particularly important in the debate between the marketplus approach and the rights-based approach. Land is instrumentalized under both
approaches, but there are key differences in each framework's approach to land
distribution. The market-plus approach takes current distributions of land as the
baseline and relies on the market to distribute land to the most efficient producer.
In contrast, the rights-based approach, which values land as a means to promote a
broad range of rights, places great value on how land is distributed and to whom.
I argued that the market-plus approach overlooks the potential of land
markets to reinforce existing power structures and deprive land users of a vital
rights-protecting resource. Commodification of land can also reinforce existing
hierarchies and further concentrate rural land in a manner that exacerbates tenure
insecurity and undermines food productivity goals. Unlike the market-plus
approach, the rights-based approach seeks to address the distributional impacts of
the land market. Specifically, the rights-based approach prioritizes alternatives to
large-scale land transfers, calls for measures to improve tenure security, and, in
cases of highly unequal land distribution, this approach promotes a state-led process
of land redistribution for the benefit of small-scale farmers. These policies have
been shown to have substantial benefits. With proper support, small-scale farming
could strengthen food security, while more equitable land distribution could
contribute to economic growth.
I also raised and rebutted salient critiques of a "rights-as-trumps" approach.
Specifically, I considered whether a human rights framework could accommodate
necessary trade-offs and manage increasingly complex and interdependent global
processes in which the rights of multiple communities are at stake. I argued that
international human rights law provides a robust normative framework that sets
specific thresholds to help guide states as they manage trade-offs between various
socioeconomic goals. These thresholds are notably absent from the market-plus
approach, which endorses trade-offs between concrete rights and vague, uncertain
gains.
The rights-based approach also attempts to address conflicts that may arise
among rights-holders. Although these conflicts raise questions that are difficult to
fully resolve, I conclude that the strength of the rights-based approach is that it
provides a normative framework that prioritizes the needs of the most vulnerable
communities affected by land investments. The market-plus approach falls short in
this regard: Its framework does not give the rights of these communities normative
value; instead it emphasizes average utility gains.
This Article also considered the potential of each approach to effectively
regulate land deals and protect land users' rights in light of the significant power
dynamics at play in land transactions. I found that both frameworks emphasize
procedural safeguards to protect land users' rights. I argued that the procedural
safeguards offered by the market-plus approach, such as consultations and
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contracts, fail to empower those routinely left out of the development debate.
Indeed, the more the market-plus approach views the human rights impacts of land
deals as a technical problem to be addressed through procedural safeguards, the
more it struggles to address the actual power dynamics that underlie these abuses.
The rights-based approach similarly struggles at the point of implementation. Like
the market-plus approach, the rights-based approach offers a range of procedural
safeguards that may fail to protect land users' rights when power dynamics are
entrenched.
I argued that an essential problem with both the market-plus approach and
the rights-based approach is that their proposed legal, and in particular procedural,
reforms rely on the host state's will to implement these reforms. But as the
experience of large-scale land transfers makes clear, such deference and faith in
states to design and implement processes and policies that are truly responsive to
land users' needs is not warranted. Also unwarranted is the faith that these
procedures will be followed where such procedures are meant to benefit
marginalized groups. I conclude that one cannot rely solely on the political will of
the host state or on legal reforms. Although legal guarantees and transparent
processes are critical for ensuring rights, political and social mobilization is
required to close the gap between law and action and between procedural
safeguards and substantive outcomes.
Resistance strategies and bottom-up initiatives are developing to contest
the global rush for agricultural land. Social movements are gaining ground, but
protesting communities frequently struggle for greater agency over local resources
and for more lasting input into decision-making around agricultural policies;
policies that are increasingly being shaped by a multitude of global actors. The
Article therefore concluded with consideration of essential institutional reforms to
support bottom-up initiatives and help empower affected communities and secure
rights guarantees. I argued that instead of relying on ineffective procedural
safeguards, large-scale land transfers must be subject to far greater substantive
restrictions and regulation. I proposed a number of measures to restrict these
transfers in both scale and duration and, sometimes, outright. In addition, I argued
that investor home states and international financial institutions must engage in a
more regulatory role; one cannot rely on investors to police themselves.
International actors must also address the factors that are driving these deals, and
must reform underlying investment frameworks to better incorporate human rights
concems.
More fundamentally, I argued that in order to truly empower affected
communities, the World Bank Group must reform its approach to land by
supporting agrarian policies that favor small-scale farmers, including redistributive
reforms that facilitate more equitable access to land (i.e., the reforms promoted by
the rights-based approach). I argued that these reforms can help ensure local
communities' rights while also supporting broader economic growth and food
security goals. International human rights law, too, must normatively evolve to
develop a substantive right to land for those communities who depend on it for their
very survival. I argued that collectively, these developments could help establish a
more sustainable framework that addresses our land-related needs today and
safeguards them into the future.
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The changes called for in this Article necessarily require the willing
participation of a wide range of actors. Social movements and civil society groups
across states have a particular role to play in urging domestic and global actors to
undertake key reforms. Even if these actors are unmoved by a sense of legal
obligation, they should be compelled to undertake these reforms as a matter of selfpreservation. As the case of large-scale land transfers makes clear, in today's
globalized world, one country's agricultural policy has the potential to affect
individuals around the world. In the short term, these land deals have already had a
discernible negative impact on the human rights of host communities. In the long
term, how we invest in agricultural land will have enormous implications for
transnational food and climate crises and for the capacity of agricultural land to
serve increasingly global needs. In the end, we need to free ourselves of paradigms
that preclude us from resolving the problems we face as a global community. We
must change how we think about land investments, and insist on strategies that
ensure sustainable and rights-protecting outcomes as we move forward.

